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THE Convention made between the British Government and the Government of the Khedive on January 19, 1899, lays down that the administration of the Sudan is to be vested in a Governor-General, who is appointed by Khedivial decree on British recommendation, and who cannot be removed save by Khedivial edict issued with British consent. Moreover, to render the Sudan absolutely free from Egyptian interference, no Egyptian law, ordinance or ministerial *arrête* applies in the Sudan unless by the Governor-General's proclamation.

Turkish or Egyptian Governors-General held power

in the Sudan from the year 1825, but for the most part the holders of that office ruled for a very brief period. The first British Governor-General of the Sudan was General Gordon, who acted for barely fifteen months, and died at his post; after an interval of thirteen years, during which period the country was ruled by the Mahdists, there came a second British Governor-General, Lord Kitchener, who was also Sirdar of the Egyptian Army. It is interesting to recall Gordon's remarks in his 'Journals' (Nov. 1884) in connexion with the appointment of Lord Kitchener as Governor-General. Writing fifteen years before the event, Gordon said:— 'If Kitchener would take the place, he would be the best man to put in as Governor-General.' Since Lord Kitchener became British Agent in Egypt, he has followed the policy of his predecessor in office, Lord Cromer, in leaving the Governor-General of the Sudan very largely to his own discretion, a discretion which has never yet failed to prove sound and statesmanlike. While possessing the power of supervision, the British Agent at Cairo has wisely refrained from exercising it, except in the form of suggestions, the aim of both Lord Kitchener and Sir F. Reginald Wingate having been from the commencement to decentralise as far as possible, and to leave to the responsible men upon the spot the control and the details of administration.

The Central Administration consists of the Governor-General, his Council and the Provincial Governors. The two former for all official purposes reside in Khartoum, and have the control of the entire Sudan under their supervision. The pay of no official exceeds 1500*l.* per annum, this being the salary of the Governor-General, who, however, as Sirdar of the Egyptian Army, receives a substantial addition to this sum. The total expenses of the offices of the Governor-General and his Council are well under 10,000*l.* per annum. The Governor-General is assisted by the Inspector-General, the Civil Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the Director of Intelligence, the Legal Secretary, the Medical Director-General, the Directors of Railways and Steamers, the Director of Agriculture, the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, the Director of Public Works, the Director of Customs and the Director of Education. There are sub-departments

dealing with such matters as Game Preservation, Agricultural Schools and Experimental Stations, Geological Survey, Research Laboratories, Veterinary Science, and the Sleeping Sickness Commission.

The division of the Sudan into provinces was carried out by the Khedive Ismail in 1871. This reform placed at the head of each province a responsible and practically independent official, instead of a mere agent subordinate to a Governor-General at Khartoum, to reach which place from the majority of the seats of local government occupied many days, and sometimes weeks. For administrative purposes the Sudan is divided into fourteen provinces, namely, Dongola, Berber, Khartoum, Kassala, Sennar, Kordofan, the Bahr-el-Gazal, and the Upper Nile in the first class; and Halfa, the Red Sea, the Blue Nile, Mongalla, the White Nile and the Nuba Mountains in the second. Although Darfur is within the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, it is governed by its own independent Sultan, who maintains friendly relations with the Government at Khartoum.

Not only are the duties of the Governor-General continuous but the responsibilities are enormous, and, at the time when the new Government took over the country, may well have seemed overwhelming. After fifteen years of effort the problems to be solved have become less and less formidable; and, while the burden of responsibility remains heavy, the decentralisation of much of the government formerly conducted in the capital has considerably relieved the situation. Moreover, the Governor-General has for some years past delegated a large portion of the detail work in the earlier stages of consideration to various permanent boards, the members of which advise the chief about all matters coming within the scope of their investigations. These Boards are as follows: the Central Economic Board, which has been in existence since 1906, with its President and Secretary, and whose functions are purely consultative; the Civil Service Selection Committee, sitting in Cairo or in London, and consisting of the officials of the Egyptian and Sudan Governments who have in previous years formed part of the Annual Selection Committee in London; the Council of Secretaries, who deal with matters arising

under the Pension Ordinance; the Harbours and Lights Board, which is responsible for the management and regulation of the ports named in the Ordinance, and of lighthouses, beacons, buoys, etc., etc.; the Khartoum Town Improvements and Allotments Board, which has the control of building-sites on Government land—and practically all land in Khartoum is Government property—the laying-out of new roads, and all questions affecting town improvements; the Khartoum Museum Board; the Labour Bureau; the Permanent Promotion Board; the River Board; the Central Sanitary Board; the Sleeping Sickness Commission, etc. No additional payment is received by officials for their services on the different Boards, the only extra remuneration allowed being in connexion with the Sleeping Sickness investigations.

A decided change has come about in both the character and the scope of the administration of the Sudan within the past few years. Ten years ago the country had barely emerged from a state of barbarism; good government was the primary requisite; the introduction of western ideas of civilisation lay far ahead. Among the first duties of the Government was the abolition of slavery, and to this the closest attention was devoted, without, however, occasioning rebellion or even disorder among a people accustomed from time immemorial to carry on this terrible trade under the open encouragement and assistance of the Egyptian Government. The danger, always imminent, of religious fanaticism breaking out afresh had to be watched with unflagging care; while the extreme physical difficulties of governing a country twice the size of France and Germany combined, and mainly consisting of swamp, desert and primeval forest, hampered all the efforts of the Executive.

To-day things are different. Each province is really a small *imperium in imperio*, ruled by a Governor and his staff of British Inspectors and Egyptian under-officials. The difficulties of distance have been overcome by the establishment of excellent and complete telegraphic and telephonic communications, and the building of fifteen hundred miles of railway. Public order is secured by efficiently-disposed garrisons composed of reliable native troops. Above all, there has been a feeling of confidence established between the Government

and the governed, the moral effect of which upon the well-being of the people is enormous. As was pointed out by an observant writer, when Lord Kitchener's 'Report on the Finances, Administration and Condition of Egypt and the Sudan in 1913' was issued last May, these matter-of-fact documents, taking absolutely for granted all the marvels which British rule has wrought in Egypt and the Sudan, and rising to a note of enthusiasm only when they anticipate further reforms in the near future, might well stand as an epitome—complete because of its very unconsciousness—of the British genius for ruling subject peoples.

This salutary and satisfactory change in the situation has enabled the Government to devote more and more attention to those questions which had temporarily to be laid aside—questions of providing wider education, of improved methods of local native administration, of a more equitable system of taxation, of a closer inspection of sanitary matters, and generally of looking into, and, where found desirable, of improving the native mode of living. In a word, the early physical difficulties having been almost if not entirely overcome, the ground has been prepared for the introduction by the Government of those administrative, judicial and financial measures suitable to the requirements of the primitive peoples whose interests have been committed to their care.

From the time when the Sudan Government was first established as a separate and responsible entity, the greatest care has been exercised to keep the *personnel* of the administration absolutely free from reproach in connexion with official incapacity, favouritism or oppression. Service under the Sudan Government has become so popular, and is regarded with so much favour by the rising generation, that the supply of officials, both military and civil, is always far in advance of the demand. The conditions of service are, however, very strict, and in some cases may even be regarded as severe, especially in regard to Oriental linguistic proficiency. In this particular it is not rare to find candidates, otherwise suitable, failing to satisfy the requirements of the Departments. Candidates are drawn from the highest educational centres of England, Scotland and Ireland, that is to

say, from the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London, from Trinity College, Dublin, *inter alia*, and from the University of Edinburgh. While recommendations from individuals personally knowing the candidates are welcomed, no attention is paid to introductions emanating from persons, however highly placed socially or politically, who cannot claim to know the candidate personally. This provision, among several others equally important for maintaining the purity and efficiency of the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, has been and is rigorously enforced. The selection of officials in all Government Departments, military and civil, is based solely upon the general capability of the candidate, as well as upon his intellectual and physical attainments; his character and moral qualifications likewise bear an important part in the decision arrived at. On the other hand, information is neither sought nor admitted regarding religious views or political tendencies, the Government disclaiming any concern in such questions.

Naturally, among the large number of applicants for appointments who are continually being interviewed, many must fail; a careful and conscientious consideration of all requests for admission results in the elimination of many applicants who are deemed to be ineligible. This is the work of a Special Committee; and, when its decisions have been arrived at, there still remain at least four times as many candidates as there are billets to fill. Even when an applicant may be considered in all other respects fit and suitable, a Medical Board, which sits in London, may find him ineligible; he cannot, indeed, be completely assured of his success until he has further passed a stiff examination in Arabic.

The candidate next passes before a 'final' Selection Board, which meets annually in London in the month of August. When he has been definitely accepted, the candidate is offered a choice of appointment in Egypt or the Sudan, and according to his preference he is placed upon the Egyptian or the Sudan list. It occurs but rarely that the former is selected; but once the decision either way is recorded it cannot be altered; should the candidate hesitate in expressing his choice, the Government concludes that he is willing to serve under either administration. Transfers of junior officials

from one Government to the other have, however, been occasionally permitted.

The successful applicant must now spend a further probationary year either at Oxford or Cambridge at his own expense, in order to study Arabic; and during this time he must also attend courses of instruction in first aid, elementary surveying, account-keeping, and such other subjects as the Selection Board may—in accord with the University authorities—consider necessary. Furthermore, the future official must know how to ride; if he does not, he is recommended to learn at once. The probationary year at an end, the candidate has to undergo the ordeal of an examination in Arabic; and the results of this test determine his seniority. Still another medical examination must be passed, and then the Selection Board once more sits in judgment, deciding finally whether the applicant shall be accepted or rejected. So high is the *esprit de corps* among the younger ranks of the officials, that it is not deemed by them sufficient to 'scrape through' their first examination; the majority endeavour to pass with honours; and even the handsome cash bonus of 100*l.*, which is presented to the successful competitor in the Advanced Arabic Examination, is of less moment than the distinction which his achievement brings to his Department, and which, incidentally, bears upon his own future promotion. The gaining of this high distinction is rare, there having been but four successful competitors up till now, among whom is the present governor of the Blue Nile Province, Mr G. E. Iles. Several young officers personally known to me have cheerfully devoted their entire furlough at home to improving their knowledge of Arabic either at language schools or by attending college lectures and studying law. With this lofty sentiment predominant among the juniors, it is not difficult to understand or to appreciate the pride with which the heads of the Sudan Government Departments point to the class of official now serving the country.

No first appointment is made for a longer period than two years, which are considered as probationary. If, during this time, the 'candidate'—he is still so regarded in the official eye—is found unsuitable, owing to ill-health or to any other cause, his services may be dispensed with

on two months' notice; and in this case he is given a free passage to England, should he wish to go home, and a gratuity of fifteen days' pay. The number of such eliminations, however, is very small, for the preliminary investigations are usually so exhaustive that few unsuitables manage to slip through.

From a remunerative point of view, as regards both salary and pension, an appointment under the Sudan Government may be regarded as distinctly attractive. Upon passing the first examination, the salary paid is E420*l*.^{*} per annum; and thereafter an appreciably advancing scale of pay as well as promotion are enjoyed. The young official enters upon his service as a Deputy Inspector, which means that he acts as a magistrate to deal with civil and criminal cases; and he may rise from the Deputy to Junior and from Junior to Senior Inspector in a relatively short period, depending upon his ability, assiduity and opportunities, with an increasing salary according to his class. Thus a Deputy Inspector who starts at E420*l*. may soon be earning E480*l*. and E540*l*.; a Junior Inspector from E600*l*. may soon be receiving E660*l*. or E720*l*.; while a Senior Inspector, who begins with E780*l*., can rise to E840*l*. and E900*l*., according to the class—first, second, or third—to which he attains.

All officials are eligible for increase of pay in the same class every two years; and a Deputy Inspector, after serving for four years, stands every chance of being promoted to a Junior Inspectorship, and after a further two years to a Senior Inspectorship. In order to qualify him for an increase of pay or promotion, a Deputy Inspector must, within two years of the date of his appointment, pass an examination in law and a further examination in Arabic. Mere length of service establishes no claim either to an increase of pay or to promotion; everything depends upon the individual officer's abilities, his zeal and the manner in which he carries out his duties, coupled, of course, with the actual vacancies occurring. No better test could well be applied, nor any more convincing proof afforded of the selection of the fittest, throughout the Sudan Government service.

^{*} One pound Egyptian is equivalent to £1 0*s*. 6*d*. English.

When an official has passed some of the best years of his life to work in the Sudan, either as a soldier or a civilian, he may retire with a certainty that his old age will be comfortable, so far as a liberal pension can help towards making it so. Pensions granted to Sudan officials upon retirement, voluntary or compulsory, are regulated by Ordinance. In order to render such pension as full as possible, a deduction of 5 per cent. is made from the pay of all pensionable officials as a contribution towards his pension. It is permissible to retire voluntarily, but there are few instances of this occurring. Those, however, who choose to leave the service may retire upon a pension after reaching the age of forty-five, provided they have done twenty years' service. Their pensions are then calculated on the average of the salaries drawn during the last three years of service, at the rate of $\frac{1}{48}$ th part of the salary for each year of service. No pension, however, can exceed 800*l.* per annum.

The Sudan Government, wherever possible, and in conformity with the requirements of the country, permits and, indeed, encourages officials to go on leave. By the regulations in force officers are granted leave (after the first year) at the rate of 90 days per annum, counting from the date of their departure from and return to Cairo. There exists a special provision for longer periods when ill-health is the cause. Moreover, owing to the very severe climatic conditions prevailing in the remoter parts of the Sudan, the Governor-General obtained a concession from the War Office to count service below Lat. 12° and in various unhealthy districts as double service—a provision which also exists in certain parts of West Africa and Nigeria.

Upon one point the Government is compelled to remain firm, that is, the engagement of single in preference to married men; the reason being the extreme unsuitability of the country as a whole as a place of residence for white women. If Khartoum, Atbara, Port Sudan, El Obeid, and possibly Wadi Medani be excepted, there are no places in the Sudan as yet where English ladies can live in comfort. Thus all candidates for appointments are made clearly to understand that they must neither be married nor yet engaged to be married, and they are warned that the Government will probably

dispense with the services of any official who becomes a 'benedict' during his period of probation. There exists a considerable proportion of married men among the superior officials; but in few cases—and these are confined to the towns above mentioned—are their wives to be found living in the Sudan.

The position of the unpensioned official in the Sudan is decidedly less enviable. The apparently high salaries which are offered lose much of their allurements when the cost of living in Khartoum and the Provinces has to be met; to save is extremely difficult, while the few economies which are effected by maintaining a modest expenditure upon existence and exercising an extreme moderation in regard to amusements, are swallowed up by the indispensable 'leave' and the expenses of home-journeys. Probably the same class of men would have done better for themselves in any of the British Colonies or in India. Moreover, the social advantages which are offered to civilians holding subordinate positions in the Government Offices are not great. The line of demarcation between the superior and the subordinate ranks is rigidly drawn. Nevertheless, large as is the class of such workers, but few complaints are heard.

Naturally the ambition of all officials is to become Governors of Provinces; and many of them, who commenced as Deputy Inspectors, have already done so. These enviable posts are not confined to military men, as was the case when the Sudan was first undergoing settlement, and when the sword necessarily played an important part in the administration of the country. To-day there exists a marked tendency in the policy of the Government to utilise the services of civilian governors where this may be done with safety. Thus civilian inspectors, when of sufficient seniority, are being more generally appointed to Governorships of Provinces at salaries ranging from £900*l.* to £1200*l.* per annum. Hitherto most of the Governorships and some of the appointments of Senior Inspector and Inspector have been filled by British officers selected from the Egyptian Army; and a proportion of these appointments will continue to be filled from the same source.

The position of a Provincial Governor is a very responsible one, for, subject only to the Governor-General

whose representative he is, he is supreme in his district, possessing the widest powers. Only tried and experienced men have hitherto been appointed, and it may be added, with fairness, that so far no failures have been recorded. It is the Governors who supervise and control the finances of their respective provinces, subject to the financial regulations of the Central Government; they are in direct charge of all public animals, arms, equipment and stores, any and all of which they must be prepared to deliver over in first-class condition at short notice for military purposes; they are responsible for the due observance of all ordinances, orders and regulations by their subordinates; they both administer justice and see it executed, while all official correspondence must pass through their hands. Heavy work is entailed upon them, notwithstanding the valuable assistance which they receive from their staffs, especially at times of assessment and collection of local taxes; while the hearing of numerous appeals, both reasonable and unreasonable, for relief, and the visiting of their outlying districts, which sometimes entails a week or even two weeks of day and night travelling through the desert, together with a multitude of minor duties, leave these hardworked officials, as a rule, but few hours of leisure.

The Senior Inspector ranks next in importance to the Provincial Governor; and it is usually from this class that governors are selected. In many cases the Seniors serve as Acting Governors whenever the supreme authority is absent, and thus they receive a practical training in their more responsible duties before being definitely called upon to assume them. In his own department the Senior Inspector is expected to be constantly at headquarters and to ensure uniformity of administrative methods during the absence of the Governor and to act as his right hand when he is present. He ranks as a first-class magistrate and administers both civil and criminal justice. Very often he is placed in complete control of an entire district, such district being, perhaps, as large as England and Wales combined; then he is a 'governor' in all but name.

The Junior and Deputy, or, as they are now officially termed, 'second' and 'third,' Inspectors are detailed for duty and residence in the various districts into which the

Province is divided, and they are answerable to the Governor for the due discharge of such duties. Under them are the Mamurs, the lowest rank of magistrate; and the Inspectors must supervise their subordinates' duties. They are likewise in charge of the police force in their district. The Mamur, who is generally an Egyptian but occasionally a Sudanese officer and a man of first-class ability and quality, acts as magistrate in small cases, while held responsible generally for the carrying out of all orders and regulations emanating from the Second or Third Inspector's Offices, and for the efficiency and discipline of the police force. In most districts there is a Sub-Mamur engaged, and sometimes more than one; this official assists the Mamur and is subject to his instructions. The Mamur and Sub-Mamurs, moreover, must execute, in their capacity of magistrate, all decrees and judgments issued by the Kadi from the Mohammedan Law Courts under the Civil Justice Ordinance.

In all Provinces, as well as in most districts, there is a separate Mohammedan Court, presided over by a Kadi, who deals with religious matters only. These are usually of a sufficiently numerous and complex nature to keep the judge fully occupied for the greater part of the day. Appeals from his decisions may be, but very seldom are, made to the Court of the Grand Kadi at Khartoum. This Court is judicially independent of the Executive; but, from an administrative point of view, even the Kadis and minor officials of the Mohammedan courts are subordinate to the Legal Secretary of the Sudan Government. The two staffs, however, work together quite harmoniously, and differences of opinion or of policy but seldom arise. Obviously it is the administrative staff which is called upon to execute the decrees and judgments of the religious courts; and this procedure is carried out with commendable tact and discrimination through the Mamurs, who mostly, but not invariably, are Mohammedans. From the very commencement, earnest efforts have been made, and made successfully, to perform the solemn promise given by Lord Cromer to the people of the Sudan, pledging the non-interference of the Government in any shape with religious affairs.

Hostile, and it must be added, unthinking critics

declare that the Moslems of to-day are really little more advanced temperamentally than the Moslems of 1300 years ago. They point, as an evidence of their contention, to the enslaved condition of their women in Egypt and the Sudan. Even if we admit that the doctrine which imposes the veil on Moslem women is out of date—it is, indeed, declared by many Mohammedans themselves to be against the tenets and principles of Islam—there can be no question that institutions like the Gordon Memorial College have helped, and are helping day by day, to assist Moslems along the paths of development and progress. It is undeniable that the present generation of Moslems is superior both intellectually and morally to those of bygone years; and the Egyptian officials, under the tutelage of the British, are proving themselves capable of doing good work in the administration. What the Moslem official has hitherto lacked has been a sufficiently strong and firm hand to control him; he is quite capable of performing good and useful work, but not intuitively. It must be firmly exacted of him, and encouraged by continual example and occasional admonition. Left wholly to himself, there is very little doubt that the average Moslem bureaucrat in the Sudan would speedily fall back into slack ways and attempt to revive many of those discreditable and dishonourable practices which caused the administration of the Turk to stink in the nostrils of the Sudanese only a generation ago. These practices were the primary cause of the long years of misery and oppression which the unhappy people of that country endured. The fifteen years of Mahdi *régime* which followed were hardly more terrible than their experiences under Egyptian rulers.

One great difficulty with which the Administration of the Sudan has had to contend has been, and is, the widely-practised eastern custom of making gifts, sometimes of great value, to the heads of departments or to minor officials. It is repugnant to the mind of the British ruler to accept presents—which may not inaptly be described as bribes—from those who are subject to their dominion; but in the Sudan the custom is so general that to have swept it out of existence without permitting of some exceptions would have meant deeply offending the native mind and severely wounding the

best-intentioned donors. Certain stringent rules have, however, been laid down to guide officials, and these are generally observed; and the discretion which is allowed to Provincial Governors is, on the whole, wisely exercised. The Governor-General himself is frequently obliged to break away from the principle of the rule imposed, since in his official position he must consent to the exchange of gifts between himself and native chiefs in their ceremonial intercourse; on the other hand, his presents are very frequently of greater intrinsic value than those which he receives. In those cases where presents (unless of trifling worth) are taken by Provincial Governors or their subordinates, they have to be delivered up to the Central Government; from this practice no deviation is permitted without the express sanction of the Governor-General. The Egyptian rulers of old were not only in the habit of freely accepting 'presents' but of cruelly exacting them; under the new *régime* these officials—now happily almost eliminated from the Administration—found one of their chief sources of enrichment snatched from them. But the ordinance is a thoroughly wholesome one, and being, as indicated, strongly adhered to, it has had an undoubtedly beneficial moral effect upon the minds of the native population. The punishment which may be inflicted upon any public servant for violating this injunction extends to a heavy fine or to three years' imprisonment, or to both. The number of convictions upon record of such offences is infinitesimal.

Much still remains to be done to reform village life in some parts of the Sudan, more especially in regard to a closer supervision of the men who held the offices of Omda and Sheikh. The natives still pay an almost superstitious reverence to their responsible chiefs; and no doubt it would be a highly dangerous expedient upon the part of the Central Government to adopt a policy which would be calculated to lessen this sentiment—of immemorial existence—since it is one which not alone holds villages and communities together but relieves the Government itself of an immense amount of minor work and a great deal of personal responsibility.

The class of men from among whom Omdas and Sheikhs are selected is, on the whole, a respectable one

and worthy of confidence. That petty tyrannies are practised by some among them occasionally may be granted, but these when examined seem but little worse, and hardly less supportable, than the oppressions noticeable in most small communities of the world, those of the most advanced European character included. There can be no doubt that the Omdas occasionally oppress the people and frequently cheat the Government in many ways; and usually they succeed in escaping detection. Even when exposed, the punishment meted out to them is generally quite inadequate; indeed the risks of practising dishonesty and tyranny are so small and the penalty so trifling that it is a matter for surprise that so many honest Omdas are to be found. In some villages the Omdas maintain a number of professional prostitutes, deriving a not inconsiderable revenue from their earnings and protecting them from any attempt which may be made to punish them for robbery or other crimes committed. Evidence came before me which showed that the greater part of the men and boys in one small village were hopelessly syphilitic, as a result of an establishment of this kind, which was openly maintained by the Omda and his elder son. These same individuals—who were also owners of the largest *merissa** distillery—continually cheated and fleeced the poverty-stricken inhabitants by weighing out their *dura* in false measures, and by compelling them to sell at anything between 20 and 40 per cent. below the market value, and this at a time when grain was commanding a substantial premium on account of its scarcity. Other kinds of petty, and sometimes serious, robbery are perpetrated by district Omdas and their subordinates, the village Sheikhs; and such things will probably continue until a closer observation can be maintained regarding their operations, and until the people themselves strengthen the hands of the Government by making complaints. This they are permitted and encouraged to do, but, from long submission to traditional tyranny, they dare not appear as witnesses against the oppressors.

It is characteristic of the British official, wherever his duties may take him, to make the best of the situation.

* *Merissa*—a native intoxicating beer.

The Sudan official speedily settles down in his strange surroundings, establishes himself quietly in his simple straw-hut or his mud-brick residence, decorating the ugly walls with such of his *lares et penates* as he may have been enabled to collect around him during his exile, and forthwith sets about forming a tennis, squash rackets or fives' court. To 'keep fit' is his main concern. He cannot afford to become flabby or 'run down'; to avoid qualifying for the sick-list any sacrifice will be made, and almost any inconveniences endured. Not only does indisposition interfere with views of promotion and customary leave, but it is considered to be unjust to 'the other fellow,' the colleague and chum, upon whose already sufficiently burdened shoulders must fall the performance of neglected or postponed duties. The spirit of loyalty and good-fellowship among the officials is very pronounced. In concluding his report for 1906, Lord Cromer wrote:

'In order really to appreciate the zeal and intelligence which the various officials in the Sudan are bringing to bear upon their work, it would be necessary not merely to read their reports but to visit the remote and inhospitable localities in which their work is conducted. Their country has every reason to be proud of them, and I hope and believe that, with the exception possibly of a few individuals, it is proud of them.'

To the uninitiated the frequent changes which occur among the *personnel* of the local administration may appear unusual, and even undesirable. It is supposed that, when an official has once become accustomed to a district and has made himself known to the greater part of the people, his influence must be considerable and should not be lightly interfered with. Nevertheless few changes are effected without due consideration or ample cause being afforded; for obvious reasons, however, no explanations are offered or deemed necessary. In one case, where an Egyptian Mamur had proved himself to be a thoroughly competent officer, and had admittedly carried out his difficult duties intelligently and, so far as could be judged, fairly, his removal to another and far-distant district, in which he had had no previous experience, occasioned some adverse comment, the official

even posing as a martyr to administrative injustice. The chief reason, as I subsequently discovered, was the large amount of personal interest which the Mamur, contrary to regulations, had gradually and secretly acquired in neighbouring properties and local enterprises, rendering his independence as a junior magistrate and administrator open to question. The aim of the Central Government is to remove all possibility of corruption or temptation from the *personnel*; and the strictest discipline as well as the closest supervision are necessary. Were even the most trivial case to be overlooked, the disease would spread like a canker. The old Egyptian rulers had been accustomed for almost a century, and until the advent of the British into the Sudan, to fatten upon the possessions of the unfortunate inhabitants whom they ruled; among them the spirit of oppression and corruption still exists; indeed, it can never be altogether repressed, although, under a strong and alert government, it can be controlled. Were this control to be in the slightest degree relaxed, the people of the Sudan would once again fall victims to the greed and injustice of their Egyptian rulers.

The mental strain entailed upon Government officials in remote districts is occasionally very severe. Sometimes a hundred miles or more will separate their headquarters from the nearest white man's habitation, and months may elapse before a friend's face is seen. The nearest telegraph office is possibly many miles distant, and the mails are but rarely received. A single officer placed in charge of a district covering perhaps some 6000 square miles may have no more than twenty or thirty native troops to assist him in maintaining order among a population of, perhaps, 15,000 or 20,000 people, composed of several distinct tribes, some of which may be at enmity with others, and among whom petty larceny is a very common crime, demanding continual watchfulness and almost as continual punishment. Murders are less common but still not infrequent; the authority of the British official alone stands between the criminals and their victims. While the general attitude of the natives towards the Government—born of a recognition of the benefits attendant upon a sound and just administration—may be, and undoubtedly is, friendly, this sentiment cannot be expected to control to any extent the

naturally suspicious and piratical nature of the people, who have been accustomed for centuries to prey upon one another, and between whom blood feuds and tribal incursions are of traditional meritoriousness.

Occasionally a punitive expedition must, perforce, be entered upon in order to vindicate the authority of Government which has been defied; and in connexion with such an undertaking the discretion of the officer in charge is put to a severe test. Headquarters would scarcely be pleased were any armed interference to be entered upon lightly; nevertheless probably any action, if taken at all, calls for urgency. An officer may entertain doubts concerning the subsequent approval of his superior, but prompt and vigorous measures may well mean the instant repression of a tribal disturbance, which, if allowed to remain unattended to, even for a few hours, may develop into trouble of far greater significance and call for wider measures of repression. Herein comes the opportunity of the responsible official to show his powers of discrimination; and it speaks eloquently for the generally dependable character of the officials employed that so few of them have been found lacking in this essential.

If the Anglo-Egyptian administration of the Sudan has hitherto proved a success, it is chiefly due to the experience which England has gained in the management of semi-barbarous peoples, to the skill with which the machinery of Government has been devised, and to the care which has been throughout bestowed on the selection of the officials on whom so great a responsibility is thrown. A summary view of the progress of the country under British rule forms a natural sequel to the foregoing account of the system by which it is governed. Lord Rosebery has declared that 'the British Empire is the greatest secular agency for good known in the world.' To realise the justice of this statement one has but to glance at the condition of Egypt to-day, and compare its peaceful prosperity with the anarchic situation of, say, 1882-4. But the transformation which has been accomplished there in the space of thirty years has been exceeded in completeness by the Sudan within one-half of that time. This beneficial change, moreover, has come

about without *réclame*, almost without remark; the channel through which the course of events may best be traced is that of the official blue books, which few people take the trouble to read.

The secret of the success achieved in the Sudan by the administration, which is but little changed in regard to its *personnel* since the commencement of its work in 1899, may perhaps be found in the strict application of Lord Cromer's policy foreshadowed at the time when the country passed under joint British and Egyptian control. Addressing an assembly of Sudanese Sheikhs and notables at Omdurman on January 5, 1899, Lord Cromer, then British Agent in Egypt, said :

'No attempt will be made to govern your country from Cairo, still less from London. You must look to the Sirdar alone for justice and good government. I do not doubt that you will have no cause for disappointment.'

This pledge has been consistently upheld, and it would be difficult to point to a people more thoroughly content with their government than the Sudanese, who have found their rulers animated by a spirit of justice and moderation entirely different from anything of the kind experienced in former times. Whatever qualms or misgivings this largely Mohammedan people may have entertained upon passing under the control of Christian rulers, were dispelled by Lord Cromer's further assurance : 'There will be no interference whatever in your religion.' There has been none ; neither has the dreaded religious question—sensitive and fanatical though the people remain—as yet occasioned any offence to Moslem subjects nor any cause for anxiety to their Christian governors. In the Sudan, as in Egypt, Islam is not only a religion ; it is a political system ; it is also a phase—and an important phase—of social life. Bearing in mind that the changes effected in the political and social customs of a Moslem people are almost invariably achieved at the expense of loyalty to the religion of Islam, the Administration of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan has shown much wisdom by interfering as little as possible with the customs and prejudices of the Moslem world ; on the other hand, it has sought to encourage the practice of Mohammedanism among the people, thus further acting

upon the sound judgment of Lord Cromer, who has expressed the opinion that in introducing European civilisation it should never be forgotten that Islam cannot be reformed; that is to say, reformed Islam is Islam no longer; it becomes something else.

Some critics consider that the Administration of the Sudan, by following the British policy in Egypt and making the form of government so largely pro-Moslem, has acted wrongly. They cite as an example the closing of all Government offices on Friday—the Moslem sabbath—and the opening of them on Sunday—the Christian day of rest; and they contend that this concession to Islam, far from creating a favourable impression upon the native mind, has developed in Moslem ranks a spirit of pride which leads to the belief that Islam is accepted as superior to Christianity, and that the votary of Mohammed enjoys a right of precedence over the worshipper of Christ. This contention, I think, may best be answered by pointing to the fact that though the ruling class in the Sudan is mainly Christian, the Christians are in a great minority, the proportion among the employees of the Government being less than one-half per cent., while among the population in general it is not more than between 8 and 10 per cent. It is obviously impossible to allow two holidays in a week, and in view of the immensely larger proportion of Mohammedans the preference must necessarily be given to the followers of Islam. On the other hand, all Christians can, if they choose, attend the services of their church twice on Sunday, for the office hours on that day are arranged so as to permit of this with the greatest facility. Officials are on duty for a few hours only in the forenoon, being rarely called upon to do more than glance through their departmental correspondence with a view to attending to any imperatively important matters. A special governmental order has long been in force designed to smooth the path of all Christian employees carrying out their religious obligations.

Nor would it appear that complete satisfaction has been reached in connexion with the religious instruction given at the Gordon Memorial College at Khartoum, the amount of time devoted to the teaching of Christianity being deemed insufficient. But the percentage of

Christian scholars in Sudan educational establishments is so small that it has been found impracticable to have separate religious instruction for each denomination. As a matter of fact, however, non-Mohammedan pupils are afforded corresponding instruction in their own faith should their parents so desire, and provided a teacher is available; and such is the case in all primary schools.

So far as the teaching of the Mohammedan religion is concerned, it may be pointed out that such religious instruction is only imparted to those pupils who are destined to become Kadis—i.e. religious judges—and teachers in the Sudan. Other pupils merely read the Korán, and receive no special religious education. The proportion of school-hours allotted to the study of Islamism each week cannot be regarded as excessive, amounting as it does to one hour daily during the four years that the primary course of study continues, as compared with eight hours per week for Arabic and the same for English, five hours for arithmetic, and three each for geometry and map-drawing.

Since the reoccupation of the Sudan, education has advanced with remarkable continuity along the original lines of the scheme for public instruction evolved, with care and forethought, by the late Director, Mr James Currie, C.M.G., who held the post of Director of Education for fifteen years. But one need not go back more than ten years to perceive how great has been the progress made in the number of pupils receiving instruction at the various schools in the Sudan. In 1905, the total was 2605, which showed an increase of 472 over the number of the previous year. At the end of 1913 there were 5226 pupils, of whom 5000 were Moslems. Little effort has been made hitherto to educate women, while the institution of some simple educational system among the negroid races of the Southern Sudan has yet to be tried.

Next to education the greatest success achieved has been in the direction of transportation. It is not easy to exaggerate the perplexity of the problems which confronted the Administration when, in 1899, they took formal possession of nearly one million square miles of country, a country almost as large as Argentina, the exact limits of which were still subjects of dispute with other nations—France, Belgium, Italy and Abyssinia.

Since then delimitation commissions have settled all outstanding boundary questions; and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan now presents itself as a compact and mature Protectorate, more than nine-tenths of which are wisely and justly administered, the other tenth being uninhabitable for Europeans or even Egyptians.

To hope to cover such a wide expanse of country by anything approaching a complete system of railways was obviously out of the question. There existed neither the money to pay for it, nor the population to make use of it. Nevertheless much has been accomplished, for the length of railway-track now in operation exceeds 1500 miles, whereas in 1896 there existed less than 50 miles of line, and this was merely an old and useless military track. The gross railway revenue has risen from E124,416*l.* in 1903 to E516,876*l.* in 1913, while the percentage of working expenses to gross revenue has been reduced from 110·2 to 76·7 per cent.

The navigation of the Nile has progressed almost equally well; a first-class fleet of steamers, belonging exclusively to the Government, now plies upon the waters of the Nile. No private company is permitted to carry passengers or freight in competition; but the ports are open to the shipping of the whole world, and show a satisfactory increase in the tonnage recorded. The international tonnage of vessels visiting Port Sudan—the principal port in the country—rose from 312,770 in 1907 to nearly 700,000 in 1914. Since the Government established regular mail steamers—which, in the face of many physical difficulties (of which shortage of water is the worst), are maintained throughout the year—great improvement in the carrying trade has been manifested. The rank vegetation known as ‘sudd,’ which formerly acted as a continual menace to the river navigation, has now been for the most part removed, and even where found still existing in great quantities is prevented from closing the channel to steamers passing to and fro. In 1905 the ‘sudd’ was found so obstructive, and so persistently blocked navigation on the Upper Nile, that a whole fleet of steamers had to be engaged to do battle against it. To-day one hardly hears of any serious delay being occasioned through this cause; and even the less-used channels are being freed.

Of public roads the country can now boast some thousands of miles. In 1906 there were barely 1600 miles of roads open, and many of these were merely cleared tracks, unmetalled and unbridged. To-day the mileage may probably be put at 5000, while some of the roads are so well constructed that mechanical traction over them is quite possible. Bridges of steel and of wood, wells at intervals which vary according to requirements, telephone wires stretching even through the tenantless desert, and nearly 10,000 miles of over-head telegraph wires, facilitate communications throughout the country.

Trade and industry, aided and encouraged by so many improvements, have responded well; but for the misfortune of a low Nile for the past three years the latest statistics would have afforded far better results than they do. Nevertheless, they show that the total value of the external trade has risen from £2,135,004*l.* in 1907 to £3,294,962*l.* in 1913; the value of the imports has advanced during the same period from £1,604,137*l.* to £2,109,776*l.*, while the exports have more than doubled, growing from £449,329*l.* to £1,185,186*l.*

Agriculture continues to be an uncertain pursuit in the Sudan owing to its dependence upon the rainfall in some districts, especially those of the Red Sea littoral, and to the seasonable rise of the Nile in others. For three years in succession the river has failed, occasioning much distress among the cultivators. In five years' time at the latest, however, the great Ghezireh irrigation scheme,* which, at a cost of 1,300,000*l.*, is destined to bring incalculable benefits to the Sudan by providing an abundance of water, will, to a great extent, offset the disappointments and losses occasioned by an erratic Nile. A permanent source of wealth—agriculture and cotton cultivation combined—will thus be provided, with the practical certainty that no further violent fluctuation in the prosperity of the people, who are largely dependent upon cultivation of the soil, will occur. Fortunately even with the present discouraging situation, by reason of which the expansion of the cultivated area is limited by

* Since this article was written, the outbreak of war in Europe has caused all work in connexion with this and other irrigation enterprises in Egypt and the Sudan to be suspended.

climatic conditions, the returns show that the area under crops has been enlarged, the energy and enterprise of the people proving remarkably stable. The Administration has devoted much time, consideration and money to placing Sudanese agriculture upon a firm footing. The amount of crops under cultivation in 1913 reached a total of 2,255,226 feddans * against 1,847,021 feddans in 1912.

That the material well-being of the people has improved since the establishment of Anglo-Egyptian administration seems clear from the steady advance which is shown in their ability to purchase certain luxuries, to which the majority of them must have been almost complete strangers, even so recently as a decade ago. Their tastes and requirements, it would seem, can now be satisfied, even at a time when poor agricultural seasons have to be faced. Since 1908, native purchases of imported cotton fabrics advanced in value from E391,047*l.* to E503,616*l.*; of sugar, from E133,626*l.* to E258,750*l.*; of coffee, from E37,863*l.* to E67,545*l.*; of tea, from E27,721*l.* to E39,114*l.*, and of foreign spices—of which the Sudanese are inordinately fond—from E5,438*l.* to E12,623*l.*

The steady improvement in the country's finances affords further testimony to the remarkable economic expansion of the Sudan. In 1898 the entire revenue, which had been estimated to produce E8000*l.*, amounted to a little over E35,000*l.*; to-day it exceeds E1,644,000*l.* There exists no longer any necessity for the annual contribution received from Egypt; the parent country, over a period of 15 years—from 1899 to 1913—had found an annual sum ranging between E391,790*l.* (in 1904) and E516,345*l.* (in 1911) to enable the Sudan budget to be balanced. The Government has now elected to walk henceforth alone and unaided; it is even endeavouring to repay gradually to Egypt the large advances which have been made at various times towards the cost of its economic development. The capital sum of that debt, which has been already slightly reduced, stands to-day at E5,198,700*l.*

It may, perhaps, be suggested that the Administration has acted rather precipitately in abandoning the Egyptian

* One feddan = 1·038 acres.

annual contribution; this, time will show. The loss to the Sudan unquestionably comes at a moment which could scarcely have been worse chosen on account of the poor state of the country's chief source of revenue—taxation upon agricultural produce—the heavy expenditure upon grain for a partly-famishing people, and the payment falling due upon a portion of the new Sudan loan of 3,000,000*l.*, including the expenses of management and those of the sinking fund, both of which must be found by the Government out of revenue. The financial progress of the Sudan will, therefore, be watched with great interest for the next year or so; inasmuch, however, as the situation is fundamentally sound, and the permanent advantages accruing from the great Ghezireh irrigation scheme approach nearer and nearer to realisation, no reason for anxiety can be said to exist.

Lord Kitchener, speaking at Khartoum early in 1912, declared: 'The future is bright, and the good administration in the Sudan, of which I am glad to see abundant proofs, will, I feel sure, result in a steady extension of the prosperity of the people.' If, since these words were uttered, a slight set-back has occurred in the wellbeing of the people for reasons already fully explained, their present position nevertheless reflects the ultimate and even the speedy result of the painstaking, cautious and eminently honest government which the country enjoys. Much has been done, much remains to do. The 'hybrid form of government,' as Lord Cromer has called it, has worked so well that not even the most pronounced pessimist can pretend that the experiment—introduced in the face of the most determined opposition upon the part of conventional diplomatists and many international jurists—has failed to justify the policy of Lord Salisbury. Probably the very unconventionality and novelty of the essay appealed to that great Foreign Minister, who, moreover, must have known something of the sterling ability of the men to whom the future administration of the Sudan was to be entrusted—Cromer, Kitchener and Wingate, a triumvirate which will assuredly go down into history as one of the most brilliantly successful regenerating influences known.

PERCY F. MARTIN.

Art. 2.—CATULLUS AT HOME.

1. *Gai Valeri Catulli Carmina*. Edit. J. P. Postgate. London: Bell, 1889.
2. *A Commentary on Catullus*. By Robinson Ellis. Second Edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1889.
3. *Criticisms and Elucidations of Catullus*. By H. A. J. Munro. Second Edition. London: Bell, 1905.
4. *Catullus*; Latin text with English prose translation. By F. W. Cornish. (Loeb Classical Library.) London: Heinemann, 1912.

THERE is a pleasant fascination in trying to form a clear mental picture of the surroundings amidst which a poet was born and bred, and in attempting to trace whether this environment exercised any recognisable influence on the direction which his genius followed, or on the forms in which it found expression. Among the Latin poets, for example, we can realise fairly well the rural conditions in which Virgil spent his youth on the great Lombard plain. In his earlier verse, amidst all the imagery which is there borrowed from Greek sources, it is not difficult to perceive also an inspiration that came from the fields and woods, the pastures and farms among which the Mincio wound its way; and the memory of these landscapes of his boyhood continued to be traceable in his poetry up to the end. Again, in the case of Horace, we recognise the lasting impression made on his young imagination by the features of his native Apulia—its thirsty summers, its flooded Aufidus, its hills, its forests and wood-pastures, its little hill-towns, and its thrifty and industrious peasantry. The poems of Catullus, dealing as they do, in the main, with the incidents of his life in Rome, afford perhaps less distinct indications of the influence of youthful associations. Yet we venture to think that from a careful study of them, in connexion with the physical features of the region of Cisalpine Gaul where he was born and spent his youth, some facts and inferences may be gleaned which go to show that early surroundings exercised a certain influence on his muse. We propose in the following pages to attempt to trace the source and nature of this influence.

The first three books on our list need no commendation from us. The commentaries of Prof. Munro and Prof. Ellis are classics in their line; and Prof. Postgate's edition of the poet supplies the best text available for English readers. The little volume of the 'Loeb Classical Library,' which includes the Poems of Catullus, gives a good Latin text on one page and on the page opposite a scholarly and elegant English prose version by the Vice-Provost of Eton. No handier edition of the poet could be desired; it should find a place in the travelling outfit of every lover of Catullus who makes a pilgrimage to Sirmio. The volume also contains the Latin text of Tibullus with a spirited English rendering by Prof. Postgate, and as if to fill up the measure of its attractiveness, it concludes with the delightful 'Pervigilium Veneris,' excellently Englished by Mr J. W. Mackail.

Among the many interesting historical associations which enhance the picturesque attractiveness of Verona, the well-founded claim of that city to be the birthplace of the greatest of Latin lyric poets is surely one of the most notable. The modern town contains few, if any, remains of Roman architecture that connect our age directly with that of Catullus. The noble arena, the ruins of a stately theatre, one or two of the arches of a bridge that still spans the rapid river, the antique gateways through which the tide of traffic still continues to ebb and flow, probably all belong to generations that lived after him. But the natural features of the district must remain much as they were when he spent his youth among them. The rushing Adige still sweeps through the town. From the heights which tower above its rapid current, the eye beholds the same noble prospect across the plains of Lombardy, to the cones of the Euganean Hills on the one side and the long range of the southern Alps on the other. No one who knows and loves his Catullus can gaze on that varied landscape without emotion. As we note, one after another, the features that were so familiar to the poet, and let our imagination dwell upon the past, his brief and troubled life, with its alternations of overmastering joy and profoundest grief, seems to unfold itself before us. We think of his boyhood and youth at Verona, where, under the roof of his father, a man of repute in the city, he must have come

into personal contact with all that was most noted in the society of the province, military as well as civil.* As we scan the varied features of the surrounding country, we can well believe that its singular loveliness could not be without some formative influence in fostering that appreciation of natural beauty, which, like a golden thread, runs through the poetry of Catullus.

In thought we follow him to Rome where, as he tells us, he eventually made his home, returning to his native district only at intervals, when a little box, selected from his travelling gear, could hold all that he needed for the visit (lxviii, 34). The vivid glimpses which the poems reveal of the gay society of his day in Rome, and the touching evidence they afford of the fluctuations of his intensely emotional nature, crowd upon the memory. They show us his abounding sociality and gaiety as a companion, the depth and tenderness of his affection for those whom he loved, the true sympathy with which he embraced his friends in their sorrows no less than in their joys; at the same time the vigour of his hatreds, or at least the strength of the vituperation with which, perhaps, he often simulated them;† and above all his passionate and tragic infatuation for the captivating but worthless Lesbia, which was at once a prime inspiration of his muse and the ultimate ruin of his life.

We recall especially that memorable journey to Bithynia, on the staff of the proprætor Memmius, where the poet hoped to replenish a purse which, he said, had come to be full only of dusty cobwebs,‡ but where the governor's vigilance frustrated his junior's intention to

* The great proconsul Julius Cæsar is said to have been a frequent guest in the house.

† See Munro (*op. cit.*, p. 75) for a reasoned argument to show that the poet's defamatory attacks on some of his contemporaries are not to be judged by modern standards of taste, but must be looked at in the light in which they would be generally understood in his day. The Roman populace, when in merry mood, were wont to vie with each other in scurrilous Fescennine verse; but the personal abuse in which they indulged was only a pastime which did not denote any real unfriendliness or enmity. Such contests in vituperation were perpetuated for many centuries. In the latter half of the fifteenth century they were signally exemplified in the sonnets of the Italian poets Luigi Pulci and Matteo Franco; and a generation or two later the most noted Scottish poets, in their 'flytings,' or scoldings of each other, exhausted the vocabulary of scurrilous epithets wherein their native language was specially rich, yet they remained good friends.

‡ xiii, 8.

enrich himself at the expense of the provincials. We can picture the consequent disappointment and disgust which led him to throw up his place on the staff and return home; his eagerness to travel and see famous places by the way, and the kindly companionship that prompted the sonnet in which he bade farewell to the comrades whom he left behind him.* More especially do we think of him at his brother's grave in the Troad, and of the anguish of that lasting grief to which he again and again gave vent in language of such passionate longing and hopeless despair.† The incidents of the long homeward voyage, as he has so graphically recited them, rise one by one into our recollection—the yacht which he purchased, built of wood from the forests of Pontic Amastris, whence in imagination he seemed still to hear the whistling of the wind through the rustling foliage of the trees from which her timbers had been cut; the sail across the rough Black Sea, through the wild Thracian Propontis to famous Rhodes and the Cyclad Isles, and thence along the shores of the threatening Adriatic—the vessel holding her course, alike in storm and calm, now with sails and now with oars, never outstripped by any other craft afloat, but coming back at last from the remotest seas to be piloted up the Po and the Mincio into the limpid waters of the Lago di Garda, where she was finally dedicated to the sailors' patrons, Castor and Pollux.‡

The Lake of Garda, now inseparably associated with Catullus, was not improbably familiar to him in his youth, for it lies only some twenty-five miles to the west of Verona. It may have been to the wealthier citizens of Verona what the coast of the Tyrrhene Sea was to those of Rome—a place where they erected villas and to which they were wont to resort for their summer holiday. Catullus' father may thus have possessed a villa on the shore of the lake, which could be easily and speedily reached by a good road from Verona. In any case, we know that the poet either inherited or otherwise acquired a residence at Sirmio off the southern coast. A more fitting abode for stimulating the noblest powers of his genius could not have been found in the whole compass of Italy. In Rome, where he threw himself, heart and

* xlv.

† lxviii, 19, 91; ci.

‡ iv.

soul, into the gay life of the city, he had many distractions and anxieties. Besides the wayward course of his passion for Lesbia, so faithfully reflected in his poems, his generosity and extravagance reduced his means and increased his solitudes. But here, in his native province, far from the stir and strife of the capital and face to face with Nature in her most varied and alluring guise, he could regain the mastery of himself.

How deep was the attachment of Catullus to this retreat on the Garda Lake may best be realised from the exuberant joy expressed in one of his most delightful lyrics (xxxix), written on the spot, when he returned from the East. The poem is addressed to Sirmio, which he calls the little gem of all the peninsulas or islands that Neptune bears on lake or sea. He can hardly trust himself at first to believe that he has really left the hot plains of Bithynia, and is now once more in his beloved retreat. What can be more blessed, he exclaims, than to drop the burden of our cares and, wearied with the toils of foreign travel, to return to our own dear home, there to rest upon the bed so eagerly desired? Such a consummation is, indeed, ample recompense for all the fatigues that have been endured. Bursting into jubilant song, he welcomes his lovely Sirmio, bidding it to share in his delight and rejoice to have its master back once more, and, with that boyish love of mirthfulness so characteristic of his temperament, he calls on the water itself to swell the general chorus of glee with all the laughter that its rippling waves can send forth.

If it be asked what were the attractions of the place that could give rise to so exuberant an attachment, the answer can hardly be given in a few words, depending as it does partly on the special features of the lake and its surroundings, and partly on the habits and tastes of the poet himself. Having a keen eye for beauty of every kind, he appreciated the varied beauties of Sirmio. This appreciation was no doubt of a sensuous rather than a contemplative nature. It was mingled, too, with gratification that this lovely spot was his own home, endeared to him by its associations. But there were some characteristics of the place that would strongly appeal to his temperament; and a consideration of these may help us to understand his enthusiasm.

The Lago di Garda, the Lacus Benacus of the Romans, differs from other Italian lakes in certain features that give it a well-marked peculiarity. Its northern half, like a Norwegian fjord, is a strip of water two to three miles broad, running in a nearly straight line towards the north-east, between two ranges of mountains that rise steeply in verdant slopes from its shores. This portion of the lake belongs characteristically to the mountain region. The southern half emerges from the mountains into the plains, where it widens out into a basin some ten miles broad, encircled only by comparatively low hills. This combination of mountainous and lowland surroundings (as, on a smaller scale, in the case of Loch Lomond, in Scotland) gives the lake its most distinctive feature. At its southern end it is separated from the great Lombardy plain by the gigantic semicircle of moraine-mounds which mark the end of the massive glacier that once descended from the Tyrolese Alps, filled up the basin of the lake, and reached the plain, at that time possibly covered by the sea.

Another characteristic of Garda is the remarkable straightness of its trend. Standing on the low hills above the southern shore, we can look along the whole length of the lake and far up into the mountain country beyond. One result of this configuration is seen in the violent storms to which the lake is subject when the winds blow strongly from the snowy uplands in the north-east. Big waves then arise, which gain force as they are driven to the southern shore, where they fall with great violence on the shingle-beach. The lake is famous for the fury of its storms. Probably Virgil saw it in one of its tempestuous moods, for he describes it as 'heaving with billows and with a roar as of the sea.'*

Near the southern margin of the lake, about three miles from the shore, a small solitary wooded island rises out of the water. From a distance it seems to stand wholly unconnected with any other land. But on a nearer view it is found to be attached to the shore by a strip of alluvial ground, so narrow in some parts as to

* 'Fluctibus et fremitu adsurgens, Benace, marino?'—'Georgics,' ii, 160. In boisterous weather sea-sickness is not unknown among the passengers in the steamboats on the lake.

afford hardly more than room for a roadway, and so low as to be more or less submerged when the level of the water at this end of the lake is raised by prolonged northerly gales.* This spit of land is a natural accumulation of considerable antiquity, which has served for many centuries as a means of communication between the island and the lake-shore. The island consists of a mass of pinkish limestone, and rises several hundred feet above the surface of the water, into which it descends more or less steeply on all sides. Its surface is clothed to the top with olive woods, which in spring are carpeted with violets, grape-hyacinths and the lesser periwinkle, that cast a flush of blue over the fresh herbage beneath the grey-green foliage of the prevailing trees.† This island, now known as Sirmione, is undoubtedly the Sirmio of Catullus. At its northern end are some Roman ruins, popularly believed to be the remains of the poet's house; but they probably belong to a later time, though, as they are placed on the most advantageous site for a commanding view of the lake and the mountains beyond, they may occupy the ground on which the dwelling of Catullus actually stood. From the summit of the island the eye takes in the whole wide expanse of the great southern basin of the lake and also the entire length of the northern fjord-like portion, with its little promontories on either side, far away into the blue distances of the interior; while above the nearer crests we catch glimpses of remote snowy peaks beyond. Owing to the southward prolongation of the lake outside the limits of the mountains, it is possible from Sirmione to see, on both sides, part of the southern front of the Alpine chain as it sweeps down to the great plain at its foot. To the west lie the foothills around Brescia, and far to the east those that rise to the sky-line north of Verona. The countless varieties of outline and diversities of colour in this vast panorama of high grounds afford to the beholder an inexhaustible source

* It was doubtless to this twofold character that Catullus alluded when he addressed his home on the lake as

‘Pene insularum, Sirmio, insularumque
Ocelle.’

† The reader will remember Tennyson's line—‘Then beneath the Roman ruin, where the purple flowers grow.’

of pleasure, to which is often added another charm in the ethereal beauty of the multitudinous canopy of clouds that gather in ever-changing shapes above the mountains and cast their shadows of darkest blue over valley and lake and sharp-cut crest. Under the soft azure of the Italian sky and amidst the brilliance of Italian sunshine, the landscape is one to which there are few rivals in any part of the globe.

That the absorbing beauty of the scenery was one of the chief attractions of the place to Catullus may surely be assumed. It could not but appeal powerfully to a mind so sensitive as his was to all that was bright and beautiful in the world around him. This appeal would be enforced by the consciousness that all this transcendent loveliness lay in his own native province, not far from his birthplace, if not also dear to him from the recollection of holidays spent here in his boyhood.

But there was a feature of Sirmio which, we cannot but think, played a notable part among the charms which the place had in the eyes of Catullus. No one can attentively read his poems without observing the remarkable contrast between the tone of his allusions to the sea and seafaring and those of other Roman poets to the same subject. Whereas Horace, for example, seems to exhaust his native tongue in seeking terms of abuse to express his antipathy and disgust, Catullus utters no word of disparagement, but, on the contrary, delights to paint the beauty and grandeur of the deep, and to dwell on the pleasure he had enjoyed in sailing over its surface. His longest poem, the 'Peleus and Thetis,' is full of the spirit of the sea in all its moods of calm and storm. As the epithalamium of a sea-goddess, such a poem would naturally include references to the sea; but the poet displays such an exuberance of allusion and so great a variety of picturesque epithets as to indicate how much he was at home among the 'clear waves,' the 'salt depths,' the 'blue expanse of the sea,' the 'windy main,' the 'foaming surge,' and the 'wave lashed into white froth by the oars.'* Indeed, it would seem as if

* lxiv, 1-18. 'Liquidas undas,' 'Phasidos fluctus,' 'vada salsa,' 'cærulea æquora,' 'ventosum æquor,' 'tortaque remigio spumis incanduit unda,' 'freti candenti e gurgite,' 'e gurgite cano.' All these phrases and epithets are crowded into the first eighteen lines of the poem, as if Catullus

he found the Latin language inadequate to convey his vivid impression of the grandeur of the sea in a storm, for he coins a new word to express the continuous torrent-like roar of the waves along an exposed line of coast (*fluentis sono litore*, lxiv, 52). Again, the sonnet on the yacht which carried him back from the East could only have been written by one who had the instincts and experience of a yachtsman, and who loved his vessel as a personal friend that had braved with him all the perils of the deep. From many other of his poems similar evidence might be given of his keen appreciation of the sea.

Now the position of Sirmio—an islet, like a ship at anchor, in the midst of the largest expanse of fresh water in Cisalpine Gaul—could not but appeal to the imagination of a poet who was also a yachtsman. One is tempted to believe that it may have been by boating and sailing on this lake in his boyhood that Catullus imbibed his taste for seamanship. At his other homes in Rome, Tivoli or Verona he had no opportunity of being afloat; and one of the sources of his eagerness to get back to Sirmio probably lay in the opportunities which the place gave him of indulging in a favourite pastime. There was no such tempting field for inland aquatic sport to be had anywhere else in the country. We can hardly believe that he undertook the trouble and expense of having his trusty yacht piloted from the Adriatic Sea up into the Lacus Benacus, merely to have the gratification of dedicating it as an offering to the Dioscuri. It seems much more probable that the transportation was carried out in order that he might have the satisfaction of cruising on Benacus in his beloved eastern *phasellus*, with sails or oars as the weather might permit. It is clear that a considerable interval of time elapsed between the return of the vessel and the occasion when the poet described her achievements to his friends and pointed to her hulk quietly moored by the shores of the lake.* The final laying-up of the yacht and her

was so full of delight in the deep, and so carried away by the prospect of writing a sea-story, that he could not restrain the exuberance of his language.

* The voyage is there referred to as an old story—'*hæc prius fuere*' (lv, 25).

dedication to the sailors' divinities may not have taken place until the time came when she was considered no longer seaworthy. Moreover, we can imagine that when the poet had provided in a grateful spirit that his *phasellus* should spend a quiet and honoured old age near his home at Sirmio, he would not fail to put in her place another craft of some sort; for the spirit of the yachtsman would impel him, as long as the state of his funds would permit, to maintain the means of being afloat and moving over the surface of his 'limpid lake.'

From the way in which the southern end of the Lago di Garda extends well out of the Alpine chain, and from the position of Sirmione off the shore, the horizon visible from this place is remarkably extensive and distant in every direction save towards the north. 'The blue rim where skies and mountains meet' is so unobstructed and lies so far away that the sunrises and sunsets must be exceptionally well seen. We know that these times of the day were dear to Catullus, and we may believe that their glory as seen from his home here would be to him not the least of the pleasures of the place. From his 'fast-anchored isle' he would see the sun rise from behind the far-off slopes of the southern Alps north of Verona. When early astir on the lake, he might look on such a scene as he has vividly depicted in the 'Peleus and Thetis,' 'when the dawn mounts upward to the threshold of the wandering sun, and the morning breath of the west wind, ruffling the calm sea, urges forward the sloping waves which at first move slowly before the mild breeze, with a sound as of gentle laughter; but as the wind freshens, they wax ever more and more, and floating far away, flash back the crimson light.'* At evening, from the crest of his isle he could see the sun sink beneath the distant hills above Brescia, and the Alpine peaks, one after another, lighted up with the gleam of the after-glow. The regular succession from dawn to dusk, so impressively visible from Sirmio, would now and then, for a moment, suggest a solemn thought to the poet, as in the sad but exquisitely musical verses:

'Soles occidere et redire possunt :
Nobis, quum semel occidit brevis lux,
Nox est perpetua una dormienda.'†

* lxiv, 269-275.

† v, 4.

But the Lago di Garda does not always wear a placid smile; and Catullus, who had sailed through so many furious seas, without ever appealing for protection to the gods of the adjacent shores,* could not fail to take pleasure in watching its surface in a storm. From a firm foothold at the top of the cliff in which the island ends towards the north—a cliff which may have been the boundary of his garden—he could look across the whole expanse of this 'ventosum æquor.' Nowhere else could he behold such uproar in fresh water. It would remind him of the 'truculenta pelagi' on the Ægean or the Adriatic Sea. As he looked northwards, the distant mountains and the upper part of the lake would probably be shrouded in grey mist out of which he would see the white-crested waves march towards him in rapid succession until they burst in all their fury against the limestone cliff below. If he retreated from this tumult to the sheltered lee-side of his isle, he could hear, three miles away, the loud roar of the breakers along the southern shore—a sound which, as he heard it among the eastern seas, he has expressed in words that seem to bring the scene vividly to both eye and ear:

'Litus ut longe resonante Eoa
Tunditur unda' (xi, 3).

The visitor who knows the lake only in all the loveliness of its tranquil summer beauty, smooth as glass or only gently rippled into 'Lydian laughter,' may find a difficulty in picturing to himself what it is at the height of a great gale from the north. But should he have any geological experience, he will find at the northern end of Sirmione impressive proof of what has been achieved by the storms of many successive centuries in battering down the solid limestone rock. Precisely as happens on a bold coast exposed to the gales of an open sea, the original sloping declivity of the islet has been cut back into a vertical cliff, with a flat platform of rock at its base. When the water is low this platform may be traversed dryshod; but, when the level of the lake is high and a strong northerly gale is blowing, the waves

* iv, 18-23. Horace, on the other hand, regarded such supplication as the normal practice of seafarers—'Otium divos rogat in patenti prensus Ægæo.'—'Carm.' II, xvi, i.

sweep against the face of the cliff, which they slowly undermine. Since the glacier retired and water took the place of ice in the basin of the lake, a huge notch has thus been excavated out of the northern front of Sirmione by the bombardment of the waves. There would seem to have been an appreciable amount of loss during the last 1900 years, for some of the masonry, connected with the so-called villa of Catullus, is now at the verge of the precipice. There are probably few other places in Europe where the abrasive energy of waves generated in a freshwater lake is so strongly demonstrated.

In the neighbourhood of lofty mountains the atmospheric changes are marked by a wider range and take place with greater rapidity than is the case in lowland regions. Summer and winter are more sharply marked off from each other. Storms are more frequent; rains are heavier; and any serious fall of temperature is indicated by the appearance of fresh snow on at least the higher peaks and crests. Even in the course of a single day the changes of sky may be many, and may quickly succeed each other. The look of the landscape alters continually under these transformations of the heavens above; and thus a fresh source of beauty and charm is given to scenery that is in itself already full of attraction. The peculiar position of Sirmione is eminently favourable for watching these movements of clouds and winds, and their effects on the aspect of the mountains on the one hand and the rolling lowland on the other. Moreover, to what can be seen on land there is here added a wide expanse of water, which even more sensitively reacts to atmospheric perturbations. To a poetic eye like that of Catullus, the contemplation of these constant and almost kaleidoscopic variations in the tones and colours of the landscape, synchronous and sympathetic with the changes in the face of the sky, would be, even if unconsciously, another of the fascinations of his Sirmio.

The swiftness with which the atmospheric changes may succeed each other in that region of mountain and plain was vividly brought home to the writer in the course of a boating excursion on the southern portion of the Lago di Garda one mild day in April. There had been a slight snowfall on the loftier heights during the

previous night, but, as the day advanced, the white covering on peak and crest was growing visibly less under the warm sunshine. Huge masses of dazzlingly white cumulus cloud hung apparently motionless above the mountains, on which they threw shadows of the deepest blue; while the sunlit ridges and green slopes above the upper half of the lake gleamed with an almost prismatic radiance, that recalled the sheen of the finest Limoges enamel. The surface of the lake lay absolutely smooth and still, save when ruffled here and there into streaks and patches of darker azure by fitful gusts of air from above. Every mountain within sight was reflected on this bright mirror. It seemed as if Nature were in deep sleep, and unlikely to be roused for many hours to come. But eventually some ominous dark clouds were seen to be gathering in the north-east, whence an occasional muttering of distant thunder could be heard. These sombre masses of vapour spread over the sky with a rapidity which was in striking contrast to the immobility of the huge white clouds that seemed still asleep on the more distant western mountains. Large drops of rain and then pellets of hail began to fall, as if shot from catapults, into the oil-like surface of the water. As the storm quickly approached, the thunder grew louder and more frequent, the lightning more startlingly vivid, until the full majesty was revealed of such a tempest as can only be witnessed in a mountainous region with multitudinous echoes. The rain now fell in one continuous torrent. Flash rapidly succeeded flash, with increasing brilliance, followed and even accompanied by crashing peals, which, reverberating from the many cloud-capped ridges of the chain, gathered into one sustained roar.

‘Far along
From peak to peak, the rattling crags among,
Leaps the live thunder! Not from one lone cloud,
But every mountain now hath found a tongue.’

It was a memorable experience to have been on the Lago di Garda under such different aspects in the course of a single day. Doubtless Catullus must often have witnessed a similar tempest during his sojournings by the lake; and, although he may not have appreciated, as

Lucretius could, the elemental grandeur of such displays of Nature's energy, his sensitive and imaginative temperament would not remain unmoved by their impressive magnificence.

But there was one portion of the scene to which he seems to have been blind. The panorama of mountains to be seen from the southern end of the Lago di Garda is always the feature of that marvellous landscape which first arrests the attention of modern visitors, and to which the eye most often and admiringly turns. Even when we bear in mind the horror of the antique world for the wildness and the dangers of mountains, it is impossible to escape a feeling of surprise that such a keen-eyed poet as Catullus should have found words in praise of the lake, but none for its great mountain-girdle. Only once does he refer to the Alps; and then it is merely to express his conviction that his comrades Furius and Aurelius would be ready to go with him anywhere, even should he decide to tramp across the lofty Alps in order to behold the monuments of Cæsar's rule, the Gaulish Rhine, and the dreadful Britons at the end of the world (xi, 1-12). The passes through the western part of the chain had come in his day to be continually traversed by soldiers and traders; but there is no evidence in his poems that, even in the times of his deepest dejection, though he may have planned a journey, he ever ventured to distract his thoughts by visiting trans-alpine countries, or even penetrated into any of the glens of the chain which were almost visible from his home. That, living face to face with such a mountain landscape yet far away from any of its dangers, he should not only express no appreciation of it but even make no allusion to its existence, seems to us one of the most striking proofs in literature of how insensible cultivated men still were to the grander types of scenery. Seventeen centuries had to pass after his time before the glories of the mountain-world began to be discovered, and a hundred years more before they were generally appreciated in all civilised communities.

There appears to be good reason to believe that Catullus wrote some of his best poetry at Sirmio. Certainly two of the most delightful of his joyous lyrics had their birth here. His rapturous address to Sirmio

and the lake, on his return from the East, drew its inspiration from the very place itself; and the poem in which he recounts his homeward voyage was penned with the favourite yacht resting near him by the shores of his lake. Probably also he composed here the touching verses in which he conveys his sympathy to his friend Manlius, who in his deep sorrow was like 'a shipwrecked man cast up by the foaming waves of the deep'; while at the same time the poet himself, by the death of his beloved brother, had been 'plunged into the waves of misfortune,' and had lost all joy in life. His longer and more elaborate poems are with probability referred to his later years. In these the numerous allusions to the sea, to seafaring and to shipwreck suggest that, although they may have been planned or even begun in the East, they were mainly written after his return, and were carefully elaborated and corrected in such uninterrupted leisure and with such inspiring surroundings as he could best secure on the shores of Benacus. Amid the fever and fret, the joys and sorrows of his short but crowded life, it was to this much-loved spot that his thoughts fondly turned, as a haven of peace and rest amid all that is beautiful in Nature. It is here too that, after the lapse of so many centuries, readers in whose hearts he still awakens a tender sympathy by the frankness, brightness and affection of his character, and in whose ears the music of his verse ever lingers, feel themselves to be specially drawn towards him in admiration of his genius, and in pity for the brief and troubled career of so rare and lovable a spirit. To the end of time this little islet of Sirmione will remain the fitting shrine consecrated to the memory of Catullus.

ARCHIBALD GEIKIE.

Art. 3.—THE GERMAN SPIRIT.

THE present war is a conflict, which admits no truce or reconciliation, between two conceptions and ideals of life. Liberty, democracy, and the moral law, are ranged in battle order against physical force, militarism, and the claims for universal domination.

The German spirit, once idealistic and humanitarian, has developed into the opposite of itself. Heine could reasonably describe the Germans as 'a speculative people, Ideologues, thinking backwards and forwards, dreamers who only live in the past or the future, and have no present.' But no longer do they willingly see in Hamlet, the dreamer who would be a man of action if only he could cease to think and ponder, their own national type and image. The successful wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870-1, and the notable expansion of German commerce, have intervened. Faust, however, still remains the acknowledged symbol and mirror of their mind and character. 'Two souls, alas! reside within my breast, and each withdraws from, and repels, its brother.' It is the purpose of the following pages to show that Germany, instead of harmonising its divergent tendencies, as is sometimes claimed, has made an unholy alliance between its idealism and its realism. The ideals of the Germans have come to be brutal and material; their lust of practical power is based upon those 'vain hopes, vain aims, inordinate desires, blown up with high conceits, engendering pride,' which, according to Milton, are the motives of the apostate angel.

The conspicuous institutions of Germany are the school and the barrack. The one is the complement of the other. From the universities proceed that love of country and firm belief in its future destiny, which have permeated all classes. The professor, and above all the professor of history, enjoys an influence to a degree unknown elsewhere. Niebuhr already, and Ranke, had advocated the claims of Prussia to the hegemony of the German-speaking states. After 1850, Sybel, Mommsen, Häusser, Droysen, Giesebrecht, all writing from the Prussian point of view, fostered patriotism to the height. And they were self-proclaimed realists, applying to

history and politics the methods of natural science. They anticipated Darwin in promulgating the doctrines of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest; or rather, they accepted as supreme those laws of nature which Darwin himself subordinated to the play of moral qualities in the human sphere.

Of these historians, Treitschke was the last and most notorious. Germany is the work of Prussia; Prussia of its army; and its army of its kings. That was his theme. Ruskin indeed, studying the history of these kings in Carlyle's account of the predecessors of Frederick the Great, was troubled by 'continually increasing doubt how far the machinery and discipline of war, under which they learnt the art of government, was essential for such lesson.' Even so far back as 1645, at the Conference of Münster, the Swedish ambassador felt constrained to describe with bitter and accurate irony the philosophy of the Hohenzollern family. 'God speaks no longer to princes by prophets and dreams; there is a divine calling wherever there is a favourable opportunity to attack a neighbour and extend one's own frontiers.' But Treitschke, misapplying his Darwinism, is spared all scruple. 'The historical rôle of Prussia began in the days when this Power incorporated, one after the other, the German states for which the hour of death had sounded.' He was ever ready with his triumphant chant of *Vae Victis*: woe to the weak, unfitted to survive. 'Pure and impartial history could never suit a proud and warlike nation.' And his voice, if of the loudest, was but one among many. David Friedrich Strauss, politician, Hegelian, author of the '*Leben Jesu*,' declared that Prussia never made any but 'holy' wars—holy, since the unity of Germany was due to them. The war of 1870 was 'a work of public salubrity accomplished by Germany, France being rotten to the marrow.' All nations are rotten to the marrow who stand in the way of Prussia, or cast a shadow upon Germany's rightful 'place in the sun.'

Jena and Sedan, the crushing defeat or the crowning victory—Prussian history pivots on these. But for the disaster of Jena, Prussia could not have achieved the triumph of Sedan, could not have stood forth the appointed instrument to fulfil the 'historical mission' of Germanism. To further this mission, Prussian hegemony

in Germany was necessary; and Prussian hegemony could only be established by war. Didon, studying in the German universities at the beginning of the 'eighties, found it universally accepted that 'German unity could not have been accomplished without force and violence; it implied on the part of Prussia that policy of ruse and audacity consisting in the skilful preparation for conflict, in playing the part of the offended one, and in risking the future in a game of dice with victory.' Sedan or Jena, in this present war? 'Downfall, or World-Power?' asks Bernhardi, Treitschke's military disciple, ready, along with his nation, for that policy of adventure, of gambling risk, which Nietzsche advocated as a chief law of conduct.

War is the sum of German realism. German policy is the reflex of what occurs in the animal kingdom. The philosophical historians and their military followers celebrate the happy necessity of war with deepest fervour. They re-echo the old Greek philosopher, with his 'war is the father of all things,' and Hobbes, who discovered the natural law to be 'the war of every man against every man'—a law that was regulated by 'kings and persons of sovereign authority,' who are 'in the state and posture of gladiators' and 'uphold thereby the industry of their subjects.' The Industrial period, which is supposed, by merely trading nations, to have superseded the period of Militarism, is nothing but a state of war, barely latent. War itself is a form of industry, bringing profit.

'The one unpardonable sin,' according to Treitschke, is 'the failure to use one's might.'

'Troops always ready to act,' said Frederick, the arch-model of the House of Hohenzollern, 'my war-chest well filled, and the vivacity of my character, were my reasons for making war against Marie Therèse, Queen of Bohemia and Hungary. Ambition, interest, the desire of making a name, carried the day with me, and I determined on war.'

He could refute Machiavelli before he became master of the State, and practise his doctrine afterwards. The first principle of realistic politics is that there are no principles, except those of self-interest. There are only opportunities, and these are fugitive. He is the best diplomatist who watches for the fit occasion to attack.

War! war! 'The living God (says Treitschke) will take care that war shall always return as a frightful medicine for the human race.' 'War,' says Marshal von der Goltz, 'is the right education of the people, and the true centre of national culture.' Should Germany not be sound, then 'war,' says Treitschke, 'is the sole remedy.' Should there be any internal difficulties in the German Empire (such as the increasing power of the Social Democrats), then 'a people that wishes to maintain its equilibrium must stir itself up from time to time by war.' Roon declared that 'the question of the Duchies (Schleswig-Holstein) is not a question of right, but a question of might; and we have the might.' 'To the end of time,' says Treitschke, 'weapons will maintain the right; and therein lies the holiness of war.' Might will be right, for at once, when war is proclaimed, there is 'a new rectification of boundaries corresponding with the reality of might displayed.'

But what of the Germans, or even the Prussians, who are not connected with the army, the university, or the bureaucracy? Maximilian Harden, the well-known journalist, said last year: 'Few people think of war. We need peace too much. War would compromise the results of the considerable efforts of these forty years which have given Germany considerable power; those who reflect on this cannot desire war, and, as Germans, we do not love it for itself.' Sudermann, the second German dramatist of the epoch, calling attention to the fact that the German people, 'laborious and pacific,' has full confidence in the Emperor and the Government, expressed his conviction that Prussia and Germany, ever since the Middle Ages, have never fought but in self-defence, except when their intention was to 'constitute themselves,' as in the war of 1870-1. But what of their openly proclaimed intention to 'constitute themselves' as the 'World-Power'? Alfred Kerr, literary man and editor, still in the same year, was as realistic as you please, 'looking facts in the face'—biological facts—as Treitschke bids his disciples do:

'Nothing can hold out against historical fatalities. The German arrives, with his rich blood, and I think his hour is come. The law of life requires that the less strong shall

be eliminated; the true conquerors are the hungry. And we are the hungry. The money we have gained has given us a taste for more; the well-being we have conquered has increased our appetite. When the German looks round about the world, he finds that he has come off badly, and that what is left him is only the scraps of a good meal. But this division, in his thoughts, is only provisional.'

As 'war,' says Treitschke, 'is the sphere in which the triumph of human reason displays itself most conspicuously,' and its 'majesty consists in the fact that murder can here be committed without passion,' so the conception of the Prussian State is equally in conformity with reason. Formulated in advance by Hegel, it is idealistic; and realistic, as in full agreement with the biological law. 'Radicals,' says Treitschke, 'pretend that the State springs from the free consent of citizens. History, on the contrary, teaches us that, most usually, States are founded against the wills of citizens by conquest and domination.' 'Whoever is not manly enough to look the truth in the face, that the State above all is might, had better leave politics alone.' 'Will is the essence of the State.' And will, to Treitschke as to Nietzsche, is the 'Will to Power,' the will to conquer and dominate.

Moreover, as the German army is invincible, so the State, the Prussian autocracy, is infallible in its methods and aims. 'Thanks be to God,' cried Moltke, 'the old patriarchal *régime*, the old theory that people are to be made happy in spite of themselves, still subsists in Prussia, in spite of progress'; while Bismarck had his own way of eulogizing Prussian mastery: 'Prussia is like a flannel-waistcoat; disagreeable at first, and scratchy—but it's warm and sticks well to the skin.' Thus, there is no room for the exercise of public opinion; the bureaucracy, that third institution of Germany, supplies such information as is needed.

But there is such a thing as responsibility? Ministers are responsible to an abstraction; to the non-moral—or immoral—State. 'Austria does not want war,' said a diplomatist to Bismarck, 'and it will avoid giving you a pretext for it.' To which the future Chancellor replied: 'I have a pocketful of pretexts and plausible causes.' It

was the same in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870. 'Blessed,' says Delbrück, the successor of Mommsen, 'is the hand that falsified the despatch of Ems,' and thereby provoked the war. Bismarck, later, acknowledged the falsification; and German historians approve it, in full agreement with Zarathustra-Nietzsche: 'A good cause, you say, sanctifies every war. But I say unto you: it is a good war that sanctifies every cause.' And the pledged word, the treaties signed? 'All treaties,' Treitschke declares, 'are written with the clause understood: so long as things remain as they are at present.' 'If the statesman perceives that standing treaties no longer represent the real conditions of power, and cannot attain his purpose by friendly diplomacy, then'—it must be 'war.' And further: 'The statesman has no right to warm his hands at the smoking ruin of his Fatherland with the pleasant self-praise that he has never lied. That is merely a monkish virtue.' Might is right. It is the duty of ministers to collaborate with Destiny. And the German nation, headed by Prussia, is destined to rule the world.

After 1870, no longer France, but England, was the enemy. The Crown Prince, now the Emperor, said to his French tutor: 'When the pointed helmet (Germany) and the red breeches (France) march together, gare à Carthage'—woe to England, the trading State. Since then, to his expressed chagrin, he has vainly wooed France to his side; while the historians, his masters, and the German nation at large are unable to understand why France should not be content to live upon the reputation of its past. England, the robber and pirate, is the one enemy. 'With the English,' says Treitschke, 'love of money has crushed all feeling of honour, and all distinctions of just and unjust. They hide their poltroonery behind lofty phrases of unctuous theology.' Whereas Germany openly proclaims that might is right, and that is just which is to the interest of Germany. The English 'sacrifice all to profit,' while Germany is idealistic. The British Empire is the result of chance and trickery. While it was building, Germany was 'too busy with its neighbours'—too busy with philosophy, said Heine—to notice that 'England was grabbing the world.' Germany has entered late upon its construction of a world-empire:

'In the present division of the extra-European world, Germany has always had too small a share. It is now a question that concerns our existence as a great state whether we can become a power beyond the sea. Otherwise we have the hideous prospect of England and Russia parcelling out the world; and it is hard to say whether the Russian knout or the English money-bag is the more immoral and horrible.'

It may be necessary to crush France once more, and to thrust back the menace of Muscovitic barbarism, but with England it is merely a question of the strong nation wresting an ill-gained empire from a nation that is weak and effete. For Germany is convinced of English decadence; the colonies are loosely tied to the mother-country; there is a complete inability to effect a Customs Union within the empire; above all, England cares so little for empire that her sons refuse national service under arms, refuse that sacrifice which the sons of Germany so proudly make. In short, says Treitschke, 'a State like England, which does not exercise the might of arms, is no longer a State.' The task of conquering England is easy. For now, even more than when Didon wrote in 1883, 'no German is to be found who does not consider his nation invincible by the number and worth of its soldiers, the ability of its chiefs, the superiority of its organisation and of its armaments.' For England there is nothing but hatred and contempt. Why tax Germans for the building up of German colonies? It is finer and more popular policy to employ one's money upon the increase of armaments which, sooner or later, shall set their grasp upon the English colonies, already equipped and so much better situated.

After war, the State, while not ceasing to be biological and 'beyond morality,' condescends to the peaceful conquests of German Idealism. A subdued world is to participate in the benefits of German Culture. As Treitschke promises: 'The State, the Prussian State, when supreme, will recognise that physical might is only a means to guard and further the higher goods of humanity.' Only, one remembers how Ranke, after 1870, failed to discover the 'purifying action' which, he had hoped, would result from the war. 'All menaces ruin;

religion is undermined. . . . There is nothing left but industrialism and money.' And one remembers how Treitschke, in 1895, drawing towards his end, and regarded askance by the Emperor because of certain veiled criticisms, publicly deplored the fact that :

'Everything is becoming more barbarous in morals, politics, and life. . . . Much that one thought of as associated only with the Roman Empire of the Decline is in reality brought about, in our midst, by that intensive culture of large cities which, in turn, besets us . . . One would say that the crash of arms has caused to spring up a new race of Bœotians, and is about to stifle all intelligence of the arts and sciences.'

Quite apart from the manifestations of German Idealism in action, of which we now hear day by day, it is worth while for a moment to consider this 'Culture,' so vaunted and flaunted before us. Nations, and national cultures, are interdependent. Kant (with Scotch blood in his veins) is unthinkable without Locke, Berkeley, Hume; Fichte without Berkeley; Schelling and Hegel without Spinoza, the neo-Platonists of Alexandria, and Brahminism; Schopenhauer without Buddhism: Nietzsche without Hobbes and Gobineau. There is full acknowledgment how vast is the debt of German literature, in its onward stages, to Shakespeare and Rousseau; to Scott and Byron; to Dickens. For the last forty years, German literature, assimilating Ibsen, Tolstoy, Maeterlinck, Guy de Maupassant, Walt Whitman, Wilde and Shaw, is in no way superior to, or even equally important with, the literatures of neighbouring countries. Hauptmann, its most conspicuous figure, is Slav in his inspiration. For German art, fully worthy of the name, we still have to look backward to Dürer and Holbein. Even in music, the classical period, from Bach to Brahms, has seemingly reached its close; Wagner and Richard Strauss are of the Titanic and florid period that so often heralds the decay of an art; the most interesting works of the immediate present are Russian; while the savants are laborious, methodical, and cosmopolitan, as they have ever been.

Without being conquered, the world is fully able to appreciate German thought and art. But are these 'Culture'? Houston Stewart Chamberlain, son-in-law

of Wagner, and Viennese by adoption, fervent in the praise of things German, draws a distinction between culture and civilisation. 'There is a Chinese civilisation, but not a French or a German.' Nietzsche maintained that, 'as far as Germany extends, it stifles culture.' In a pamphlet, proceeding on the lines laid down by Chamberlain, a copy of which is said to have been presented by the Emperor to Mr Roosevelt—a pamphlet in which the Emperor himself is exhibited much as a Messiah of the German Spirit—it is pointed out that it is England, and not Germany, that possesses the most definite form of culture, expressed not only in its politics and artistic movement, but still more characteristically in its methods of education, its sports, stock-breeding, domestic architecture, furniture, in brief the framework of its daily life. Whereas German culture is still to be inaugurated, is a matter of the future. And meanwhile, the anonymous author urged, let the nation aid the Emperor in creating an invincible navy. It is only because of 'the mediocrity of Teutonic taste,' that Germany neglects its duty. The one thing needful is an enormous increase of armed force, and the things of the soul shall be added to this force.

Although the sceptical elements in Kant's philosophy have allowed a not very conspicuous body of neo-Kantians to reinvestigate the problem of consciousness, German transcendental Idealism, in the land of its birth, is relegated to past history, and has no present influence. Scots and English may still examine the sounder portions of Hegel's system; but in Germany nothing remains of it but the historical fatalism that sees in material success the triumph of reason and progress, and the teaching that the hour of the third human period has struck, the hour of Germany. The radical wing of the Hegelians ended the movement, by logically developing it. D. F. Strauss saw in Christianity a myth, a creation of that human spirit in which the divine becomes conscious of itself. And Feuerbach, taking the last step, assured the Germans that man is incapable of knowing anything higher and better than himself; that it is open to him to think as he may, and fashion ideals, if he must, according to his own devices.

Thus was the German house of the spirit left empty, swept, and garnished for new-comers. Crude Materialism, a reaction against the previous Idealism, for a time held sway. Then the pessimism of Schopenhauer seized upon, and pervaded, the national mind for long years. In the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, a loudly voiced demand for a new and optimistic literature resulted in a passing triumph of Naturalism, deeply pessimistic from the first. Finally, the influence of Nietzsche, neglected, depreciated, extolled by turns, much as Schopenhauer before him, became paramount, as wholly suited to the present phase of the national mind.

This new mental and moral malady of Germany bears many names, and no definite one—Subjective Idealism, Neo-Romanticism, Individualism. Nietzsche, weak, delicate, kindly, passed from the altruistic pessimism of Schopenhauer and Wagner to the recognition of biological laws and a voluntary optimism. He would be the very opposite of that to which his nature inclined him. He would preach a gospel of joyous and adventurous force. 'It is true that man shall fix for himself his own aim.' 'The true liberty of man, the true free-thought, is that which the Crusaders learnt in the East from the order of the Assassins: "Nothing is true, all is allowable."' Once Germany, with Prussia for its model, was docile and obedient; now it is exposed to the ravages of that Individualism which rejects all laws, except of its own making, which wrongly interprets the proposition of Spinoza that anticipates the doctrine of Nietzsche: 'Every one without exception may, by sovereign right of nature, do whatever he thinks will advance his own interest.' Once Germany was idealistic and humanitarian; now 'we range ourselves among the conquerors; we meditate upon the necessity of a new order of things, of a new slavery also—for every amelioration of the type "man" in force or in happiness requires as its condition a new kind of slavery.' Once Germany patiently prosecuted the search for objective truth; now it is discovered that there is no objective truth, and 'the supremacy of the scientific mandarin' is no more to be admired than 'the success of democracy.' Once Germany was romantic, 'constantly remembering the past,' said Heine, 'and constantly brooding over the future, but

never knowing how to grasp and understand the present'; now it is—or lately was—fervently romantic anew, straining towards the future and its promise that the 'superman' shall be born, the forceful German generation that shall hold the world in thrall.

It were long to follow in detail the ravages of this new Idealism, the moral perversities due to this neo-Romantic Individualism. 'God is dead,' proclaimed Nietzsche. And his disciples, aristocrats of the spirit, *Künstler*, claim all license to luxuriate amid 'the fulness of phenomena,' and to 'live themselves out.' Religion is gone; 'good' is that which is advantageous to self; and moral values are but degrees of strength and weakness. A vague theism, a 'kingdom of God' is indeed still preached. An Eucken can revive the moral and spiritual order of Fichte; but Fichte declared that the moral order itself is God. 'We need no other, and can conceive no other.' And Eucken but presents the conception of a living and personal God as a consolation for those in deepest sorrow. Destructive criticism has given place to constructive engines of material force. Textual and historical criticism has given place to the refutation and rejection of Christian morals. There is a constant demand from many quarters that a new religion shall come into being. Mysticism, intuition, the acknowledgment that instinct—the subconscious, or unconscious—is supreme, mainly go to the making of it. Nor is any hesitation felt as to whether the subconscious may not be the source of animal tendencies rather than of divine. The ape and tiger must not die. For Nietzsche says:

'Man requires that which is worst within him, to attain that which is best; his worst instincts are the best portion of his might. . . . Man must become better and worse.' 'Here is the new law, oh my brethren, which I promulgate unto you: Become hard. For creative spirits are hard. And you must find a supreme blessedness in impressing the mark of your hand, in inscribing your will, upon thousands and thousands, as on soft wax.'

We are warned by Burke not to bring an impeachment against a whole nation. The majority of Germans, no doubt, still hold by tradition. The simple and unsophisticated among them bid us remember that the

Emperor, their 'Peace-Emperor, is 'pious.' But he has learnt the lesson of Bismarck, and is a Hohenzollern. Frederick William the Fourth, equally romantic with William the Second, declared in 1848: 'I will never permit a scrap of paper (the constitution he was offering) to interpose between the Lord God on High and myself.' The grandfather of the Emperor, returning to Berlin after the victory of Sadowa, opened the Chambers by thanking Providence for the grace which had aided Prussia to drive away from its frontiers the invasion of the enemy—the self-defence being a carefully planned onslaught, that the hegemony of Germany might be wrested from Austria. 'Take away from me my convictions,' said Bismarck, 'and you have lost your Chancellor. Deprive me of my union with God, and tomorrow I will pack up, and grow oats at Varzin.' Such religion is mystic fetichism. He, and the House of Hohenzollern, instead of regarding themselves as instruments of destiny, of God, should have considered Bacon's statement that 'it were better to have no opinion of God at all than such an opinion as is unworthy of him'; they should have remembered that God is the God not of one, but of all nations, and the God of mercy. Whereas the Emperor's famous address to his army in China was but a paraphrase of Nietzsche's 'Verily, let my happiness, my liberty, rush onward like the hurricane. My enemies will believe that it is the Spirit of Evil raging above their heads.'

As his more recent speeches show, the Emperor has studied Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who is one of those who require a new religion, of German origin, and suited to the Germans. And there are other signs that the Emperor is ready to favour and foster such a religion, since it would be the proclamation of a Teutonic Jehovah, guiding his German elect to world-victory, with the House of Hohenzollern as warrior high-priests. Or in place of Jehovah, read Odin. Renan wrote to Strauss: 'Your German race always seems to believe in Walhalla.' Heine, before Renan, declared that 'Christianity—and that is its fairest merit—has to some degree softened the brutal Germanic delight in warfare, but could not destroy it; and when once that taming talisman, the Cross, is broken, then once more rattles out the wildness of the

old warrior, the mad Berserker rage.' Then 'Thor with his giant hammer springs forth at last, and breaks Gothic domes to atoms.' He prophesied, not indeed the present war, but democratic revolution in Germany; a return to Paganism, to the ancestral religion of blood and iron, when once it was divulged that transcendental Idealism was but a veiled and godless Pantheism.

There is one religion, at any rate, common to the intellectual few, and the simple many, in present Germany. The German race is the elect of destiny, say the one; of God, repeat the other. Neo-Romanticists, racial mystics, may dream with Gobineau of the conquering Aryan race, on whose shoulders rests the future of humanity. 'That which is not German is created to be enslaved.' H. S. Chamberlain somewhat modifies the theme. The French and the Slav are also Aryans; indeed any one, if so he wills, and fitly equips himself, can be an Aryan in the spirit, as it were by an elective affinity, and await the religion that is to be. But this is all too subtle for present Germany. The Aryan, the Superman, is the German. Pangermanism is the simple and sufficient creed.

As we have it in an endless series of pamphlets, Pangermanism is frowned on or favoured by the bureaucracy, according as occasion serves. These pamphlets, and the periodical organs of the various leagues, with their lists of approving professors and magnates, are equally monotonous and nauseating. One of these organs bears, or bore, as legend and ideal aim: 'From the Skaw to the Adriatic! From Boulogne to Narwa! From Besançon to the Black Sea!' But that is little, compared with the demands put forth in the pamphlets. Take a single one for a sample, as far back as 1895, the better to secure modesty and moderation, if possible. In it we learn that the great German Confederation of the future is a national State, which includes the majority of Germans living in Europe. Its inhabitants are not exclusively German, but it is ruled exclusively by Germans. Thus by allowing only Germans to exercise political rights and to acquire landed property, the German people will regain the feeling which they had in the Middle Ages—that of being a ruling race. They, however, gladly tolerate in their midst the presence of foreigners for the performance

of lower manual labour. And thus will grow up a people 'capable of transmitting to humanity in the ages to come all the treasures of German culture.' This, at least, is more moderate than Treitschke. 'The civilising of a barbarous nation'—and all are barbarous except Germans—is the offer of alternatives, 'either to merge itself in the dominant nation, or to suffer extermination.' But then, what blessings will result to the conquered, if they choose aright! Prussia, nobly exercising its hegemony over the 'United States of Europe,' will guard Europe against the competition of Asia, and of those other United States, whose commercial rivalry needs to be checked.

The Germans are naturally systematical. France subdued, and Russia, it was to be the turn of the robber and peddler State to which we unfortunately belong. And the 'peaceful penetration' of Brazil would in good time furnish a *casus belli* against the United States. 'Never have the Germans given up an idea without fighting it through in all its consequences,' Heine declared long ago. Only there is no sign of a Moltke or a Bismarck among present Germans. 'Never have the Germans been psychologists,' said Nietzsche. They have failed to isolate and attack each single Power in turn, as they have failed to grasp the true character and resources of the nations which they would forcibly sweep aside. H. S. Chamberlain cites Luther's dictum that the Germans are 'a blind people,' and Herder's epigram that 'the Germans think much, and—not at all.' 'The German is not a good critic,' he adds. 'Acuteness is not a national possession of the Teutons.' He regrets that, 'entering recently into the history of the world,' they have not yet had time 'to ask themselves how things are going on in their immediate neighbourhood.' Till they find such time, 'they will sport on the edge of the abyss, as if it were a flowery mead.' Such carelessness is part of their character; and he finds it almost praiseworthy, since the Greeks and the Romans before them rushed to their ruin, totally unconscious 'how the pressure of events was removing them from the face of the earth, lively to the last, mighty and proudly sure of triumph to the last.' This is lyrical, after the manner of his ethnical mysticism. But he has said it.

Upon illusion, follows disillusion. How soon will the Germans awake to the truth of things? They know the Greek tragedies, and yet forget the penalty that befalls the overweening. Trained in history, they are acquainted with the rise and fall of Spain, of Louis XIV, of Napoleon, aiming at universal empire; and yet will not derive the due lesson. Napoleon they hate, as the cause of their long suffering; and, admiring, would imitate. There are blots on the moral scutcheon of all the nations; but the Germans would deliberately and consciously accomplish, on the largest scale, that which other nations have done in the past, almost unconsciously, and as it were by hazard. Machiavellians, they reprobate the growth of the British Empire, and would fain use force to wrest it away for themselves. On one occasion, at least, Treitschke deviated into moral sanity. 'The future course of human history cannot consist in the creation of a single dominant power; the ideal we should aim at is an orderly society of peoples.' But Treitschke, no doubt, meant that this orderly society should lie under the hegemony, the heel, of Prussia. In what way then, and how soon, schooled by adversity, will they confess their error? 'If the State,' he says, 'can no longer accomplish what it wills, it falls into ruin and anarchy.' Will they, at less cost than this, repudiate that national egoism, that 'will to Power,' that instinct of domination which is the fruitful mother of illusion, confusion, and lies? Will they admit at length that there is a political as well as a commercial morality; that patriotism can too often be, as Dr Johnson said, 'the last refuge of a scoundrel'? 'The Germans must be freed from within, the attempt from without is useless.' Meanwhile the friends without—lovers of liberty two of them, and the third well in the way of becoming so, friends made foes against their will—prosecute this war in order to end war, it may be; to break down the evil spirit of militarism which has beset a great people overwrought by pride, arrogance, infatuation, and megalomania.

Art. 4.—THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY.

1. *Naval Administration*. By Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton. London: Bell, 1896.
2. *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Eleventh Edition. Vol. 1, Art. 'Admiralty Administration.' Cambridge: University Press, 1910.
3. *The Times Book of the Navy*. London: Published by 'The Times,' 1914.

PART I.—THE POSITION OF THE FIRST LORD.

As an organ of administration, the Board of Admiralty is quite unique; and, since its constitution, powers, functions and responsibilities appear to be very imperfectly understood, it is worth while to examine them in some detail. The Board consists of a certain number—the number has varied from time to time—of Commissioners. These Commissioners are officially styled 'The Lords Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral,' or more briefly 'My Lords Commissioners of The Admiralty'; and they derive their authority to act in that capacity from a Patent issued by the Crown as often as a new Board of Admiralty is constituted. The terms of this Patent have, with certain exceptions to be presently mentioned, remained substantially unchanged since it was first issued by Queen Anne in 1709, on the death of her husband Prince George of Denmark, who had held the office of Lord High Admiral. From that time forward the office has been in commission except for a few months in 1827, when it was revived by Canning in favour of the Duke of Clarence, afterwards King William IV.

But the Patent of Queen Anne was not even in those days the sole source of the authority exercised by the Board. Her Board was not the first Board of Admiralty. The office of Lord High Admiral had been in abeyance more than once in earlier days; and, in particular, it was in abeyance—its powers being exercised by a Board—when the Battle of Beachy Head was fought on June 30, 1690. Arthur Herbert, Earl of Torrington, was held to have misconducted himself in that battle, and it was proposed to bring him to a Court Martial.

But it was objected that the Board of Admiralty could not order a Court Martial involving issues of life and death, inasmuch as that power had by a Statute of Charles II been reserved for a Lord High Admiral alone. To get over this difficulty a declaratory Act was passed, reciting that all powers lawfully vested in the Lord High Admiral 'by Act of Parliament or otherwise' did and should appertain to the Commissioners 'to all intents and purposes as if the said Commissioners were Lord High Admiral of England.' That Statute is still in force, but it was not passed without strong opposition; and it is worthy of note that in a protest recorded by seventeen members of the House of Lords one of the objections taken was that

'the judges having unanimously declared that the law marine was nowhere particularised in their books, whereby the power and jurisdiction of the Lord High Admiral may be ascertained, so that the practice is all that we know of it, we conceive it unprecedented and of dangerous consequence, that the jurisdiction exercised by the Lord High Admiral should, by a law, be declared to be in the Commissioners of the Admiralty, whereby an unknown and therefore unlimited power may be established in them.'

It is manifest from this that neither the Patent granted by Queen Anne nor any of its successors down to the present day could in any way restrict the powers vested in the Board by the Statute of William and Mary; and those powers were expressly declared by the judges in 1690 to be 'nowhere particularised in their books,' and by the protesting Peers to be 'unknown and therefore unlimited.' As a matter of fact the Patent was framed in exact accordance with the Statute:

'Granting to any three or more of you full power and authority to do everything which belongs to the office of Our High Admiral, as well in and touching those things which concern Our Navy and Shipping as in and touching those which concern the rights and jurisdictions of Our High Admiral.'

The only substantial change which has been made in the Patent since it was first issued by Queen Anne—there are other verbal and textual changes of no great moment—is that, wherever the words 'any three or

more of you' occur in the original Patent, they now read 'any two or more of you.' The authority for this change is to be found in an Act of Parliament, 2 Will. IV, cap. 40, passed to give effect to the many reforms initiated by Sir James Graham, who was First Lord of the Admiralty in the Ministry of Lord Grey.

But the Patent of Queen Anne, together with all its successors, did manifestly effect, or at least intend to effect, one very material change. By putting the office of Lord High Admiral in Commission it substituted the authority of a Board for that of a single individual. Whatever the Lord High Admiral could do by virtue of his 'unknown and therefore unlimited' powers—whether statutory, prescriptive, customary, or what not—that also the Board of Admiralty could do, acting as a Board through any three or more of its members, and since 1832 through any two or more of them. There are of course many acts of administration which do not require the authority of the Board for their execution, and probably those which do require such authority have never been more than a very small proportion of the whole; but such acts as require the authority of the Board can, according to the Patent, only be done by two or more of the Lords Commissioners sitting and acting as a Board. In other words, a literal interpretation of the Patent, and—so far as the plain sense of the words can be taken to indicate intention—the intention of the Patent, must be held to imply that the Lords Commissioners are co-equal and co-ordinate, the First Lord or President of the Board being invested with no more authority than any of his colleagues, except in so far as he speaks and acts with the authority and at the bidding of the Cabinet, which is of course, in modern times, supreme in the last resort. According to this view the First Lord is *primus inter pares* and nothing more. If the terms of the Patent are to be strictly observed, the First Lord can issue no executive orders except with the concurrence of his colleagues or at least of one of them. Such orders were in former times signed by three Lords at least and countersigned by the Secretary. Nowadays they are signed by the Secretary, endorsed 'By order of My Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty,' and stamped with the seal of the Board.

Such is in ordinary circumstances the procedure as prescribed by the Patent and sanctioned by long usage. But in extraordinary circumstances it is certain that the business of the Admiralty has not for many generations been conducted in strict accord with the terms of the Patent; and that the powers, prerogatives and initiative of the First Lord have never been confined within the limits which would circumscribe them if he were, as the Patent manifestly made him, no more than *primus inter pares* in relation to his colleagues. It is in truth not the Patent which really regulates the business of the Admiralty, but a body of usage, more or less flexible and variable in character, and never reduced to precise definition in writing, which has come down from time immemorial. According to this ancient usage there has always been inherent in the First Lord an elastic power which enables him to undertake any duties which the public welfare may require. In other words, although in all ordinary circumstances the First Lord acts only in concert and after consultation with the Board, yet in extraordinary circumstances of grave emergency the First Lord is supreme and may concentrate in his sole person all the powers of the Board, which powers are, in the words of the Peers' protest of 1690, 'unknown and therefore unlimited.'

This was clearly established once for all by the evidence given before a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861. Sir James Graham, who had been First Lord from 1830 to 1834 and again, during the Crimean War, from 1853 to 1855, said in evidence before this Committee :

'The more I have investigated the matter, the more I am satisfied that, like the common law in aid of the statute law, the power exercised by the Board of Admiralty and the different members of it rests more upon usage than upon the Patents, uninterrupted usage from a very early period.'

Asked if he would recommend any change in the Board of Admiralty, Sir James Graham replied :

'If the supremacy of the First Lord be admitted and be not contradicted, I think it is right now. If, in consequence of all these inquiries and commissions, the strict terms of the patent of equality be insisted upon and the supreme power of the First Lord be shaken or negated, I think the system

is brought to an end and must be changed. On the other hand, if the supreme power of the First Lord, as it has been exercised for centuries, be maintained inviolate, I think it can work well as it is.'

In another answer Sir James Graham said, 'I carry it so high as this, that the First Lord must be supreme; and, being supreme, all are subordinate and co-ordinate under him.' The same experienced Minister had previously said in evidence given before a Committee on the Dockyards, 'The Admiralty can only work by the First Lord exercising power to such an extent as really to render the Board subservient to his will.'

Sir Charles Wood, afterwards Lord Halifax, who succeeded Sir James Graham as First Lord in 1855 and held that office until 1858, having previously served as Parliamentary Secretary of the Admiralty from 1835 to 1839, frankly avowed that he had never dreamt of reading the Patent:

'I found the practice established,' he said, 'when I was Secretary, and I have acted upon it since, without ever, I must fairly say, looking at the Patent. I should very much doubt whether any officer, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of the Admiralty, or anybody else ever read the Patent by which he was appointed. . . . I have been guided entirely by the prescriptive usage, which is a sort of tradition in every office.'

Asked whether he concurred in the opinion quoted above as given by Sir James Graham before the Dockyard Committee, Sir Charles Wood first replied that such a case 'ought never to arise with a proper administration of the Admiralty by any First Lord,' and added that he had never contemplated any such occurrence. But on being further pressed he said, 'In extreme cases extreme remedies must be applied; and, if the Junior Lords oppose the opinion of the First Lord upon serious matters, the Board must be changed.' In his evidence before the same Committee of 1861 Sir John Pakington, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty from 1858 to 1859, gave a detailed account of two instances, in one of which he had overruled his professional colleagues—not, however, without the approval of the Cabinet and the sanction of the Queen—while in the other he had intended

to do so had he not quitted office before the matter came to maturity. In the former case, apparently in order to conform with the letter of the Patent, he instructed his secretary to obtain the signature of some one other Lord to the Minute he had prepared ; but so completely did he regard this as a mere matter of form that he rather ostentatiously declared that he never knew and was careful not to inquire how or from whom the required signature was obtained.

The Duke of Somerset was First Lord of the Admiralty at the time when the Committee of 1861 was sitting, having held that office from 1859 to 1866. He expressed the opinion that 'the Patent created a governing body that did not govern,' and that 'usage is the authority on which the power of the First Lord rests.'

'I consider,' he said, 'that the First Lord often exercised that power absolutely in regard to the most important questions. The First Lords have written abroad to Admirals of Fleets and told them to take such and such a course, in private letters of their own ; and that must be if you are to have rapid orders given, and very often, it may be, secret orders.'

This testimony is corroborated by that of Sir John Briggs (who was for many years Reader to the Board of Admiralty, and in that capacity fully conversant with all its proceedings) given before another Committee which sat ten years later in 1871. Sir John Briggs was asked, 'Were not orders constantly sent to the Fleet, sometimes by the First Lord, sometimes by the First Sea Lord, upon his single signature, in consequence of a communication from the Foreign Office ?' The reply was 'Constantly.'

The cumulative evidence here adduced seems clearly to show that, so far back as 1861, the supremacy of the First Lord was, in the judgment of four experienced First Lords of the Admiralty, essential to the proper working of the Admiralty and sanctioned by immemorial usage and prescription, notwithstanding the letter of the Patent, which knows nothing of supremacy and plainly points to equality. But here the analogy of the Treasury Patent comes in to show how completely usage and prescription may supersede the letter of a formal instrument. The 'Lords Commissioners of the Treasury' are

appointed by a Patent—which seems to date from the fusion of the Exchequers of Great Britain and Ireland—to execute the office of Lord High Treasurer. The Patent grants to any two or more of the Commissioners named in it the power to do anything that could formerly be done by the separate Commissioners for Great Britain and Ireland. Yet the Board of Treasury now never meets—it has held no meetings since 1856—and all its powers are exercised on occasion either by the First Lord of the Treasury or by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in most cases by the latter. The powers of the Board of Admiralty have undergone no such complete decay as this, nor can any one doubt that it would be disastrous if they had. But it would seem that they have long, perhaps always, been exercised subject in the last resort to the unfettered supremacy of the First Lord. It is true that Sir Charles Wood said, ‘I can hardly conceive a case in which the First Lord of the Admiralty would differ from the whole of his professional advisers on any professional subject’; but he acknowledged, as we have seen, that, if such an extreme case ever did arise, ‘the Board must be changed,’ in other words, the opinion of the First Lord must prevail. It is also true that when Sir John Pakington overruled his professional colleagues he was careful to obtain the approval of the Cabinet and the sanction of the Queen for what he proposed to do.

Perhaps in these two cases we may discern the true limits by which the supremacy of the First Lord is circumscribed. On the one hand the First Lord, equally with each and all of his colleagues, is subject as a matter of course to the superior authority of the Cabinet. On the other hand, his relations to his colleagues on the Board are just as much founded on usage and prescription as his own supremacy is; and it is manifest that the Board could not work at all unless those relations were marked by good will, good feeling, good sense and a spirit of loyal co-operation. If, then, in any grave emergency the First Lord should deem it his duty to act without consulting his colleagues or in opposition to their advice, and if, after so asserting his supremacy, his action has neither been disallowed by the Cabinet nor followed by the resignation or dismissal of his colleagues

it must be assumed, until the contrary is proved, that his supremacy has not been abused. Even so questions may be raised as to the wisdom, expediency, or propriety of his action; but none can be raised as to his prerogative authority, long established by usage, prescription, and precedent.

It has often been represented that this supremacy of the First Lord was first established by an Order in Council passed in 1869, whereby the First Lord was represented as 'responsible to your Majesty and to Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty'; while the other members of the Board were enjoined to 'act as his assistants in the transaction of the duties,' each of them being responsible to the First Lord for the administration of such business as was assigned to them by the Order in Council. This Order was passed at the instance of Mr Childers, who became First Lord in 1868 and soon made it clear that he entertained very advanced views as to the prerogatives attached to his office. By enjoining the members of the Board to act as the First Lord's 'assistants,' it unquestionably had the effect, as was doubtless intended, of gravely and very injuriously impairing the authority and influence of the Board; and this effect was shown in the fact that, whereas in 1866 no fewer than 249 Board meetings were held, in 1870, under Mr Childers' *régime*, only 33 meetings were held. Most of these lasted only a very few minutes, and none lasted so long as half an hour, even when the Estimates for the year were under consideration. In other words, Mr Childers practically abolished the Board and reduced its meetings to a mere empty formality.

This system was found to work exceedingly ill; and it did not long survive the retirement of Mr Childers from office. He ceased to be First Lord in 1871, and was succeeded by Mr (afterwards Lord) Goschen. In 1872 a new Order in Council was passed, whereby the Order of 1869 was rescinded, and the members of the Board were no longer represented as acting merely as the 'assistants' of the First Lord. But, like its predecessor, this new Order recognised the First Lord as 'responsible to Your Majesty and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty,' and made the other Lords responsible to the First Lord for so much of the business of the department

as might from time to time be assigned to them. In subsequent Orders in Council of various dates—of which one of the most important was that of Aug. 10, 1904—this responsibility and this allocation of business were defined in substantially the same phraseology; and it is now a well-established principle of Admiralty administration that the First Lord is responsible to the Crown and Parliament for all the business of the Admiralty, while his colleagues are responsible to him for such business as he may from time to time assign to them. But it is quite a mistake to suppose that the supremacy of the First Lord was first established by the rather ill-starred Order in Council of 1869. It was first textually formulated by that instrument, but it had been established long before, in fact from time immemorial. On this point there would seem to be no appeal from the authoritative deliverance of the Hartington Commission, which reported in 1890. After defining the effect of the Order in Council of 1872 in the sense above indicated, the Report of that Commission proceeds:

‘It is clearly shown, however, by the evidence given by the Civil and Naval Lords before the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861, that the administration of the Admiralty rested on the same basis previous to the issue of the Order in Council above referred to. The Order in Council of the 14th of January, 1869, in which the sole responsibility of the First Lord for the administration of the Navy was first officially laid down, merely, therefore, gave formal sanction to what had been the actual practice for many previous years.’

Finally the whole matter may be summed up in the weighty words used by the late Sir William Anson in his classical work on ‘The Law and Custom of the Constitution’ (Vol. II, Sect. v, p. 192):

‘The Lords Commissioners are nominally upon an equality. The Patent makes no distinction in their respective positions; the political chief of the Admiralty is only the Lord whose name stands first in the Commission. But in fact the First Lord is supreme for two reasons. The First Lord has for a very long time been a member of the Cabinet. He therefore speaks to his colleagues with the force of the Cabinet behind him. If the other Lords differ from him at the Board, he

can say that, unless his wishes are carried out, he will not remain a member of the Board. If, as would be probable, the rest of the Cabinet supported the First Lord against his colleagues, the King would be advised to issue fresh Letters Patent, constituting a new Commission of the Admiralty, in which other names would be substituted for those of the dissentient members of the Board.

‘Again successive Orders in Council have made the First Lord responsible to the King, and to Parliament, for all the business of the Admiralty, and have, in addition, made the other members of the Board responsible to the First Lord for the business assigned to them.’

The foregoing discussion has been deliberately conducted on purely academic lines. No attempt has been made to discuss or even to glance at any recent action, whether legitimate or not, attributed to the present First Lord. The facts are not accurately known; and, even if they were, the issues raised by them would be purely personal issues, or, at most, issues of policy and expediency. On such issues, if the facts were known, there might be much to be said, possibly on both sides.

In the concluding part of this article, which will appear in the second half of this number of the ‘Quarterly Review,’ the ‘Distribution of Business’ in the Board of Admiralty will be discussed. It is a subject which was much debated a few years ago and it still appears to be imperfectly understood in some quarters. It will be treated separately because it concerns not so much the position and functions of the First Lord as those of the First Sea Lord.

JAMES R. THURSFIELD.

Art. 5.—A REVOLT OF ISLAM?

Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey. [Cd. 7628.] London: Wyman, 1914.

TURKEY'S dramatic—or melodramatic—entry upon the stage of the European conflict has, as was natural, given rise to some apprehension and many speculations. In the following pages I shall attempt, not a forecast which events might falsify, but an estimate of Turkey's qualifications for the rôle she has undertaken to play; trusting that such an estimate, based upon the past and the present, affords a reasonable index to the probabilities of the future.

The Ottoman Empire has been assigned, by those who control its destinies at this hour, two tasks, which, though closely connected, can best be understood if treated separately. The first is to create a diversion in favour of Germany by a direct attack on two of Germany's enemies, Russia and Great Britain. The Caucasus and Egypt are the fields upon which the Sultan's forces are expected to prove their capacity for making themselves disagreeable to our allies and ourselves. The task is of a purely military nature, and must be judged by a purely military standard. No one who has had the opportunity of studying the Turkish soldier on active service will deny his many valuable qualities—his gallant disdain of death in battle, his dogged tenacity of purpose, his stoical patience under hardships and privations. In all these respects he is a match for any troops he may have to meet. But war, especially war under modern conditions, is not so much a matter of martial virtue, as of organisation; and organisation implies the possession of mental abilities and material resources, in which the Ottoman leaders are conspicuously poor. This poverty has been demonstrated twice within the last few years; first in Tripoli, and then in the Balkan Peninsula. On both occasions lack of brains and money on the part of the commanders nullified all the efforts of their troops. It would be unreasonable to suppose that an Empire which failed so ignominiously in a struggle with States like Bulgaria,

Servia, and Greece, can achieve any very brilliant success when pitted against Russia and Great Britain. It is true that, in the present emergency, the Kaiser is endeavouring to make good his ally's intellectual and financial deficiencies; Prussian officers have been sent to direct the operations of the Ottoman army and navy, and Prussian gold to diminish the emptiness of the Ottoman Treasury. But the supply of both commodities, limited as it is by the Kaiser's nearer necessities, is bound to fall far short of the demand. The opportune addition of two valuable units to the Turkish fleet by the 'sale' of the 'Goeben' and the 'Breslau' is also an important factor which it would be unwise to ignore. But the importance of this asset, if it cannot be overlooked, can be overrated. The fighting capacity of those vessels, however great it may be, is inexorably limited to the range of their guns, and is further circumscribed by the coal-supply. Naval guns can do little more than bombard coasts, and without an adequate supply of steam-power the best ships cannot keep up their speed. What the Ottoman fleet has already done in the Black Sea marks the extent of its value.

If we turn to the Turkish army, there also we have in its actual performance a measure of its promise. On the Russian frontier the Tsar's troops have already established an ascendancy which, when his strategists consider the moment suitable, will develop into an advance. Temporary checks there may be, and the Turks may well be able to boast of local 'victories'; but repeated disaster in the past has taught them that ultimately a conflict with their mighty neighbour can end in one way only. Enver Pasha may think otherwise; but the cumulative effect of the Turco-Russian wars from the early 18th century to the latter years of the 19th has been to instil into the ordinary Turk's heart a fatalistic faith in Muscovite invincibility. The same moral may be drawn from the operations already witnessed on the Egyptian frontier. Bands of Bedouin free-lances, richer in valour than in discipline or equipment, may raid, and even score some successes; but these sporadic performances by guerrilla hordes cannot have any decisive influence over the war. As to the regular Turkish forces, which alone might endanger our

hold on Egypt, it must be borne in mind that, besides the deficiencies enumerated, they labour under geographical difficulties which would prove formidable even to a much better organised army. Before they reach Egypt those forces will have to traverse a waterless desert. I have seen Bedouins accomplishing this feat with wonderful ease. After several weeks' march on bare feet across the burning sands of the Sahara, they would stride into camp, with a handful of dates for food, and a branch of scrub for fuel—no provision was made for water, the few wells along the route and the goodwill of God being trusted to slake their thirst. But the Ottoman soldier is not a Bedouin. The stationary life of centuries has robbed him of the nomad's marvellous endurance and frugality. His needs may be fewer than those of a European soldier, but they are numerous enough to require an efficient commissariat. It is precisely in the matter of commissariat that the Sultan's armies show at their worst; and it may be doubted whether the Kaiser can do much to cure this evil.

The second task allotted to Turkey, though indirect, deserves much more serious consideration. The Sultan's participation in the war against Russia, France and Great Britain is expected to stir up the Mohammedan subjects of the three Powers into rebellion. Nothing less is anticipated than a Pan-Islamic upheaval, stretching from the shores of the Atlantic to the slopes of the Himalayas—a general Revolt of Islam. The Mohammedan inhabitants of Turkestan, Afghanistan, Hindustan, Egypt, Tripoli, Tunis, Algeria, Morocco will rise in their millions, at the call of the Caliph, and hurl themselves upon the Christian invaders of Asia and North Africa; and the Commander of the Faithful, from his palace in Stambul, will behold the vast ocean of the Moslem world swell at his bidding and overwhelm the Unbelievers under its waves. To what extent the Kaiser pins his faith to such a cataclysm, we have no means of knowing. But many of his Turkish allies are firmly convinced that this will be one of the results of their move. Many Turks, both Young and Old, have for years past been amusing themselves with the vision of a Pan-Islamic Empire under their suzerainty; and secret missionaries have

periodically been sent forth from Stambul to all the cardinal points of the Moslem world to preach this gospel and to prepare the soil for a general Jihad. Under Abdul Hamid these efforts partook of the spasmodic and desultory character that pervaded all his activities, and were tempered by the timidity, or the appreciation of realities, that always paralysed his policy. But the more enterprising and less experienced spirits which have since the Revolution steered, or failed to steer, the ship of the Ottoman Empire have displayed in this direction also their characteristic energy, ambition, and utter inability to distinguish between solid facts and the iridescent fancies of a feverish dream.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the stuff this dream is made of is wholly imaginary. The idea of a Revolt of Islam is not an offspring of the uncreative Turkish mind. The Turk has only tried to nourish a plant which originally sprang from the fertile soil of Arab idealism and still derives its sustenance from Arab faith. I have had occasion to test the vitality of the Pan-Islamic tree, to see its flowers and to speculate upon its possible fruits, during the Tripolitan war. The Arab tribesmen who came out of the Sahara to fight the Italians came full of a fine religious fervour. In fighting the invaders of Tripoli they believed they were fighting the enemies of Allah. To them the campaign was not a merely local and isolated enterprise, but an incident in a general crusade of the Faithful—one act in a great drama destined to find its climax in a liberation of the whole of North Africa from the hands of the Infidel. They gave expression to this conviction by calling the expedition a 'Holy War' and themselves 'Holy Warriors'; and they proved its sincerity by their wonderful readiness to die in witness thereof. Nor was there any dearth of apostles eager to fan their zeal and keep the hope of ultimate triumph burning.

I had the good fortune to gain the friendship of one of these enthusiastic preachers—a very remarkable personality of the Peter-the-Hermit type. He had devoted his life to going to and fro in the earth and walking up and down in it, scattering the promise of redemption in all Moslem hearts wherever they might be found. He had already been twice across the Sahara

from Morocco to Egypt. He had been in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan, in India. When I met him in the Turco-Arab camp outside Tripoli he had just arrived on foot from Alexandria, having covered the distance in ninety-four days, which included stoppages at all the Turco-Arab camps on the way. At each place he halted for a few days, not to rest, but to preach and fight. He carried across his back an Italian rifle, at his side an Arab scimitar, and on his shoulder a flag with a significant device—a green globe representing Africa, and some red patches over it representing the Moslem provinces under Infidel occupation. Alongside this blazon was embroidered the text, 'Nasrun min Allah wa fethun karib' ('Victory (is) from God, and the conquest near').

I could not have found a more competent exponent of the Pan-Islamic dream, or a more clear-sighted critic of its strength and its weakness. All his statements were enlightening, and one of his most emphatic prophecies (he laid claim to prevision of the future) has already found a startlingly accurate fulfilment. He described the nations of Europe as so many brigands who said, 'Islam is asleep; let us go in and take all we can.'

'But,' he added, 'wait and see. The day of retribution is at hand. In a few years, very few years—I will give it to you in writing, if you like—there will be a great European war, Italy fighting Austria, Germany fighting France, England fighting Germany. Then is our time for a general sweep.'*

He claimed to be the spokesman of millions of Mohammedans who thought as he thought, and felt as he felt. That the claim was well founded I ascertained from numerous conversations I had with Arabs of all sorts and conditions. But, on the other hand, I also ascertained both in Egypt and in Tunis that the distance which separates aspiration from action is as wide in Islam as it is in Christendom. Every Moslem country evinced a profound sympathy with the Tripolitan struggle for freedom; and that sentiment found practical

* These were his exact words, uttered at the beginning of 1912. See 'The Holy War in Tripoli,' by G. F. Abbott, p. 263.

expression in a variety of ways. But it is most instructive to note that it did not express itself in any attempt at rebellion against Infidel rule. Neither we in India and Egypt, nor the French in Tunis and Algeria, suffered from the agitation which the Italians created in Tripoli; the seismic disturbance, contrary to anticipation, produced no sympathetic shock outside the Tripolitan area. Why?

There are two principal reasons—one positive and the other negative. The positive reason is the satisfaction of all those Moslem populations with Christian rule—a satisfaction based upon a shrewd appreciation of the practical benefits of that rule, and one that can co-exist with much sentimental discontent, without being seriously affected by it. Observers who read the nationalist newspapers of Young Tunis, Young Egypt, and Young India are often misled into the belief that the able editors of those journals are ripe for sedition. No graver error, or one betraying a more fatal ignorance of human nature, could well be made. Even if the writers of those articles mean what they say (which is far from being always the case, though the writers themselves may think it is), few of their readers are impressed otherwise than in a febrile way by them. No true Mohammedan, if he were offered the choice between the two ideals, would choose Infidel rule. But we are not living in an ideal world. The average African and Asiatic has this fundamental quality in common with the average European—he knows on which side his bread is buttered. They have never experienced under Moslem domination the personal freedom, the equality of justice, the security of life and property, the protection against disease and famine, the commercial prosperity, which they experience now under the British and French flags; and they know it. One of the main arguments I heard advanced against the Italians by the leaders of the Arab resistance in Tripoli was not the religion of the invaders, but their poverty and their inability to do much more for the Arabs than their Turkish rulers had done for them. I am not concerned here to judge the soundness of the argument, but only to state it, as being significant. And its significance was enhanced by the fact that the men who put it forward would then go on to contrast these

shortcomings of the Italians with the wealth and administrative competence of the English and the French on either side of Tripoli. Indeed, a number of Tripolitans had appealed to France to take them under her flag.

This appreciation of material advantages, though keenest among Arabs of culture and substance, is just as noticeable among the most ignorant and indigent. One instance will suffice. On the Tripoli-Tunis frontier there is a rain-water cistern built by the French. On my return from the desert, I pointed it out to my camel-driver, who was not aware of its existence. After quaffing some of the clear liquid—so different from the mud he was used to on the other side of the border—and making certain noises of satisfaction with his throat and lips, he said, 'Praise be to Allah, and to the French Government. Ah, sir. The French can think; they are not like us or the Turks!' In addition to these practical advantages which it shares with ours, I found the French administration popular for a quality which ours lacks. The French appeared to me to have found their way to the Arab's heart, as well as to his head. I have found in Tunis a *camaraderie* between alien rulers and native subjects which, after some experience of Anglo-India and Anglo-Egypt, struck me as a most exhilarating novelty.

This sound estimation of the beneficent and liberal nature of French and British rule has already, since the outbreak of the war, manifested itself in the loyal and cordial support which both Powers have received from their Moslem subjects. Fifty thousand African Arabs are at this moment fighting for France, and fighting as cheerfully as any other citizens of the Republic. We have to acknowledge with gratitude, and a perfectly legitimate self-gratulation, the devotion of British Moslems from one end of the Empire to the other. Such men of light and leading in Islam as the Agha Khan and the Nizam of Hyderabad have given magnificent tokens of the spirit which animates them and their followers. All the Mohammedan communities in India have hastened to renew to the Viceroy their expressions of hearty adherence to our cause, and to add to them expressions of unqualified disgust at Turkey's action. Egypt has

done nothing to justify the hopes based upon her by the Sultan and his advisers, while from farther south the Mohammedans of Sierra Leone, through their religious ministers (imams), send spontaneous messages of loyalty, in which we are told that they are incessantly praying that Allah may grant victory to England. They, being honest folk unversed in the frothy sophisms with which our journalists confuse our and their own minds, candidly explain, as the Agha Khan has also done, that the ground of their attachment to the British throne is not sentimental but practical. 'Some of us,' they say, 'have had the privilege of travelling to foreign parts, and from our experience of the treatment received by natives at the hands of their foreign rulers, especially the Germans—whose destruction may God expedite—we cannot but come to the above conclusion.'

The negative reason why Moslems in general have not responded to the Caliph's call is an absence of cohesion which renders any common movement impossible in the Mohammedan world. Islam still is, to a very large extent, where Christendom was in the Middle Ages. It possesses that unity of creed which rendered the Crusades possible. But this religious unity is accompanied neither by political coherence nor by community of culture. It is a far cry from the educated graduate of Oxford or Paris to the Bedouin of the Sahara. The Turkish Sultan, by virtue of his position as Caliph, and as the head of the greatest Moslem State still free, might have supplied a rallying-point to the scattered forces of Islam. But he has always failed to do so. The causes of that failure are even more instructive than the fact itself.

First comes a difference of temperament which marks off the Turk from the Arab as sharply as the extreme type of Teuton is marked off from the extreme type of Latin. There can be, and there is, no sympathy between the stolid, taciturn, slow-moving Turk and the impulsive, talkative, nimble Arab. The depth of the mental and moral chasm that separates the two races becomes apparent whenever and wherever representatives of each are brought into physical proximity, as was the case in the Tripoli camp. There I had a daily demonstration of its existence and of the mutual distrust and dislike

that resulted therefrom. The Turks despised the Arabs for their excitability, and were despised by them for their own stupidity, want of dash and initiative, and general incompetence—an incompetence particularly galling when accompanied by arrogance. The antipathy was shared by every Arab I came across, but it found most eloquent utterance among those Arabs who had come under European influence and were able to contrast the sloth they saw in the Turkish headquarters with the conditions which prevailed in Tunis under the French. Tunisian male nurses could find no words with which to express their disgust at the chaos of the Turkish hospitals; and a Tunisian who had served for some years in the French army stood aghast at the sight of the ill-clad, ill-fed, slovenly, uncared-for Ottoman troops.

Equally instructive was the Turk's indifference to, or rather unconsciousness of, the contempt he inspired. Nothing was done to bridge over by tact the chasm fixed by nature. The result was perpetual animosity, which at times developed into dangerous friction. All this was only a fresh illustration of the Turk's familiar want of imaginative comprehension—the want which has always caused him to fail as a leader of alien races. What was new was a feature imported into the picture since the Revolution. The Old Turk, whatever his deficiencies might be, was at least a True Believer; his piety made up, in a measure, for his stupidity. The Young Turk had accentuated, in the eyes of his Arab comrades, the inherited arrogance and unintelligence, by adding to it a religious indifference which in some cases amounted to rank infidelity. During the four months I spent among them, I saw only three Turks (all three men over fifty) pray; and I heard an Arab sheikh give vent to a horrified suspicion that there were among us Turkish officers who denied the existence of God. There is reason to believe that this attitude is not confined to the Arabs of North Africa—it is general among all the Arab populations, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. Even the dreamers who dream of a Day of Redemption and Retribution are shrewd enough to see that the Turk is not the man appointed for the task. The prophet whom I have already quoted summed up this feeling to me in these weighty words:

'There are many Pashas in Stambul, but not a single wise man among them. One pursues an English, another a German, a third a French policy—and they all take bribes. No; that is not the sort of people to do the great work. We want men with a Moslem policy—men who have faith in Allah. And these men are to be found in the Sahara, not in Stambul.'

The Tripolitan campaign, far from drawing the Arab closer to the Turk, had the opposite effect. The Turks had there a chance of earning Arab loyalty. Through the causes mentioned, they missed it. One result of their failure was the collapse of Arab resistance to the Italians, the disintegration of the forces which a common hope had brought together, and a bitter disillusion. Another result, equally important with reference to the present situation, was a deepening of the sense of the Turk's unworthiness and weakness. The Tripolitan fiasco was an object-lesson which has sunk deep into the heart of the Moslem world. The Holy Warriors carried away from the Ottoman headquarters an ineffaceable impression of Ottoman incompetence and infidelity. Nor is this impression likely to be modified by the knowledge that the Turkish armies at the present hour are controlled by Christian generals, and that the summons to the Faithful which has gone forth from Stambul was dictated by a commander whose name is Wilhelm. Enver Pasha and his friends realise this as keenly as they fail to realise other important facts. Hence the clumsy attempt to persuade the Arabs of Syria that the Kaiser has embraced the faith of the Prophet—an attempt which affords but another proof of the Turk's ludicrous under-estimation of Arab intelligence. In this connexion I may cite a little incident that occurred in Tripoli. We had there four young German officers who had come out to help the cause, and incidentally, to promote German prestige in the Moslem world. In the very first engagement in which one of these gentlemen participated he was barely saved from death at the hands of an Arab warrior, who, suddenly discovering that the officer in a Turkish headgear was an infidel in disguise, turned his rifle upon him.

I have dwelt on this point at some length, because it appears to be vital in a consideration of the effects of

Turkey's participation in the struggle. Another point equally relevant to this inquiry is the fact that the Sultan's title to the Caliphate has never been accepted without question by the Arabs, and that his claim to act as the guardian of the Holy Places of Islam has often been disputed by force of arms, as well as of argument, by rival claimants in Arabia. Not very long ago the region of Mecca and Medina (Hejaz) was the theatre of another of these chronic efforts to rid it of Turkish domination. To understand Arab sentiment on the subject it is sufficient to bear in mind that the Ottoman Padishah's claim to the position of the Prophet's 'Successor' (Khalif) is based entirely upon conquest, that it derives no sanction from any Power higher than the power of the sword, and that it is of comparatively recent origin. Until 1517 the Caliphate was in the hands of the ancient Abbasid House, which held it by right of inheritance—a purely spiritual trust entirely divorced from temporal authority. That year the Sultan Selim the Grim wrested from the Mamluks Egypt, Syria, and the Mecca and Medina districts of Arabia, and compelled the representative of the Abbasids, who lived at Cairo, to make over to him the title of Caliph, and to surrender the sacred heirlooms which had been handed down in his family for centuries. From this it will become obvious on how precarious a foundation rests Turkey's pretension to act as arbiter of the destinies of the Moslem world. The position could only be maintained so long as it could be defended by the same weapon by which it was conquered. Turkey, by her entry on the battlefield, is now imperilling, together with her political existence, her spiritual leadership. It should be our endeavour to profit by her action, and to turn her mental aberration not only to our own strategic advantage but to the permanent benefit of Islam. I venture to urge that the present situation should be clearly visualised in all its bearings at once, and that no time should be lost in deriving all the good that can be derived from it. The situation is favourable in itself; but it is only by vigorous effort that it can be made fruitful.

The Prime Minister, speaking at the Guildhall Banquet the other night, was at pains to assert that whatever

doom might overtake the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Places of Islam would be carefully protected from foreign interference. The statement was timely, and the action which it indicated was in the right direction. But if our Government's plans do not go as yet beyond the negative stage of non-interference with the Hejaz, it is high time that they should do so. We need a positive policy with regard to the Near East; we have needed such a policy for too many years. The moment has come to exchange a hand-to-mouth diplomacy for constructive statesmanship. The materials for such construction are ready to hand. In the Arab-speaking world we have millions of True Believers who resent the Turk's usurpation of the Caliphate, and more than one individual who, adequately supported, could replace him. In addition we have the same millions ready, if properly assisted, to shake off the Turkish yoke—a yoke which, with the spread of European education in Syria and Egypt, they have learnt to despise more even than they hated it formerly. A European Power which would attempt to substitute Christian for Ottoman domination over those populations would be simply playing into the Kaiser's hands. But a Power which would come forth with a programme of Arab independence, backed by the material means for carrying it out, would find its hands strengthened by an enormous accretion of influence throughout the world of Islam. The severance of the connexion between Cyprus and Turkey, and the deliverance of the Cypriots from the millstone of the tribute they hitherto paid the Porte, is one of the good fruits which the Turkish move has already yielded to the British Empire. But it is quite an insignificant boon compared with the benefits, strategic, political, and moral, which the British Empire could reap by utilising that move for the purpose of creating a free Arabia, and thus giving to the call to arms issued from Constantinople a practical interpretation calculated to confound its authors.

G. F. ABBOTT.

Art. 6.—THE ATTITUDE OF ITALY.

PRINCE VON BÜLOW, in a book* which appeared only a few months before the war began, described the Triple Alliance as a conservative league, instituted with the object of preserving the *status quo* against the 'revolutionary' tendencies characteristic of the foreign policy pursued by most of the other states of Europe. These 'revolutionary' tendencies resolve themselves into two maxims of foreign policy: first, that so far as possible a state should be co-extensive with a nation; secondly, that where this is impossible owing to the incapacity of any nation to govern itself, it should not be divided between two or more dominant States. Ever since the wars of Napoleon spread the doctrines of the Revolution throughout the Continent, all those states on the one hand which accepted the principles of popular government, and on the other hand all those nations which were not co-extensive with a sovereign state, have aspired to put these maxims into practice. The history of the wars of the 19th century is very largely the history of the efforts to achieve this purpose. The cause of nationality has marched from triumph to triumph; and, if Europe is not yet completely reconstructed on national lines, it is due less to the strength of the opposing forces than to the mutual jealousies and conflicting claims of those who share the same ideal, and to the general fear of provoking a conflagration the economic damage of which would be out of proportion to any political advantages obtainable.

In the first part of the 19th century Turkey and Austria were the only two European states definitely opposed to the ideal of Nationalism; but Germany, as soon as she had achieved her own national unity and independence, denied the maxims cited above as universally applicable, as she refused to concede the principle of popular government. Pan-Germanism is more imperial than national in aim; and by the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine Germany definitely committed herself to the conservative policy of upholding the *status quo* against the national aspirations of France. The defensive

* 'Imperial Germany,' by Prince Bernhard von Bülow.

alliance made between Germany and Austria in 1879 arose out of the need of mutual assistance against their common and numerous foes. The adherence of Italy to the alliance three years later has never ceased to be criticised both at home and abroad; for Italy is nationalist and democratic *nata e sputata*; her foreign policy should naturally be more 'revolutionary' than that of almost any other European state. But Italy had need, above all else, of a long peace in order to be able to consolidate her national unity and to achieve the social regeneration of her people. This, among a number of contributing causes, among which were a mistrust and jealousy of France, was the prime cause of Italy allying herself with the central Empires; and, as von Bülow remarks, 'to desire peace is, in the language of international politics, to desire the *status quo*.'

In the last quarter of a century the growth of German power gave rise to an inflated ambition to become the most powerful state and empire in the world; at the same time, as regards Austria, the ever-increasing pressure of nationalist claims caused her to contemplate striking at her enemies before they were prepared to strike at her. So the Triple Alliance gradually assumed in regard to the central Empires an aggressive character; and for this reason England descended from her position of splendid isolation and ranged herself against them. Italy continued to remain a member of the Alliance for the same reasons as those for which she entered it, for her attention was more occupied with the 'Austrian Question' as a possible disturber of the peace of Europe than with the ambitions of Germany. Then came the Balkan wars; and, as soon as it became patent that their results had robbed Austria of her last hope of solving peacefully her most grievous national problem—the Southern Slav question—Germany seized the opportunity of forcing on the conflict which was to decide whether or not her ambitions were to be realised. Thereupon Italy, which had ranged herself with Germany and Austria chiefly in the desire to avoid war, found herself faced with the alternatives of either breaking with her allies or fighting for a cause diametrically opposed to her political principles. The question was not difficult to decide. The balance of material interests at stake was

all in favour of the first alternative; and the undeniable fact that Germany and Austria were the aggressors furnished Italy with a technical as well as with a moral excuse for standing aside. It is one thing, however, to break with one's old allies, another to turn round and make war against them. Nevertheless many people regard Italy's declaration of neutrality as only a step towards joining in the war on the side of the Triple Entente. Whether this will prove to be the case or not only time can show. Meanwhile it will be instructive to examine what Italy is thinking and saying on the matter, and to state what can be gathered from the Press and from a daily intercourse with Italians of all classes.

Just as there are three alternative policies possible, so there are three distinct parties in the country between which the controversy rages. The various parliamentary groups, which more or less correspond to the different bodies of public opinion in the country, have each registered their opinion. On one hand, an alliance between the extreme Clericals and the extreme official Socialists has pronounced in favour of neutrality *usque ad finem*. The reasons of the former are not Christian charity, but a hope in the righteous chastisement of infidel France and in the triumph of Catholic Austria. It is useless to argue with them that the war against Germany is a war against Nietzscheism, the most formidable foe of Christianity, or to plead that the chiefest need of Catholicism in Austria is to be freed from the shackles of State control. The Socialists, for their part, desire peace at any price as a logical consequence of their principles of international solidarity; and it is not unlikely that the negation of patriotism is the bond of union between them and the Clericals, for there are grave suspicions that another and possibly weightier reason why the latter desire Italy to remain neutral, is the sectarian hope that Italy will be excluded from the peace congress, while the Pope will succeed in being represented.

At the opposite extreme is the party which advocates war at any price. It is composed of Futurists, Reform Socialists, Republicans and Nationalists. The Futurists bark louder than they bite; 'la guerra per noi è la sola igiene del mondo!' The Reform Socialists and

Republicans are idealists. They appeal to duty rather than to material interests. In a recent manifesto issued over the signature of Signor Bissolati, leader of the Reform Socialists, it was urged eloquently and fervently that it was the duty of Italians to stand up and fight on the side of nationality and democracy; that it would be shameful to receive Trent or Trieste at the hands of a victorious France without making the smallest sacrifice to deserve them; and that, for the honour of Italian arms, it is necessary to reverse the verdicts of Custoza and of Lissa. The Republicans use very similar arguments, though, true to their Mazzinian traditions, they lay particular stress on the prime necessity of making another step in advance towards uniting all Italians under one flag. Their appeal is not without effect, especially in Rome and in the Romagna and in those provinces which have not forgotten the Austrian oppression.

Unfortunately for the success of this propaganda, the majority of Italians are too much the calculating and practical children of this world. Before embarking on a war to liberate Trent and Istria, they want to be sure that success would mean material advantage, that the lives gained by adding the populations of these provinces to the kingdom of Italy would more than balance the lives lost in the enterprise. Italians displayed in the Risorgimento an admirable capacity for idealism, but the bulk of them need to be fed on something more solid than ideals. Now the Nationalists—who form the backbone of the war-party, and who date their origin from the need, recognised by a number of young Italians a few years ago, of giving Italy a backbone—claim to offer their countrymen, if they would only decide to make war without further delay, some solid material gain besides. Their strength lies in the fact that they are represented in all the more important political groups. They have an important following among the younger generation, and, as the Press is largely in the hands of young men, they have gained, if not the control of the most important newspapers, at least the right of using them for airing their opinions. The vast majority of them are in favour of war; and this explains the fact that the majority of the more

influential newspapers appear to be of the same opinion. But the opinion of the majority of the Press must not be taken to mean the opinion of the majority of the electorate.

Signor Giuseppe Bevione, member of parliament for Turin, who with Signor Federzoni may be considered joint leader of the Nationalist Party, published lately in the 'Stampa' a series of admirable articles on the theme of Italy's neutrality and the necessity of joining in the war. After setting forth the Nationalist creed, which is scarcely Nationalist in the ordinary sense of the word but is rather faith in the supreme importance of national prestige and national strength as a reacting influence on the economic and moral well-being of the people, Signor Bevione enters upon a discussion of the practical issues at stake. Italy must show herself before the world disciplined and organised and capable of making supreme sacrifices. She must make a military reputation. She must not only see to it that the war leaves her mistress of the Adriatic, but that the Adriatic becomes essentially an Italian sea. It is not sufficient to occupy Valona, the strategic key to the Adriatic; nor even to make sure that Trieste and Pola, predominantly Italian, become united to the motherland. Dalmatia and the Islands, which owe all that is best in them to the civilising influence of Venice, must also be redeemed. So it is the business of Italy to anticipate the invasion of the Serbs and to confront Europe at the peace congress with the logic of an accomplished occupation. She must stand shoulder to shoulder with Englishmen in Egypt against Turkey, so that she may earn the right to a modification of the Egypto-Libyan frontier in her favour, to permanent possession of the Dodekanese and to a share in any eventual partition of Turkey. The defeat of Germany and of Austria—Signor Bevione goes on to say—is not so certain that Italy can afford to stand aside. Latin civilisation, superior to Teutonic, runs the risk of being submerged for a time; and it is Italy's interest to stand as champion of Latin civilisation. The break-up of Austria is of paramount importance for the future peace of Europe and for the hope of a peace unsoiled by a senseless race of armaments. The victory of Austria means that Austria will obtain predominance in the

Balkans; the defeat of Austria—unless Italy gains by the valour of her arms a permanent and powerful position on the eastern shores of the Adriatic—means that Russia will gain that predominance. Italy must see to it that neither of these alternatives is realised. Austria must be defeated and dismembered; and Italy, aided by Greece and Roumania—both nations strongly akin to Italy—must make herself the bulwark against excessive Slav influence in the Balkan peninsula. The spread of Italian influence will moreover react favourably on Italian trade. It must not be forgotten too—it is argued—that Italy's entry into the field would hasten the end of the war, and that its prolongation would inflict greater economic losses on the country than would the cost of a campaign. Lastly, Italy, prepared for war, would be in a position to bargain with France and England for substantial concessions in return for her help—a favourable loan, for instance, and the cession, if not of Tunis, at any rate of Obok (Jibuti).

So much for the Nationalist thesis. Unfortunately it leaves out of account one vital element, of the truth of which the majority of Italians are only too conscious—namely, that Italy is not yet grown-up and would overstrain herself if she attempted to assume all at once such enormously increased responsibilities. The army and navy are now no doubt in excellent trim, but—it is argued on the other side—what if the Dual Alliance made a concentrated effort against their former ally? Such a move would facilitate the advance of the French, but meanwhile the result might be disastrous for Italy. Italy is not in a condition to suffer even a temporary blow; and to divide her forces between Egypt, Dalmatia and the Veneto would be courting misfortune. The unwisdom, too, of acquiring Dalmatia, supposing it were possible, is patent. As the vast majority of the population is Serb, its acquisition by Italy would only stir up trouble for the future, at the best resulting in a 'senseless competition of armaments.' The best bulwark against the 'Russian peril' is to be found in the Balkan states themselves. To suppose that Greater Serbia will come under Russian influence is to fall into an error, which history has demonstrated already three times to the shame of British statesmen. Wellington insisted in 1829

on restricting the frontiers of Greece, for fear that the new kingdom should fall under Russian influence; Palmerston insisted, against the advice of Cavour, on the division of Roumania in 1856 for the same reason; and Disraeli, for fear of Russia, upset the treaty of San Stefano at the expense of Bulgaria. Yet not one of these little states has failed to pursue a policy strictly in accordance with its own interests and independent of Russia. The only effect of the various restrictions has been to fan the flame of Balkan unrest. Apart from this question, and disregarding the chance of disaster, it is doubtful whether Italy could stand the strain of a great war. The war in Tripoli, successful as it was, proved that Italy's stamina is not great. It is still more doubtful if the economic benefits which would accrue from hastening the conclusion of hostilities would outweigh the economic cost of a campaign; and, as things stand at present, neither France nor England is willing to purchase Italy's aid by material assistance.

The majority of the nation are aware of these facts and, without wishing to commit themselves to anything so rigid as a policy of unconditional neutrality, they would prefer peace, provided that it does not injure their vital interests or frustrate the realisation of their more pressing hopes.

In an article which appeared lately in the 'Corriere della Sera,' Signore Borgese, author and journalist and one of the ablest and most popular of political writers in Italy, summed up the practical aims which Italy hoped to achieve as the result of the war. They are modest enough. First, a relatively stronger position in the Mediterranean in comparison with France; secondly, an indisputable predominance in the Adriatic; thirdly, a political understanding with England. Considering the many common interests of the two countries, such an understanding should not be difficult to negotiate. The second is realisable, whatever the result of the war, on the one hand by a timely occupation of Valona, and on the other by keeping intact and heightening the efficiency of Italy's naval and military forces. If Austria emerges victorious, she will at any rate not be in a position to veto Italy's permanent occupation of Valona; and the possession of that port is enough to guarantee Italy's

predominance in the Adriatic. On the other hand, if Austria and Germany are severely beaten, there will be no obstacle to Italy's command of that sea. If the peninsula of Istria is allotted to Germany or Servia, the possession of Valona will guarantee Italy's position. But Italy hopes that Istria—apart from the possibility of her being able to occupy it peacefully, so to speak, in the event of Austria losing authority over it before the actual termination of hostilities, which is not altogether an improbable supposition—will be handed over to her, not in reward for anything she may have done, but in homage to the claims of nationality and in consideration of the interests of future European peace. In this case, the time would not have come for Italy to spend money on the fortification of Valona, for with the possession of Pola it will be many years before the Serb navy will be in a position to rival hers.

In regard to the Mediterranean, the relations between Italy and France have never been very cordial. The section of the people inspired by Pan-latinism is insignificant. France is considered to be animated by jealousy of Italy's progress and by fear that the day is not far distant when Italy will take her place as leader among the Latin nations. Moreover, the Italian character does not mix well with the French. Accordingly, many Italians do not conceal their pleasure at the prospect of emerging unscathed from the perils of a great war, while France is expending her blood and treasure so profusely. The efforts of France to enlist Italy on her side have been interpreted, not as a sign that the Triple Entente is in need of another ally, but as due to a desire to see Italy make sacrifices proportionate to those which France is making. The influential Bolognese journal, 'Il Resto del Carlino,' has even suggested that the reason why France has as yet done comparatively little in the Adriatic is the desire not to weaken her fleet in relation to that of Italy; and the 'Stampa' of Turin has declared that for the same reason the forcing of the Dardanelles is not to be hoped for, as the task would fall to the lot of the French. Altogether Italy's rivalry with France is a powerful argument in favour of a continuance of a policy of neutrality, and in the meantime of reorganising and

equipping her army and navy to a degree of efficiency never before attempted.

This middle policy of a conditional neutrality, 'armed and vigilant,' is supported by the large and heterogeneous body of citizens represented in Parliament by the so-called Liberal Party, which is actually the party in power. They require a new cause to arise before Italy commits herself to war. They are particularly jealous of Italy's honour. The Italians are a very self-conscious race, and they bitterly resent the charge so often made against them abroad—at one time perhaps not undeservingly—that they are an unscrupulous people. They are anxious to live down this evil reputation; and they consider that to declare war against their old allies on a mere pretext and without the presence of some new cause, such as the failure of Turkey to prevent the Pan-Islamite Campaign from spreading into Libya, would be a dishonest action. The government in the hands of Signor Salandra may be trusted to keep Italy's honour bright. Signor Salandra has gained the confidence of the mass of the people; and the country is congratulating itself that at last it has a Government on which all can implicitly rely. If the Government decides on war, it can in its turn rely on the people to make all the necessary sacrifices, gladly and willingly. For the present—and the majority of the Italian people note the fact with relief and satisfaction—everything points to an indefinite continuance of the policy of 'armed and vigilant neutrality.'

Art. 7.—THE WAR IN OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER.

I.—BY LAND.

IN the article which appeared in the October number of this Review the chief events of the war were reviewed up to the end of September. At that period a great battle had raged without intermission for more than a fortnight on the heights north of the Aisne from its junction with the Oise to Berry au Bac, and thence eastwards along a line passing south of Rheims across the plain of Champagne and through the forest of the Argonne to the neighbourhood of Verdun. The line then curved southwards along the heights east of the Meuse to the vicinity of St Mihiel, where the French and Germans faced each other on opposite banks of the river, and, again turning eastwards, traversed the undulating district of the Woëvre to the Moselle at Pont à Mousson. Intermittent fighting was also proceeding along the frontier of Lorraine and in the Vosges, which still continues, without, however, having exercised any direct influence on the main operations, the scene of which has lain throughout to the west of the Moselle. The enemy's forces in Belgium, which had previously been employed in containing the Belgian field army based on Antwerp, and in covering the lines of communication traversing that country, had been concentrated for the attack on Antwerp, in which a force of artillery, stated to comprise two hundred guns including numerous howitzers of large calibre, was also employed.

The retreat of the Germans from the Marne had been so hurried that it seemed likely at first that the heights north of the Aisne were being held merely as a rearguard position to cover the reorganisation of the main armies, and the preparation of a defensive position further north. It soon became evident, however, that the position was of great strength, and was occupied in force with a view to stubborn defence. Further to the east, the enemy's retreat, which had been conducted with more deliberation, ceased on reaching the line already indicated. The utmost efforts of the Allies failed to make any material progress on any part of the front. What at first appeared to be a rearguard action on a large

scale developed into a general engagement of great intensity along a front of 180 miles. It was not a hastily entrenched position that the Germans held. It had been prepared deliberately and with consummate skill during their advance to the Marne.

This preparation, during an offensive movement, of an entrenched position in rear on which the army may fall back in case of defeat, forms a distinctive feature of the German system, and constitutes a novelty in war. The method has been followed on every occasion. During the advance to the Niemen at the end of September, a position was prepared on the East Prussian frontier, armed with heavy artillery and occupied by *Landsturm* troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons, before which General Rennenkampf's army was detained for a month after winning the battle of Augustovo. Entrenchments were constructed along the frontier of Posen and Silesia before the end of September, in anticipation of an offensive movement to the Vistula; and the army which fought at Warsaw in October was provided with a position in the rear which it was prevented from occupying by the vigour of the Russian pursuit, and the movement of a large force of cavalry from Novo-Georgiewsk against its left flank. The invariable provision of rallying positions by the Germans might seem out of harmony with the doctrine of the offensive with which they are imbued, and which has been carefully inculcated by their whole system of training; but it is in accordance with the thoroughness which characterises all their methods, and the foresight with which they provide for every possible contingency.

The attack on the position between the Oise and the Moselle, the defence of which was materially aided by heavy siege artillery set free by the fall of Maubeuge, was persisted in by the Allies with great gallantry for many days. The character of the fighting has been said to resemble siege warfare. Ground gained by the Allied troops was promptly entrenched; and a step-by-step advance ultimately resulted in the opposing trenches being, in places, only separated by one or two hundred yards. At a few points the enemy's advanced trenches were carried, but the main position proved unassailable, owing to the skill which characterised

the defensive arrangements. Wire entanglements were lavishly used; guns commanded the approaches from concealed positions; and machine-guns hidden in short lengths of trench projecting from the general line brought a cross-fire to bear on the ground in front. The enemy, true to the principle of the offensive and the teaching of their drill-book, met attack with counter-attack. It would, indeed, be incorrect to describe their attitude as defensive; it was a persistent and determined offensive. It may be concluded from the reports that they were normally the assailants. The entrenchments acted as a base from which assaults were suddenly delivered across the narrow intervening space. This kind of fighting has characterised the campaign throughout. It is novel, because the kind of situation from which it originated necessarily marks the close of tactical operations at manœuvres. It was not, indeed, altogether unforeseen, though it has surpassed in its development and duration anything that was imagined. It may be regarded as the outcome of the use of entrenchments in the attack which our Field Service Regulations recognise; though, curiously enough, the German drill-book is silent on the subject.

Although a battle between entrenched armies bears some resemblance to siege warfare, it is quite dissimilar in several important respects. A besieged army is cut off from all outside sources of supply. It is entirely dependent on its own resources, which must ultimately become exhausted. If, for the moment, we regard the German army as being on the defensive at the beginning of October, it will be evident that it was by no means in a state of being besieged. Its communications with Germany were open for the supply of food, stores, and reinforcements. Its freedom of movement was restricted only by the Allied army in front. On the other hand, it had not the advantage conferred on a besieged army by the encircling defences of the fortress, which provide facilities for meeting attack from every quarter. Hence, when the Allies failed to make any impression on the enemy's position by frontal attack, they sought for a vulnerable point elsewhere. The northward movement west of the Oise was initiated with the object of enveloping the flank and threatening the lines of communication.

It is unnecessary to discuss the details of this operation, of which little is known. It failed because the Germans were able to bring up troops as fast as the Allies for the prolongation of their line. The struggle of each army to outflank the other ultimately resulted in the line of battle reaching the sea, which both prevented further extension and put a stop to the attempts of either side to outflank the other.

It would be hard to say whether the Allies or the Germans have derived more advantage from this extraordinary situation. As regards the tactical situation it may be said, broadly, to militate against the side acting offensively because it has prevented outflanking operations, which seem alone to promise decisive success under present-day conditions. In this respect it has been disadvantageous to the Germans, who have maintained the offensive throughout. On the other hand, it enabled the Allies to bring their naval power into play, by which the defence of their left flank was materially strengthened. From the strategical point of view the Germans benefited by the transfer of the bulk of their army to a position which directly covers their main line of communication through Belgium, both supply and retreat being thus facilitated. Should retreat become necessary, their right flank will derive security during the operation from the proximity of the Dutch frontier. From the Allies' point of view the change in the situation was unfavourable in two respects. It made any enterprise against the enemy's lines of communication impracticable, and it deprived them of the direct retreat into the interior of France which enabled them to wrest the offensive from the Germans early in September.

The extension of the line of battle towards the north was the cause of another important change in the situation. During the earlier stages of the campaign the Germans had contented themselves with masking Antwerp by a detachment of sufficient strength to keep the Belgian field-army shut up in the fortress, and to prevent it from attacking their line of communication passing through Brussels and Louvain. Later on, the necessity of reinforcing the army in France obliged them to withdraw their regular troops from Belgium, their place being taken by *Landwehr* and *Landsturm*.

The Belgians, finding themselves opposed by inferior troops, seized the opportunity to adopt a more active attitude; and reconnaissances which were made in some force resulted in minor encounters in various localities. The retreat of the enemy from the Marne was the signal for a vigorous offensive, which threw the Germans back to Louvain, and seriously threatened the railway, which was one of their chief lines of supply. This display of activity proved that the Belgian army was not a negligible quantity; and, when the line of battle in France began to approach the Belgian frontier, the necessity of ridding themselves of the menace to their right flank became evident to the Germans. The troops in Belgium were rapidly reinforced; the heavy siege artillery, of which Austrian howitzers formed part, was brought up; and the place fell after ten days' attack, the details of which need not be described.

The fall of Antwerp was a serious loss to the Allies, because it deprived them of the co-operation of the Belgian army against the German flank and rear during the subsequent operations. Except for immunity from these attacks, it conferred no immediate material advantage on the Germans. Owing to its peculiar situation it cannot be used as a base for naval operations at any time without violating the neutrality of Holland, which holds the approach from the sea. It is not, indeed, to be supposed that the Germans would hesitate to use the neutral waters of the Scheldt if it suited their purpose to do so; but they are unlikely to provoke the hostility of the Dutch while their hands are fully occupied with the Allied army in the west and with Russia in the east. The moral advantage resulting from the possession of Belgium's last stronghold was, however, considerable. It made their military occupation of the country effective; and it gave them, prospectively, the coveted 'window on the sea,' which they hope to retain till the conclusion of the war, and to make the base of further conquests in the future if the result of the present war should not satisfy all their ambitions.

The downfall of cherished ideas is apt to cause a reaction. The speedy destruction of the modern forts which formed the outer defences of Antwerp, and which

were generally believed to be proof against artillery, succeeding similar experiences at Liège, Namur, and Maubeuge, has caused popular opinion to swing to the opposite extreme, and to suppose that the days of permanent fortifications are ended. This sudden revulsion of opinion seems premature. The triumph of the modern howitzer over the armoured fort must be regarded as an episode in the long contest for supremacy between guns and armour. Each improvement in guns has necessitated a corresponding advance in protective structures; and hitherto—on land at least—the gun has always come out second-best. At sea the conditions are different. There is a limit to the size of ships, and, consequently, to the combined weight of guns and armour that can be kept afloat. The result has been that the gun has emerged triumphant, because victory can be won only by offensive action; and a ship which, though able to resist the enemy's shells, could not carry guns to penetrate his armour would be useless in war. On land the weight of defensive structures is not so rigidly restricted; and the variety of materials that might be used is only limited by the power of invention. On the other hand, the weight of the gun must be within the capacity of the existing means of transport under service conditions. The 28 cm. Austrian howitzer owes its presence in the field to the invention of motor transport, and in weight it has probably reached the practicable limit. It also needs a concrete platform which takes long to construct; and its immobility debars its use in positions where it would be liable to capture. The 42 cm. German howitzer is permanently mounted on a railway truck of special design; and its sphere of action is, therefore, confined to existing railway systems of standard gauge.*

There are other considerations which must be borne

* A description of the 42 cm. howitzer appeared in the 'Engineer' of Nov. 20. These howitzers may, conceivably, have been employed in the attack of Maubeuge and Antwerp, but there is no direct evidence of their having been used at all. The 28 cm. howitzer could have effected all that has been attributed to the larger piece; and there is some evidence of its having been used at Namur. The largest German field howitzer has a calibre of 21 cm. and a maximum range of about 8000 yards. The high-explosive shell weighs 260 lbs. For transport the gun is dismounted and placed on a special wagon. Baulks of timber are carried to form a firing-platform.

in mind. A fort, much more a cupola, is not a large target for high-angle fire at long ranges; and adequate arrangements for observation are necessary to make the fire effective. There is no doubt that the defences of Antwerp and the other fortresses successfully attacked had been carefully reconnoitred by enemy spies in peace, and the ranges ascertained. These places, Antwerp especially, abounded in spies, who are believed to have helped materially to direct the fire. The means for denying a possible enemy such advantages are obvious.

The defence of a modern fortress depends largely on the use of mobile armament and the provision of adequate entrenchments for the infantry of the garrison in the intervals between the detached forts. If suitable and timely preparations had been made, it is likely that the defence of Antwerp might have been considerably prolonged. The Germans deferred attacking for so long that the Belgians appear to have thought they did not intend to attempt the enterprise. Up to the day before the bombardment of the outer forts began, the official reports from Antwerp displayed this optimistic attitude. The work of entrenching was, in consequence, begun too late, with the result that it was very far from completion when the infantry attack began to develop. The trenches were not only inadequate in profile, but faulty in design; and, while the firing line was much exposed in the front trenches, the cover provided for supports and reserves was quite insufficient. The enemy's artillery made the position practically untenable before their infantry came to close quarters. When we consider how successful the French and British troops have been in holding hastily constructed entrenchments against attacks of unprecedented violence, we can imagine what might have been achieved at Antwerp had proper foresight been exercised and the requisite engineering skill been available. The gallantry of the Belgian infantry could not compensate for the defective nature of the defences.

Those who may imagine that the days of permanent fortification are ended will do well to reflect on the part which the eastern defences of France, especially the section between Verdun and Toul, have played in the war. They compelled the Germans to adopt the circuitous line of invasion through Belgium, entailing disadvantages

which have had a material effect on the course of the campaign. The violation of Belgian neutrality brought the Belgian and British forces into line with the army of France. The Belgian resistance, which owed its efficacy to the fortress of Liège, gave time for the concentration of the Allied armies. The long lines of communication have proved a source of serious embarrassment, and their exposure by the advance to the Marne contributed materially to the victory of the Allies, and obliged the Germans to relinquish the offensive. The enemy's position was insecure until the prolongation of their right flank covered the lines of communication, while this great extension of their line obliged them to keep an immense army in France when troops were badly needed in the eastern theatre of war.

The Belgian field-army made good its retreat by the strip of territory which lies between the Dutch frontier and the Scheldt, and formed up on the left of the Allies' line between Dixmude and Nieuport, where it has sustained repeated and violent attacks. The German force released by the fall of Antwerp was probably between 60,000 and 120,000, the former figure being that given in a statement published by the Press Bureau. The Berlin war-news gave its strength as 200,000 men, which is doubtless one of a series of fictitious statements designed to mislead and impress the Allies, which were published at that time. In this category may be placed the announcement that the objective of the German attacks was Calais, to which wide publicity was given, this being quickly followed by the publication of an article by General Baron von Ardenne, in which a speculative scheme for the attack of England from the Channel ports was discussed. It seems reasonable to suppose that these and other threatening rumours which gained currency at that period were expected to cause nervousness in this country, and to induce the Government to keep troops back for home defence which were urgently required to reinforce our army in France. The idea of an advance on Calais was, moreover, calculated to capture the imagination of the German public, and to arouse the ardour of the troops. It is hard to find any other hypothesis to account for the sudden importance

attached to the possession of Calais, which the enemy might have appropriated without opposition at any time during September.

A battle cannot be won, nor can a war be brought to a decisive conclusion, merely by the capture of a geographical objective. Victory in battle implies the rout of the portion of the enemy's forces engaged and the destruction of their *moral* to an extent that will prevent their being reorganised so as again to become an efficient fighting force for a considerable time. A decisive issue to a war can only be attained by destroying the enemy's armies, and by breaking the spirit of the government and the nation, so as to prevent new armies being raised such as those the French placed in the field during the latter part of the war of 1870-71, and to obviate unorganised resistance in the form of guerrilla warfare. It is evident that the mere conquest of the coast-line would not achieve any of these results. In battle a geographical objective may be assigned to define the direction of an attack, and to insure the co-operation of different bodies employed in its execution, and the concentration of their efforts on the attainment of one specific object. Calais is obviously too remote to fulfil any of these purposes.

An attack on England by sea from the Channel ports would require the defeat of the British Fleet as a necessary antecedent. A surprise attack, by evading the Fleet, could not be effected, because among other reasons it would be impossible secretly to assemble the requisite transport. For the purposes of a raid by aircraft the Channel coast would afford no special facilities to compensate for the enormous sacrifice of life which the enemy's efforts have entailed. Such an enterprise could be attempted with almost equal ease from Belgium, the difference in distance from the probable points of attack being inappreciable. Nor does it seem that the coast would be a suitable situation for an aerial base, owing to its exposure to a surprise attack by hostile aircraft, which might approach undetected over the sea.

The enemy's violent and persistent offensive between La Bassée and the sea has doubtless been partly inspired by the desire to drive the Allied forces out of Belgium with the view of completing the occupation of the

country, and, more especially, making their possession of Antwerp secure for the reasons already assigned. These are political and not military objects. From the military point of view the Yser canal would, no doubt, be desirable as a submarine base for operations in the Channel. But such a base has already been established in the Bruges canal, whither several submarines are believed to have been transported in sections by rail. The open harbours at Ostend, Dunkirk, and Calais would seem to be less suitable for the purpose on account of their being more exposed to attack by destroyers. These are, however, secondary objects, and, as such, subordinate to the main object, the destruction of the Allied army.

It is a feature of this great battle that for several weeks the principal fighting has taken place on the flanks of the line; in the west between La Bassée and the sea, and, in the east, within an area comprising the eastern heights of the Meuse and the Argonne forest. In these localities the battle has raged continuously, and often with desperate violence; while the fighting in the centre, both east and west of the Oise, has been intermittent in character, and of a less determined nature, except for occasional outbursts such as that which occurred early in November in the neighbourhood of Vailly. It is evident that both sides attach considerable importance to the operations on the eastern flank; and it may be of interest to consider the probable reasons. The locality would not seem to offer any particular attraction to either combatant as a scene for decisive efforts. The French are embarrassed by the line of the Moselle, strongly fortified from Metz to Thionville, which affords complete security to the German left flank, while the line of fortifications extending from Verdun to Toul offers a serious impediment to a German advance.

The Verdun-Toul defences have been an obstacle to the accomplishment of the enemy's plans throughout the campaign. When the Allies were driven back to the line of the Marne, the northern portion of the defences was uncovered by the field-army; and the Germans seized the opportunity to make violent attacks on Verdun, and on Fort Troyon, the second fort in the chain of *forts d'arrêt* connecting Verdun with Toul,

which is unduly exposed to attack on the south side. These attempts happily proved abortive, and the timely success of the Allies on the Marne retrieved the situation. It may safely be concluded that the Germans designed to open fresh lines of communication through Metz, and to acquire a secure base of operations on the Moselle, which derives great strength from the fortresses of Metz and Thionville. These modern fortresses are linked together by intermediate redoubts, the whole forming a stronghold of the first importance. The reduction of the Verdun-Toul defences was clearly essential to this design, which, had it been accomplished, would have materially strengthened the enemy's position in France by securing an advanced base of supply close to the scene of operations, connected with the interior of Germany by a well-designed and efficient railway system. It would also have opened up secure lines of retreat should necessity arise.

While this was probably the chief aim of their efforts, with a view to offensive operations, the enemy were also probably influenced by the necessity of defending their line of communication through Luxembourg, which would be imperilled by a French offensive based on Verdun. The Trèves-Montmédy railway passes, within seventeen miles of the Verdun forts, through a tunnel, the destruction of which would cause the Germans serious embarrassment. It is perhaps unnecessary to observe that the enemy's operations on this flank are materially assisted by the fortress of Metz, which forms a strong *point d'appui*, and by the network of strategic railways behind it, by which reinforcements can be brought up from Germany or transferred rapidly from other parts of the great battlefield.

The operations on the western flank have been characterised, since the fall of Antwerp, by a persistent German offensive, directed chiefly against three points in the Allies' front—Dixmude, Ypres, and La Bassée. Some political reasons which may have contributed to the selection of the La Bassée-Nieuport line for the main offensive operations have already been noticed, but we must conclude, on military grounds, that the real object has been to crush the left of the Allies' line, with the ulterior object of rolling up the remainder of their left

wing, which would then be exposed to attack in flank. Outflanking operations being prevented by the sea, the next best expedient was to destroy this portion of the front, which might be expected to be specially vulnerable owing to its unhomogeneous composition. The localities against which the main attacks have been directed are those where the Allies' armies join. The defence of such localities is apt to lack cohesion on account of the divided command and responsibility, and it may be weakened by jealousy or lack of mutual confidence between the troops. If such were indeed the enemy's design, it has been signally foiled by the loyalty with which the Allied commanders have co-operated, and by the *camaraderie* which exists between the soldiery of the three armies. Ypres, which has been the objective of the most violent and determined attacks, is tactically weak, as it forms a salient projecting in front of the general line.

Although fighting has been almost continuous along the whole front of three hundred miles from the Moselle to the sea, the part between the La Bassée canal and Nieuport, forty miles in extent, may be regarded as the scene of a separate battle. Against this point the Germans concentrated not less than half a million men, comprising the pick of their active corps. This moderate estimate gives an average strength of seven men per yard of front. The distribution of the troops would not, however, be uniform. Strong forces would be concentrated in the localities selected for the main attacks, the strength along the remainder of the line being reduced to that required to make a sufficient demonstration to hold the Allies' troops in their position and prevent the despatch of reinforcements to the points of real attack. If we assume that an average of three men per yard will suffice for the latter purpose, and allow an average of five miles front each for the main attacks, we arrive at a strength of nearly fourteen men per yard in the three localities, Dixmude, Ypres, and La Bassée, available to drive the attacks home. These three attacks were not simultaneously pressed on every occasion. An analysis of the official reports shows that in the course of sixteen days in which the severity of the fighting indicated that the enemy were making a genuine attempt to break through the line, the attack was 'violent' in all three

localities on five days, and in two of the localities on four days, while on the remaining seven days only one locality was the objective of serious attack. The British force, which had to bear the brunt of many violent attacks, may safely be said to have been outnumbered, at one period, to the extent of at least five to one.*

The consistent failure of attacks pressed home by greatly superior forces has been a feature of the campaign in France. Local successes have been gained repeatedly, of a magnitude which might have been decisive under the conditions of former battles, but without exercising any material effect on the general situation. We do not know enough of the details to do more than conjecture the causes of this change. One may be found in the vast extent of front in comparison with former battlefields. A success which, in former days, would have affected the entire front and compelled a general retirement, has a merely local effect in relation to the extensive line of battle, and is remedied by a readjustment of, perhaps, a few miles of the front. There are several specific instances which support this view, of which one may be quoted. The capture of Messines by the enemy on Nov. 1 might well have decided a battle such as Gravelotte, where the French fought on a front of about eight miles, somewhat less than the distance between Ypres and the Lys. To quote 'Eye-witness,' the loss of this tactical point merely necessitated 'a slight adjustment of our flank and centre.' Another cause may perhaps lie in the rapidity with which reinforcements may be brought to threatened points by means of motor transport. An attacking force which succeeds in penetrating the position may find itself confronted by reserves, enveloped on the flanks by the adjoining portions of the line which have bent back by the assault, and enfiladed by machine-guns. The situation frequently results in the lost position being almost immediately regained. Referring to the German attack on Nov. 11, the severest that our troops sustained,

* Sir John French's despatch, published on Nov. 30, proves that this estimate is far below the mark. During the period 20th-31st Oct. the British had an average strength of only 1·6 rifles per yard of front. The 3rd Corps, with a front of 12 or 13 miles, had less than one rifle per yard available.

'Eye-witness' says: 'Such was their resolution and the momentum of the mass that, in spite of the splendid resistance of our troops, they succeeded in breaking through our lines in three places. . . . They penetrated for some distance . . . but were counter-attacked, and enfiladed by machine-guns, and driven back into the trenches.' And again, in connexion with the fighting on the following day: 'Immediately on our left the French were strongly attacked and driven back a short distance, our extreme left having to conform to the movement, but our Allies soon recovered the ground they had lost, which enabled us to advance also.'

These are only examples of events which have occurred daily since the battle began on the Aisne. Ground is gained at one point and lost at another. Sometimes the lost ground is recovered almost immediately by the speedy arrival of reinforcements. At other times it remains in the enemy's possession till the morrow because adequate reinforcements take longer to arrive owing to distance or lack of motor transport. Or again it may remain an object of contention for days. The material point is that the local reverse leads to no decisive result. It is remedied either by successful counter-attack, or by local readjustment of the line. During two months' fighting there has hardly been a change in the general line that could be indicated on the largest-scale war maps in general use.

It is hard to imagine how a battle of this kind can be brought to a decision, when the troops on both sides are able to endure incessant bombardment and repeated infantry attacks by day and night. Its experience furnishes an unexpected vindication of the paradox enunciated by the philosopher-strategist Von Clausewitz nearly a century ago—that the defensive is the stronger form of war, but a decision can only be attained by offensive action. The offensive shatters itself against the entrenchments of the defence, gaining, perhaps, a momentary advantage. Then a counter-attack drives the assailant back, only to be shattered, in turn, against the opposing trenches. There is infinite carnage but no decisive result. A period of quiescence supervenes while both pause to recover and refill their depleted ranks. The story is then repeated.

The experience of this battle, and of the war generally, proves conclusively that, when armies are equal in respect of fighting efficiency, it is futile to hope that frontal attack will lead to decisive results. There has been a tendency on the part of some military writers to deride the traditional preference of the Germans for enveloping tactics and their distaste for frontal attack, forgetting that the principle of envelopment is directly inculcated by our own Field Service Regulations. Every decisive success obtained during the war of which detailed information is available has been obtained by envelopment, or threatened envelopment, of the enemy's flank. The rapid advance of the enemy on Paris, the victory of the Allies on the Marne, and those won by the Russians at Lvoff (Lemberg), Lublin, Rava Russka, and on the Vistula in October, were all due to tactical or strategical pressure on one or both flanks.

Except for the battle on the Marne we must, in fact, turn to the east to find decisive victories. The Russian battles have all been manœuvre-battles; and the Russian commanders have shown themselves capable of handling the immense forces which distinguish this war from all previous wars with a skill that neither the Germans nor the Austrians have approached. The first phase of the campaign was characterised by strategical operations similar to those of Napoleon in the campaign of 1814 in France. The Russians concentrated the bulk of their forces alternately against the Austrian armies in Poland and Galicia, defeating them successively in the three battles of Lvoff, Lublin, and Rava Russka, and pursued the remnants beyond the river Wisloka almost to the forts of Cracow. A pause in the active operations then ensued, towards the end of September, at which point our review of the operations in the eastern theatre of war begins.

Alarmed at the success which had attended the Russian arms in every quarter, except for the temporary reverse sustained at Osterode in East Prussia, the Germans, about this period, began to concentrate important forces on the frontiers of Posen and Silesia, and, by throwing advanced bodies of troops across the Warta, to threaten an offensive movement on the Vistula.

The Russian General Staff appears to have ascertained the enemy's plans about Sept. 22, when the further progress of the army beyond the Wisloka was arrested. Subsequent to that date the official communiqués preserve complete silence concerning events in Galicia and Poland, till, on Oct. 1, a statement was issued at Petrograd announcing that considerable German forces had been concentrated in the Petrokoff and Kielce districts, against which the Russian cavalry, supported by infantry detachments, were operating vigorously. It soon became evident that during this period of silence, and for some days afterwards, the Russian army in Galicia was being withdrawn behind the San, while the main armies were assembling behind the Vistula from Sandomir to Warsaw. These movements were covered by a large force of cavalry, which came into contact with the enemy approximately on the line Lodz-Petrokoff-Kielce. Meanwhile General Rennenkampf, commanding the Russian army of the north, who had retreated to the Niemen before von Hindenburg's advance, defeated the latter in the battle of Augustovo on Oct. 3 after many days' severe fighting in the forests and marshes of Western Russia, and drove the enemy back to their entrenchments, which had been previously prepared on the East Prussian frontier. These entrenchments had been armed with heavy artillery, and partly occupied by *Landsturm* troops and detachments from the fortress garrisons. The East Prussian frontier being thus secured, von Hindenburg, with part of his army, proceeded to Poland to take command of the main army operating against the Vistula.

The operations which followed were on a scale of unprecedented magnitude. Irrespective of the forces in North Poland and East Prussia, which exercised no direct influence on the principal operations, the front on which the Austro-German armies advanced was three hundred miles in extent, reaching from the Vistula below Warsaw to Marmaros Sziget in the Carpathian Mountains. Eliminating the area south of the Dniester, where the operations were of a secondary and disconnected character, there remains a front of 230 miles along which the ensuing battle was violent and continuous. This main theatre of operations may be divided into three sections,

the northern extending from the lower Vistula (below Warsaw) to the Pilica, which became the scene of the decisive operations; the centre, from the Pilica to the Vistula above Sandomir; the southern extending thence to the Dniester. The northern Austro-German army was stated (unofficially) to comprise twelve army corps, with two cavalry divisions, amounting to about 500,000 men and 2000 guns, chiefly German troops. The army of the centre was of nearly equal strength, composed chiefly of Austrians. The southern army was entirely Austrian, and was said to be 300,000 strong with, probably, 700 guns. To ensure co-operation between these vast armies, the German General Staff assumed supreme control of the operations, superseding the Austrian General Staff, who had, indeed, shown little ability during the earlier phase of the war. German officers were also appointed to the principal commands.

The German design was probably to obtain possession of the western districts of Poland and Galicia up to the Vistula and the San, and to secure the line of these rivers, with the fortresses of Novo-Georgiewsk, Warsaw, Ivanogorod, and Przemysl, with the view of holding it against the Russians during the winter. They also, no doubt, intended to gain the line of the Narew by forces operating from the East Prussian frontier; but this plan was defeated by the successful defence of the fortress of Osowetz at the end of September, and by the operations of a Russian force in the direction of Soldau.

The enemy's offensive was admirably timed, and the attack began simultaneously along the whole front of 230 miles on Oct. 15. The defeat of the northern army in front of Warsaw was completed on Oct. 20. At about the same date the left wing of the army of the centre was driven back to Glovacheff, where a stubborn resistance was maintained till Oct. 26. The right wing was driven from the Vistula, and Sandomir was occupied by the Russians on Nov. 3. Its retreat was followed two days later by the retirement of the Austrians from the San, on the banks of which they had hitherto fought with great obstinacy.

It would be impracticable to examine these operations in detail. The essential points to note are that the prolonged resistance of the army of the centre led to

its separation from the northern army, and that the tenacity with which its right wing maintained its position till Nov. 3 caused its left to be thrown back, necessitating a retreat in a south-westerly direction towards Czeszochowa and Cracow, and increasing the gap between it and the northern army. The information available leads to the conclusion that the retirement of the Austrians from the San was in a great degree due to the retreat of the army of the centre.

The battle of Warsaw, which decided the first phase of the campaign, was distinguished by the ability displayed by the Russian commanders in handling large bodies of troops, and the skilful use made of the railway system east of the Vistula. The bulk of the army was assembled some distance behind the screen of the river, on the railways leading to the city, while the remainder stubbornly opposed the German advance on the left bank, falling back to within a few miles of the outer forts, and inducing the enemy to deploy. Meanwhile reinforcements were brought up by rail, a column crossed the river about Góra, twenty miles above Warsaw, while a large body of cavalry issued from Novo-Georgiewsk, which the Germans had neglected to mask. Assailed in front and on both flanks, the Germans were driven in disorder as far as Skierniewice before they could make a stand. Thence they fell back more deliberately to the frontier, blowing up the roads and bridges, and destroying the railways, thus making effective pursuit impossible.

The separation of the northern German army from the army of the centre seemed to offer the Russians an opportunity for defeating them in detail by manœuvres similar to those which they had employed successfully in September at Lublin and Rawa Russka. There can be little doubt that they entertained this design, but were prevented by the wholesale destruction of the communications, which made rapid movement impossible and enabled the enemy's armies to make good their retreat beyond the Warta, the northern army between Thorn and Kalisz, and that of the centre on Czeszochowa and Cracow. After several minor engagements, the Russians began to close in about the latter place from the east and north-east by Nov. 15; while in the north

their cavalry, on Nov. 9, reached the line Nieschawa-Slupce, close to the frontier between the Vistula and the Warta. Here their progress was arrested, though a Cossack detachment contrived to penetrate to the vicinity of Pleschen on Nov. 10, where it damaged the German strategic railway. Two or three days later a new German offensive movement began to develop on both banks of the Vistula, extending southwards towards Kalisch, before which the Russian cavalry was obliged to retire. On the Kalisch-Wielun front the enemy were retiring towards the frontier. Between Czeszochowa and Cracow they attempted an offensive movement, but were driven back to an entrenched position previously prepared, where fighting was still going on at the time of writing.

This situation marked the beginning of a new plan of operations which the German General Staff had matured during the retreat from the Vistula. By destroying the road and railway communications they gained time to effect an important redistribution of troops with the aid of the strategic railways which run parallel to the frontiers of East Prussia, Posen and Silesia. A considerable force, probably comprising the bulk of the German army corps with the addition of some Austrian corps and the whole of the cavalry, was rapidly concentrated between the Vistula and the Warta. A relatively small force was left about Kalisch and Wielun, while the bulk of the Austrian armies occupied the entrenched position between Czeszochowa and Cracow, and extended south to the Carpathians. North of the Vistula, troops were railed from East Prussia to Thorn, with the view of taking the offensive on the right bank of the Vistula in order to ensure the left flank of the main army against attack. The design was to force the northern Russian army to accept battle under unfavourable conditions, and, if successful, to gain possession of Warsaw and the line of the Vistula, thus accomplishing part of their original plan. Defeat in the battle would entail the retreat of the Russian army in South Poland, and endanger its line of supply and retreat through Kielce, Radom, and Ivangorod. The situation was, in fact, similar to that which would have arisen in October if the Russians had retained their position in Galicia

while meeting the German offensive in Poland. They avoided it on that occasion by relinquishing the pursuit of the Austrians, and concentrating their armies behind the Vistula and the San.

The German offensive movement developed rapidly. On Nov. 17 the Russian advance guards were falling back on the River Bzura, which, rising near Kutno, flows through Lowicz and falls into the Vistula at Wyszogrod, twenty miles below Novo-Georgiewsk. On the same date the enemy's advance guards had passed Lenczyca, moving in the direction of Piatek, which is south of the Bzura and twenty miles west of Lowicz. The main armies came in contact about Nov. 18, and a desperate battle ensued, which was still undecided at the time of writing.

The entrenched position on the East Prussian frontier to which the Germans retired after their defeat at Augustovo had been prepared during the advance to the Niemen, with the same skill and ingenuity that has been shown in the construction of entrenchments in the western theatre of war. The method of defence adopted by the enemy was similar to that followed in France, being characterised by violent and persistent counter-attacks on various points of the Russian front, which was also, no doubt, heavily entrenched. The Russian official statements, always reticent, gave little information concerning the details of the month's fighting which ensued; but such indications as there are point to the attitude of the Russians having been, in the main, defensive until the enemy became exhausted and discouraged by unsuccessful attacks. A portion of the position was then captured on Nov. 3, near Vladisloff, twenty miles south of the Niemen; and the Germans were ultimately obliged to fall back to a second line of entrenchments among the Masurian lakes, from which they are unlikely to be dislodged, except by pressure on their lines of communication, until the frost makes the lakes and marshes which abound in this region passable for troops. The advance of the Russian force operating in the Soldau district, by threatening their line of retreat, would soon compel a retirement; but the resistance has been stubborn, and the situation, at the time of writing, was obscure.

In the East, as in France, the Germans have the advantage of possessing heavier guns, which play an important part in the attack and defence of entrenched positions. Guns which are outranged and outclassed are useless in battle. They are unable either to subdue the enemy's artillery, or to approach near enough to shell his trenches effectively. Troops thus badly supported are at a great disadvantage both for attack and defence. During the first fortnight of the fighting on the Aisne the Allies were much embarrassed by the superior weight of the enemy's shell-fire, to which their artillery was unable to reply; but the balance of gun-power was subsequently rectified in some degree by the arrival of naval and siege guns and howitzers. The transport of heavy artillery in Poland was no doubt much impeded by the damage done to the communications by the Germans during their retreat.

It has already been remarked that the appearance of the German heavy gun in the field has been due to the invention of motor traction. In many other respects the petrol motor has caused new developments which have, at times, materially influenced the course of the war. The Germans, remarkable for the thoroughness of their preparations during peace, have, from the outset, made the fullest use of the invention. Armoured motor-vans have been extensively used for the transport of troops under fire; and cavalry employed on reconnaissance have been invariably supported by infantry transported in this way. With adequate roads the infantry easily keep pace with the horses, and are fresh when the time for action arrives. It would seem likely that, in European warfare, mounted infantry may disappear, with its attendant disadvantages of fatigue to man and horse, the deduction from its fighting strength consequent on the necessity of leaving at least one-third of the men in charge of the led-horses, and the immobility of the latter, which prevents their following the course of an action in order to be accessible when required. Motor transport has also been freely utilised for the transfer of troops from place to place in rear of the line of battle, and for carrying reinforcements rapidly to threatened points. The foresight of the Germans in making extensive provision of motor vehicles before the outbreak

of the war seems to have given them an advantage over the Allies at the outset; but the disparity in this respect has since been rectified in a great degree by the use of motor omnibuses and other improvised conveyances.

It is perhaps unnecessary to refer to the use which has been made of mechanical transport for the conveyance of supplies, except to observe that the supply of the immense forces now in the field by means of horse transport would have been precarious, if not impracticable. The rapidity which has at times characterised the movements of large bodies of troops would certainly have been unattainable by the older methods. The appearance of the motor in war has caused the destruction of roads by an army in retreat to assume increased importance; and the effectiveness of such measures has been materially enhanced.

So little information is available regarding the part played by aircraft that it is only possible to indicate in general terms the uses to which they have been applied. As adjuncts to heavy artillery for purposes of observation, they appear to be almost indispensable. Howitzers firing at long ranges from concealed positions have been enabled to obtain the range after one or two shots by means of information transmitted by observers from above. Observation from stations on the ground, or from buildings or temporary erections, is so inefficient that ranging entails great expenditure of ammunition and loss of time. It has been stated by 'Eye-witness' that on days when aeroplanes were unable to fly, the fire proved so ineffective that it was abandoned.

The value of aircraft for reconnaissance is too obvious to need mention, were it not that there has been a tendency to invest it with undue importance. Owing to danger from artillery and rifle fire aeroplanes are compelled to maintain an altitude from which only masses of troops can be observed. Numbers cannot be estimated with any accuracy, nor can guns be distinguished from transport. It is impossible to ascertain whether villages, woods, or other cover are occupied; and in certain circumstances considerable bodies of troops can be concealed from observation. It is likely that reconnaissance by aeroplane can be of little use except to determine the

positions of considerable forces in open country, and to detect large movements of troops. The idea that aircraft will supplant cavalry even for reconnaissance is clearly erroneous, while their offensive power is restricted to dropping bombs, of which the efficiency is uncertain.

There are some well-authenticated instances of offensive action between hostile aeroplanes; and it is obvious that an army whose aircraft establish a superiority over those of the enemy will have a great advantage. The French and British pilots appear to have gained such an ascendancy. 'Eye-witness' has stated that during the transfer of the British force from the Aisne to the Belgian frontier our aeroplanes kept the air free from hostile aircraft for several days, and thus screened the movement from observation.

The battle of Warsaw affords a typical instance of a situation in which effective reconnaissance by aircraft would be of the utmost value to the commander of the attacking army. Cavalry, even had the Germans been superior in that arm, could not have ascertained what was happening beyond the broad waters of the Vistula. The failure or negligence of their air-service on this occasion resulted in their being left in complete ignorance of the extensive movements of troops behind the river, which led to the envelopment of their front and flank. It has been suggested that they relied on spies, who abounded in the Polish capital, to keep them informed of the Russian dispositions. Even should that be so, the omission to corroborate the information by means of air-reconnaissance is hard to understand. It has been characteristic of the Germans throughout the war to make use of all available means, legitimate or otherwise, for the attainment of their ends.

At the end of four months of war, the situation may be summarised as follows. In the Western theatre of war the Germans have concentrated their principal efforts and the bulk of their armies in the endeavour to destroy the Allied armies of France, Belgium, and Great Britain. It is believed that, during part of November, their forces amounted to some fifty-two army corps, comprising nineteen of their twenty-five regular corps, equivalent to about two and a quarter million men.

These vast forces have been hurled with fruitless violence against the entrenched positions of the Allies, with the result that their best troops have sustained enormous losses. Their offensive now appears to have been suspended in consequence of the withdrawal of part of their forces to meet the threatening situation in Poland. Meanwhile the Allies are waiting on events and are unlikely to squander their forces in frontal attacks, the futility of which has been proved. Delay, which is in their favour, is likely to prove fatal to the Germans, who have committed themselves to the impracticable plan of attempting the offensive in both theatres of war with insufficient forces.


In the Eastern theatre of war two principal battles are being fought, one between the Vistula and the Warta, and the other on the line Czeszochowa-Cracow extending southwards to the foothills of the Carpathians. The former will probably decide the future course of the campaign. If, as seems likely, the Germans should be defeated, they will be obliged to fall back on the defensive towards their own frontier. If the Russians should lose the battle, they must retire behind the Vistula, and abandon their offensive in south-west Poland and Galicia. The Germanic Allies would then endeavour to pursue their original plan of holding the line of the Vistula and the San during the winter, and attempt to obtain a favourable situation in the West with augmented forces. A Russian victory in the battle between Czeszochowa and the Carpathians is a necessary antecedent to the investment of Cracow, preliminary to the invasion of Silesia or Moravia. The operations in East Prussia may be regarded as secondary to those in Poland. The defeat of the Germans in the latter region would ultimately entail the abandonment of East Prussia.


W. P. BLOOD.

II.—AT SEA.

THE outstanding and most obvious feature of the naval war has been the losses of ships, officers and men which we have suffered; ten cruisers, large and small, a torpedo gunboat and three submarines have been sunk—one by

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misadventure—with a sacrifice of life so great that we have not realised its extent.* Is it, therefore, to be concluded that we have been injured seriously in a military sense? Have our chances of winning the eventual victory which will reassure our command of the sea decreased as the war has progressed?

The record of the war on the seas suggests some preliminary reflections. There is a vital and essential difference between military and naval power. A nation fortunately situated geographically as we are can, after some months' delay, create new armies, enlisting men, commissioning officers, providing equipment. It is not a rapid process, but it has already been shown that it can be done even by a democracy with political conditions unsuited to the organisation of violence and its effective direction. On the other hand, unless hostilities last longer than they can possibly last owing to economic circumstances, naval power cannot be improvised; with the battleships and cruisers which a country has built or building when hostilities open it must win or lose.† This is the first point which is usually ignored; army deficiencies can be made good by a maritime country which possesses complete or partial control of sea communications; naval deficiencies, except in respect of details, cannot be supplied, since it takes six years to train a junior officer, almost as long to produce a skilled lower-deck rating, three years to build a battleship, two years to complete a cruiser, and about twelve months to construct a torpedo vessel—destroyer or submarine. There is also another consideration. Armies fight for positions; navies fight that their merchant ships may use the seas without molestation.

If we bear in mind these distinctions, it is not surprising that the progress of the war has been marked by a succession of battles of first-class importance on the continent, directly bearing on the ultimate issue of the

* Down to Nov. 11 the British naval casualties amounted to 4,327 killed, 473 wounded, and 973 missing, apart from the men of the Royal Naval Division interned in Holland. The high proportion of killed will be noted; in modern naval war few are wounded, but many drowned. The blowing up of the battleship 'Bulwark,' owing apparently to an accident, can hardly be regarded as a war casualty. Over 700 lives were lost.

† This statement does not apply absolutely to destroyers and submarines, as under favourable industrial conditions they can be constructed rapidly.

war, while at sea there has been no engagement between the various fleets involved in hostilities which can by any possibility influence our fortunes. The explanation lies on the surface. Both our enemies, though possessing considerable naval power—war shipping with a displacement of over one million tons—have not so far disputed in any serious degree our use of the seas. We have been able to continue our trade with our allies and the neutral countries of the world. We have been in a position to mobilise no mean proportion of the effective manhood of the Empire, and to draw upon the military resources of India, and transfer these men either to England for a period of final training or direct to the battlefields on the Continent. Nor is this all. By the active employment of our naval power, we have been in a position to keep from our enemies what we have chosen to describe as contraband and conditional contraband, while they, on their part, have been unable to effect any limitation of our supplies of material to be employed in the prosecution of the war. The naval issue has so far gone by default. This is not to say that, at its 'selected moment,' the German High Sea Fleet will not sally forth and accept the challenge which the Grand Fleet has so repeatedly offered. Whatever may or may not happen in the Adriatic, it is impossible to doubt that, when circumstances are considered favourable, the main forces of the German Navy will be exerted, for German officers and men, as many incidents have shown, are lacking neither in seamanship, courage, nor strategical ability. But in the meantime, with the Russian Fleet on the east and the British Fleet on the west, the Germans have chosen to evacuate the seas in our favour; and we have been reaping all the advantages of sea command and translating them into economic and military power.

Incidental naval actions have occurred. Despatches have been published—after long and unexplained delay—describing the successful scooping-out movement in the Bight of Heligoland; British and German submarines have been operating freely; mines have robbed both navies of ships; an engagement has taken place off the Chilean coast with sad results; and British, Russian and French men-of-war have been surprised and destroyed at Zanzibar and Penang.

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Before an attempt is made to examine any of these events, none of them, so far as our fortunes are concerned, contributing in any appreciable degree to the eventual issue of the war, it may serve a useful purpose to set out the main losses which the several navies have suffered, the dates when the different ships were launched being stated in each case :

BRITISH.

Cruisers :

<i>Ships.</i>	<i>Lost.</i>	<i>Tons.</i>	<i>Launched.</i>	<i>Crew.</i>
Good Hope . . .	By gun-fire, Nov. 1 . . .	14,100	1901	880
Aboukir . . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . . .	12,000	1900	755
Cressy . . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . . .	12,000	1899	755
Hogue . . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 22 . . .	12,000	1900	755
Monmouth . . .	By gun-fire, Nov. 1 . . .	9,800	1901	537
Hawke . . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 15 . . .	7,350	1891	544
Hermes . . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 31 . . .	5,600	1898	456
Amphion . . .	Mined, Aug. 6 . . .	3,440	1911	320
Pathfinder . . .	Torpedoed, Sept. 5 . . .	2,940	1904	268
Pegasus . . .	By gun-fire, Sept. 20 . . .	2,135	1897	234

Gunboats :

Speedy . . .	Mined, Sept. 3 . . .	810	1893	85
Niger . . .	Torpedoed, Nov. 11 . . .	810	1893	85

Submarines :

AE. 1 . . .	Foundered, Sept. 14 . . .	725	1912	24
E. 3 . . .	Destroyed off Germany, Oct. 18 . . .	725	1911	24
D. 5 . . .	Mined, Nov. 3 . . .	550	1909	24

Armed Merchantmen :

Oceanic . . .	Wrecked, Sept. 8 . . .	7,333	—	—
Rohilla . . .	Mined, Oct. 30 . . .	4,240	—	—

FRENCH.

Gunboat :

Zelée . . .	By gun-fire, Oct. 22 . . .	680	1899	100
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Destroyer :

Mousquet . . .	Torpedoed Oct. 28. . . .	298	1902	62
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Torpedo-boats :

347 . . .	Collision, Oct. 9 . . .	98	1906	26
338 . . .	Collision, Oct. 9 . . .	97	1906	20

RUSSIAN.

Cruisers :

Pallada . . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 11 . . .	7,775	1906	573
Jemtechug. . .	Torpedoed, Oct. 28 . . .	3,050	1903	340

Armed Merchantman :

Prut . . .	By gun-fire, Oct. 29 . . .	5,500	—	—
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JAPANESE.

<i>Cruiser:</i>		Ships.	Lost.	Tons.	Launched.	Crew.
	Takachiho	.	Mined, Oct. 17	3,700	1885	357
<i>Destroyer:</i>						
	Shirataye	.	Wrecked, Sept. 4	380	1905	70

GERMANY.

GERMANY.						
<i>Cruisers:</i>						
Yorck	.	Mined, Nov. 3	.	9,050	1904	638
Megdeburg	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 27	.	4,500	1911	373
Köln	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28	.	4,350	1909	379
Mainz	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28	.	4,350	1909	379
Ariadne	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28	.	2,660	1900	275
Hela	.	Torpedoed, Sept. 13	.	2,040	1895	187
Emden	.	By gun-fire, Nov. 8	.	3,544	1908	361
Königsberg	.	Bottled up, Oct. 30	.	3,550	1906	322

Gunboats:

Itis	.	Captured at Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	900	1898	125
Jaguar	.	" " Nov. 6	900	1898	125
Luchs	.	" " Nov. 6	900	1899	125
Möwe	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 9	650	1906	81
Tsing-tao	.	Interned, Aug. 17	168	1903	45
Vaterland	.	Interned, Aug. 17	168	1903	45

Destroyers:

V. 187	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 28	650	1910	82
S. 126	.	Torpedoed, Oct. 6	487	1901-2	55
S. 119	.	By gun-fire, Oct. 17	420	"	"
S. 118	.	" " "	420	"	"
S. 117	.	" " "	420	"	"
S. 115	.	" " "	420	"	"
S. 90	.	Driven ashore, Oct. 20	396	1899	56
S. 124	.	Sunk after collision, Nov. 23	463	1904	56
Taku	.	Captured at Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	280	1898	50

Submarine:

No. 15	.	Run down, Aug. 9	250	1909	24
No. 18	.	Rammed, Nov. 23	650	1912	27

[Several other German submarines are believed to have been lost.]

Armed Merchantmen:

Cap Trafalgar	.	By gun-fire, Sept. 14	9,854	—	—
Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 27	5,521	—	—
Bethania	.	Captured, Sept.	4,848	—	—
Markomannia	.	Captured, Oct.	2,840	—	—
Spreewald	.	Captured, Sept. 12	2,414	—	—
Graecia	.	Captured, Oct.	1,697	—	—
Königen Luise	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 5	948	—	—
Ophelia	.	Captured, Oct. 17	—	—	—
Itolo	.	By gun-fire, Sept.	165	—	—
Rhios	.	By gun-fire, Sept.	150	—	—
Soden	.	Captured, Sept.	150	—	—

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AUSTRIA.

Cruisers:

Ships.		Lost.	Tons.	Launched.	Crew.
Kaiserin	Eliza-	Sunk by her own crew,			
beth	.	Tsing-tao, Nov. 6	4,000	1890	418
Zenta	.	By gun-fire, Aug. 16	2,300	1897	305

Gunboat:

Temes	.	Mined, Oct. 23	440		
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Torpedo-boat:

19	.	Mined, Aug. 17	78	1886	28
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All the vessels torpedoed, except the Russian Cruiser 'Jemtchug' and the French Destroyer 'Mousquet,' were destroyed by Submarines.

The British losses of warships, apart from submarines, include only one vessel less than ten years old—the 'Amphion,' while the 'Pathfinder' almost comes within that period, having been launched on July 16, 1904. Of the other vessels two were 13 years old, two 14 years, one 15 years, one 16 years, one 17 years, two 21 years, one 23 years. According to German calculations, a cruising ship remains effective 15 years; and on this assumption the toll in ships has not been heavy, though the sacrifice of life has been grievous. Our allies have suffered the loss of only one ship of consequence—the 'Pallada.' Turning to the enemy, the Germans are the weaker, apart from the 'Hela,' by 7 cruisers which were of value as war units, and the Austrians by two ships more or less obsolescent; the Germans have also been deprived of 6 gunboats, 11 torpedo craft—probably the number is larger—and eleven merchant ships which were performing war duties.

An examination of the casualties of the war leads to the conclusion that the process of attrition has far more seriously affected the striking power of the German than that of the British Fleet. The effect of this has been to increase still further our margin of superiority, since it follows that if the weaker Power loses more ships than the stronger, the latter gains no inconsiderable further advantage, particularly if on the outbreak of war, as in our case, the stronger Navy had a greater number of ships on the eve of completion for sea. In his letter to Prince Louis of Battenburg on the latter's resignation of the position of First Sea Lord, Mr

Churchill referred to 'The enormous impending influx of capital ships, the score of 30-knot cruisers, the destroyers and submarines unequalled in modern construction which are now coming to hand.' In his speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet the First Lord referred again to the growing strength of the Navy :

'At the end of nearly a hundred days of war the Navy, . . . in spite of losses of ships of no great consequence, of officers and men irreparable—the Navy, in spite of losses, is actually and relatively stronger at every point and in every branch compared to our enemies than it was on the first day war was declared, and it is stronger most particularly in those branches of the Naval service which all the circumstances of modern war prove to exercise the most powerful influence upon the struggle.'

While we do well not to minimise our losses, it is very necessary that they should be studied in true perspective. Any admiral can preserve his command intact if he does nothing ; but, if he exerts himself to bring economic pressure upon the enemy, it is inevitable that casualties will from time to time be reported. In order to hit the stomach of the enemy—for this is the task confided to the British Navy—he has to expose his own head ; and science has given the foe, acting on the defensive, new means of stealthy attack. The loss of a few cruisers on the part of a great naval Power with overwhelming strength is as nothing compared with the injury which is day by day inflicted upon an enemy dependent more or less upon oversea supplies. He may show few signs of exhaustion during the first few months of war, but the effect is cumulative. We may be assured that, as the war progresses, Germany and Austria will suffer more disastrously from the silent pressure of the British Navy than from the active operations of the allied armies. The latter strike blows which cause heavy loss of life, but the vacant places in the ranks can for a long period be made good from the reserves ; there is no means of easing the economic situation which is created by naval pressure. The reserves of Germany and Austria-Hungary in food and raw materials, and particularly raw materials which are necessary for the making of new armaments, are in the present situation obtainable

only from oversea. The British Fleet, in association with the fleets of France and Japan, denies safe passage ; and consequently there is no possibility of relieving the situation in these two countries in so far as it is affected by a shortage of supplies.

It is no object of regret that no naval battle should have occurred either in the North Sea or in the Mediterranean. It would be foolish on our part to complain because the enemy has yielded to us the fruits of command of the sea without calling upon us to pay for them—fruits which he can never hope to regain. There is a tendency to underestimate the value of the victories which our sea power has been winning from day to day and week to week. In naval history there is no record of conquest so triumphant as that which the last four months have provided. The oversea trade of Germany and Austria, which rivalled our own, has been brought to a standstill ; profits are not being made, and the goodwill of the enemies' business men is disappearing. German and Austrian shipping has been either captured or driven off the seas ; and it is doubtful if the mercantile marines of these two countries will ever recover the position which they occupied prior to the war. The German flag has been swept off the Pacific ; Kiao-chau, on which over 20,000,000*l.* had been spent, and the other Pacific colonies, have passed from German control ; of the colonial empire, which was the pride of the Kaiser's subjects, all that remains are isolated territories in Africa, which in due course will have to be surrendered. We can, therefore, look back upon the progress of naval events since the war opened at the beginning of August with feelings of satisfaction almost unalloyed.

There have, however, been incidents in the naval campaign which have occasioned disquietude. So far the public has been provided with no explanations of several events, and has been left to draw its own conclusions from meagre statements issued from time to time. In the first place the escape of the German cruisers 'Goeben' and 'Breslau' in the Mediterranean still remains a mystery. It has been announced that the disposition of ships made by Admiral Sir A. Berkeley Milne, the Commander-in-Chief of the British force, has been approved by the naval authorities. The court-martial

which was demanded by Rear-Admiral E. T. C. Troubridge, who was in command of the First (Mediterranean) Cruiser Squadron, has resulted in a full and honourable acquittal. Neither officer has been held to blame for this unfortunate incident, which apparently had no slight influence in leading Turkey to join in the war. In the second place, no statement has been forthcoming to explain why ships of such large size as the three Cressys, with crews numbering 1,459 officers and men, were employed in performing patrol duty, which could as efficiently, if not more efficiently, have been done by smaller ships offering a smaller target and carrying much smaller crews. Nothing, moreover, has been stated officially in explanation of the absence of a screen of destroyers on this occasion. It has been affirmed that the small craft were driven into port by the high seas which were running. If this were the fact, it is regrettable that no official statement has been made, and that the nation has been furnished with no reasons in excuse for these ships being left to cruise under conditions so perilous. In the third place, public anxiety has been aroused by the action off the Pacific coast when three British cruisers—the ‘Good Hope,’ ‘Monmouth’ and ‘Glasgow’—were engaged by three German ships with disastrous results.* The British ships were older, slower and less powerfully armed. The disparity in armament is revealed in the following statement :

GERMAN SQUADRON.		
Armament.		Weights of Shells.
16 8·2" guns	4400 lbs.
12 5·9" "	1212 "
10 4·1" "	350 "
36 3·4" "	756 "
Total weight of metal thrown by German guns		6718 lbs.
BRITISH SQUADRON.		
Armament.		Weights of Shells.
2 9·2" guns	760 lbs.
32 6" "	3200 "
10 4" "	310 "
21 12 pds. guns	252 "
Total weight of metal thrown by British guns		4522 lbs.

* It seems clear from the report of Captain John Luce, of the cruiser ‘Glasgow,’ that only one small cruiser, and not three, was with the flag of Vice-Admiral von Spee.

When it is borne in mind that the British vessels were far less heavily armoured as well as armed, and that with the 'Glasgow' they fought with the afterglow of the sunset silhouetting them and at a range of about seven miles, at which their guns must have been comparatively ineffective, the deplorable loss of the 'Good Hope' and 'Monmouth' is a result which might have been foreseen. It has been stated by the Admiralty that the battleship 'Canopus' had received orders to join Sir Christopher Cradock's squadron, but it has also been admitted officially that she was not present to assist in defending the British flag; and so far—for good reason or bad—no statement has been issued in explanation of her absence.

The Admiralty's claim, advanced by the First Lord in the House of Commons on Nov. 27, that nothing can be revealed at present in connexion with these incidents which could profit the enemy, must be admitted. On the other hand, will the passage of time and subsequent revelations prove that the naval authorities have taken the nation into their confidence to as great an extent as they could have done without injury to our interests? A time of war is no occasion for captious criticism, but, when thousands of officers and men have been called upon to sacrifice their lives, there is a natural anxiety for the most complete assurance, which can only come with fuller knowledge, that their lives were not sacrificed in vain or unnecessarily. The real point is, whether, without jeopardising British naval interests, a fuller revelation could not have been made of the facts.

It is no mere accident of war that the large ships which have been sunk by the Germans on these several occasions were all vessels which were either obsolete or obsolescent. The nation will do well not to conclude, in the absence of more complete details than are at present available, that the strategical arrangements of the Admiralty have been at fault or that the officers in command have been to blame for losses sustained. Judgment must be suspended. When the history of the war comes to be written, the sinking of these ships and the sacrifice of so many lives will be attributed, there is reason to anticipate, in the main to two correlated causes. In the first place, it has been necessary to maintain a force of overwhelming power and high

efficiency in the main strategical theatres—in the North Sea and the Mediterranean—where the issue of the war will be decided and where the British and French Fleets have been able to exert economic pressure on the enemy. These dispositions have exhausted the resources of modern ships at the disposal of the naval authorities of the two countries, and there have remained only older craft for what must be regarded as the incidental operations of war on the seas. The policy of concentration could not be abandoned in order to supply the deficiencies in the outer seas directly traceable to the policy of economy which was forced upon the Admiralty during the years of peace.

This is no time for party polemics and recriminations, but there are facts which should not be ignored. What is the truth? The Unionist Party, with more or less consistency, urged in the House of Commons that our naval preparations were being made on an inadequate scale. The Unionist Party represented a minority of the electors of the United Kingdom. The majority not only was opposed to larger appropriations to the Fleet, but on the eve of the war was displaying increased irritation at the fact that year by year so much money was voted for the Fleet. So recently as November 1913, the delegates who attended the annual meeting of the National Liberal Federation, under the presidency of Sir John Brunner, passed, not by a majority, but unanimously, a resolution protesting against the existing scale of expenditure upon the Navy. This meeting was attended by representatives from every part of the country, and not a voice was raised in opposition to this resolution. In the following month a deputation of thirty-nine members of Parliament waited upon the Prime Minister in order to reinforce the arguments which had been advanced at Nottingham. In view of subsequent events it may be of interest to recall the names of these members.

Baron de Forest.
 Sir W. P. Byles.
 Mr Arthur Ponsonby.
 Mr J. A. Murray Macdonald.
 Mr G. Harvey.

Mr W. H. Dickinson.
 Sir John Jardine.
 Mr S. L. Hughes.
 Mr Hector Morison.
 Mr G. H. Radford.

Mr H. Chancellor.
Mr A. C. Morton.
Sir W. P. Beale.
Mr P. A. Molteno.
The Hon. F. McLaren.
Major McMicking.
Mr T. E. Harvey.
Mr F. Kellaway.
Mr A. Marshall.
Sir S. Collins.
The Hon. R. Denman.
Mr J. A. Baker.
Mr D. M. Mason.
Mr Leif Jones.
Dr Chapple.

Mr H. Manfield.
Mr H. Nuttall.
Mr E. Jones.
Mr P. Alden.
Dr Addison.
Mr A. Rowntree.
Mr J. M. Henderson.
Mr H. J. Glanville.
Mr J. W. Pratt.
Mr J. A. Bryce.
Mr D. V. Pirie.
Mr W. M. R. Pringle.
Mr A. MacCallum Scott.
Mr T. Lough.

By this action, the above-named members singled themselves out for special reprobation; but the views which they held were those which a large number of members expressed on every possible occasion in the House of Commons. Most of the Liberal Party and almost all the members of the Labour and Nationalist Parties protested against the scale of naval expenditure demanded from Parliament year by year. Fortunately the majority of them were more intent upon obtaining the fruits of the Parliament Act than anything else, and were content to postpone the day of reckoning with the Government until the Home Rule, Welsh Disestablishment, and Plural Voting Bills had been put upon the Statute Book. Let it be admitted that the Government, in its successive Navy Estimates, not only went beyond the wishes of its supporters in the House of Commons, but had driven to exasperation by its standard of naval expenditure—the sum rose to 51,500,000*l.* this spring—the majority of those electors throughout the United Kingdom on whose good opinion its continuance in office depended.

Now that war is in progress, we are paying in ships and in valuable lives the penalty of economy. The cruisers which were not built are the cruisers which we now need. There is no incident in history more astounding than the failure of the people of this maritime empire to realise what sea-power means to them. Reference has already been made to the action of the majority in the House of Commons and the opinions which were

held by the vast proportion of the electors of the United Kingdom. Even the Unionist Party, which criticised the Government's proposals for the Navy, lacked the courage to come out boldly in advocacy of a standard of two keels to one against the next greatest naval Power. The oversea Dominions, which are now pouring out their men and treasure with magnificent generosity, failed to recognise the peril which threatened them. The Imperial Squadron which was advocated five years ago at the Imperial Conference—being then described as fleet units—had no existence when hostilities opened.* Five years were lost; and, when the crisis came, there was no squadron of battle-cruisers and scouts to take up the task of patrolling the great trade-routes and hunting down the German cruisers which have succeeded in doing so much damage to British shipping. Had the Admiralty had at their disposal, for these operations in the outer seas, six or eight battle-cruisers, each mounting eight 12-inch guns and of high speed, the 'Good Hope' and 'Monmouth' would never have been destroyed. Had the naval authorities possessed eight or twelve cruisers of the Town class, the old cruiser 'Pegasus' with her crazy engines would have never been caught broken down at Zanzibar and been converted into a shambles by the gunfire of the 'Königsberg,' and the careers of the 'Emden' and other German cruisers would have been shortened. As has ever been the case in our history, economy in war preparations, during the years of peace, has proved the grossest extravagance in time of war; and unhappily the price has had to be paid, not by those who were responsible for the economy, but by those who realised where it tended.

The lessons which the naval war has taught are the value of speed and the importance of numbers. In the Bight of Heligoland twelve large ships, because they were swift, could operate in the enemy's waters though they were known to be infested with submarines. The same moral was reinforced by the sinking of the slow cruisers in the North Sea. Owing to

* Australia and New Zealand, it should in fairness be added, did build some ships. The latter Dominion's battle-cruiser assisted in the smart engagement—the first of the war—in the Bight of Heligoland, and the Commonwealth's small cruiser 'Sydney' sank the 'Emden.'

their high speed and the immensity of the seas, the German cruisers which have been harassing our commerce succeeded for many weeks in eluding action; and even now only two of them have been rounded up. Although it is too early in the war to reach any final conclusion as to the menace of the submarine, a succession of incidents has already suggested that it is neither invincible nor invulnerable, and that the surface ship has in high speed, gun power, and the ram an effective means of reprisal. 'More frigates'—fast sailing ships of small size—was the continual cry of Nelson in the last century; we may be sure that it is the cry which our admirals are now making. Speed is the weather-gauge of modern war; and, so far as we have been called upon to suffer losses, the reverses have been due to rejection of the two Nelsonian maxims—'More frigates' and 'Only numbers can annihilate.'

It is impossible to ignore the losses which we have incurred, but there is solid satisfaction to be drawn from the inevitable conclusion that nothing has happened which can affect adversely our fortunes upon the seas. Despite incidents which are regrettable, the naval organisation has triumphed to an extent which we had no reason to expect; and we have been supplied with convincing proof that in two important factors we are supreme. The Board of Admiralty has worked with energy and success; and the officers and men of the fleets at sea have shown that, though the ships have changed and many new and embarrassing conditions of naval warfare have been introduced, they are still instinct with the same spirit that gave into our keeping the trident over a hundred years ago.

ARCHIBALD HURD.

III.—IN SERBIA.

THE fog of war, which lies so heavily upon all Europe since the beginning of last August, has naturally obscured the eastern campaign which Austria-Hungary so lightly undertook against Serbia. But greater events nearer

home must not allow us to underestimate the influence of the Balkan situation upon the conflict as a whole. It deserves our attention for various reasons. In the first place the Austro-Serbian dispute, and the Southern Slav problem which underlies it, formed the *causa causans* of the European war; and its final settlement, in whatever form, is one of the most essential preliminaries to a stable peace in Europe. Secondly, Serbia has rendered very signal services to the common cause of the allies; for throughout the opening months of the campaign she has held at bay four Austrian army corps which might otherwise have been employed in Alsace or in Belgium, and which might perhaps even have turned the scale at a critical moment. It was Serbia's need which brought Russia into the field, just as it was the fate of Belgium which finally decided our own intervention; and it is becoming more and more obvious that, just as Germany regards Belgium not merely as a right of way but as a permanent acquisition, so Austria-Hungary aims at the complete subjugation of the two Serb kingdoms.

When Austria-Hungary arrogantly announced her 'punitive expedition,' many persons in this country jumped to the hasty conclusion that Serbia was doomed, and that her resistance would be overcome long before Russia could come to her aid. They may perhaps be excused for thus underestimating Serbia's capacity as a military power, for her reputation had been clouded by the regicide of 1903; her achievements in the first Balkan war—at the battles of Kumanovo and Monastir—had been persistently belittled or ignored by blind admirers of Bulgaria; and the very scanty records of the second Balkan war, which reached these shores, failed to give any adequate idea of Serbia's exploits at the Bregalnitz. Even those who had formed a juster opinion, might fairly be excused for imagining that the exhaustion produced by her recent wars with Turkey and Bulgaria would seriously affect her powers of resistance in a war against one of the great Powers. In thus arguing, however, they forgot not merely the extraordinary recuperative force of the Serb peasantry, but above all the intensity of the national feeling which nerved the nation to resist. Rightly or wrongly, every Serb has for years past regarded a conflict with Austria as

inevitable; and it is no secret that Serbia's efforts to perfect her army in the four years which elapsed between the Bosnian annexation and the Balkan war had defence against Austria rather than aggression against Turkey as their objective. To the Serb, then, the war means a struggle for existence against an irreconcilable foe, and at the same time for the liberation of his enslaved kinsmen from a foreign yoke.

While, however, the war is for Serbia a national war in the most literal sense of the term, there are very obvious limits to her resources, and even the greatest gallantry cannot hold out against overwhelming odds. In the first Balkan war the Serbs succeeded in putting 356,000 men into the field, exclusive of the last line of defence, which was employed upon internal lines of communication. Despite their losses against the Turks, it is calculated that the forces with which they opposed Bulgaria amounted to 348,000, a number of new drafts having been hurriedly enrolled in the interval. During the last year a new division, that of the Vardar, has been raised from the population of the newly acquired territory; but, after all necessary allowances have been made, it would still not be safe to estimate the effective forces of the Serbian army during the present war at a higher figure than 350,000, though doubtless another 50,000 or 100,000 would have to be accounted for, before the final resistance could be quelled.

The Serbs are weak in cavalry, though the few regiments which they have are of good quality; but the hilly nature of the country which they have to defend explains and minimises the defect. It is more than atoned for by their infantry, which has repeatedly shown powers of endurance and an *élan* of which any army in the world might be proud. This is still further strengthened by the almost ideal relations which prevail between officers and men—a feature which must have impressed every one who has visited their camps and shared their mess. The great difficulty has always been, not to spur them on, but to hold them back. Men to whom Marko Kraljević, the hero of their national ballads, is no mere myth, but a heroic reality, heading their columns on his white charger and waving them on to victory—such men are not to be judged by the ordinary

standards of modern warfare. But perhaps their most formidable arm is their artillery, which is not merely material of the very first class, but is served with deadly precision and efficiency and quite unusual mobility. The Serb gunnery officers have learnt all that the most proficient Frenchmen can teach them. Their medical and sanitary arrangements compared very favourably with those of their Bulgarian allies during the first Balkan war; and it is to this that must be ascribed the far larger proportion of recoveries from wounds and the relatively greater immunity from epidemics among the Serbians. Those who judge armies by the goose-step or by parade uniforms will not have much praise for the Serbian army (though it may be worth mentioning that its field-service kit is one of the smartest in Europe); but as a fighting machine, seasoned by the rough-and-tumble experiences of two recent campaigns, it cannot be valued too highly, within the limits prescribed by a country of four million inhabitants.

The data, without which any final verdict upon the present campaign is impossible, are still lacking, and it would therefore be rash to attempt anything more than a mere outline of events. It is known that the Serbian Government and General Staff had long regarded aggression on the part of the Dual Monarchy as a grave possibility; but it is equally certain that the authorities were taken unawares by the events of last July. Immediately after the declaration of war the seat of government was transferred from Belgrade to Nish; and the army was concentrated round Kraguyevatz, in the very centre of the country. Indeed, it appears to have been taken for granted that the Austrian mobilisation would completely outpace the Serbian, and that vastly superior Austrian forces would occupy Belgrade and Valjevo, the strategic keys of the north and west, before the Serbs could be ready for resistance on any large scale. The fact that after nearly four months of hostilities the Austrians have only accomplished one-half of the programme which they originally hoped to achieve within a fortnight, should prevent us to-day from excessive pessimism in judging the situation.

The first efforts of the Austrians were of necessity directed towards effecting a crossing over the rivers Save

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and Danube, which form the northern boundary of Serbia. They were, however, successfully frustrated by the Serbs, who had of course made a very careful study of the vulnerable points along the entire river front, and were thus able to place artillery in selected positions, in which the superior height of the southern bank secured them a distinct advantage. Over a fortnight passed without a single Austrian soldier effecting a crossing; and thus the Serbian army was ready long before the first serious advance took place. On Aug. 12 the Austrians crossed the Save and the Drina in N.-W. Serbia, at that point where the junction of the two rivers forms a kind of peninsula of flat and fertile land. On the 16th and 17th there was desperate fighting on the line between Shabatz and Lesniza, in which the invaders received a severe check; and on the 21st the battle was resumed on a still larger scale, the decisive position being at Cer (Tser). On Aug. 25 the Austrian forces were finally routed and driven back in great confusion across the Drina into Bosnia. It is calculated that at least 200,000 men were engaged on either side; the Austrian casualties were especially heavy, and large stores, and over 60 guns, fell into Serbian hands. The town of Shabatz was reoccupied, but was found to have suffered severely from the same methods which the Germans have applied with such success in Belgium.

At this stage two of the Austrian corps were transferred northwards to Galicia, and the offensive against Serbia was abandoned for the moment. Throughout August, however, the Austrian guns bombarded Belgrade at regular intervals, and many important buildings were destroyed or seriously injured. This treatment of an undefended town—a town, moreover, in which so much of the resources and civilisation of the little kingdom are concentrated—unquestionably formed part of a deliberate system. Roused by such continuous provocation, the Serbs planned a daring coup. On Sept. 10 they succeeded in crossing the Save under cover of night, stormed the town of Semlin in Syrmia, and silenced the guns which commanded Belgrade. Some weeks earlier, in combination with the Montenegrin forces, they had assumed the offensive along the southern frontier of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on Sept. 14 succeeded in occupying the

strong garrison post of Vishegrad, formerly the Austrian point of departure for the Sandjak of Novibazar.


Such aggressive moves on the part of Serbia compelled the Austrians to resume the offensive. Reinforcements were poured into Bosnia, and on Sept. 9, after three days' fighting, a large Austrian army forced its way across the Drina from a line stretching from Bjelina to Zvornik. Strengthened continually by fresh troops, they at first forced the Serbs to retire; but the latter in their turn hurried up further reinforcements. The battle of the Drina, as it has been collectively called, lasted for three days longer (Sept. 15-17), and ended in the rout of the Austrian right and a second complete ejection of the invaders from Serbian soil. The effort had, however, necessitated the evacuation of Semlin and a complete withdrawal from Syrmia. A week before, the Serb population of that district had welcomed the Serbian army with enthusiasm; and now the returning Austrians took a terrible revenge, with the result that crowds of fugitives made their way into Serbia and put a further strain upon the scanty resources of the little kingdom.

Their second great victory, however, encouraged the Serbs to resume operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Montenegrins occupied Fotcha, and a joint column advanced to within ten miles of Sarajevo. But the defences of the Bosnian capital are very strong; and this attack was mainly a piece of bluff, intended to impress the native population. Sarajevo can only be seriously threatened from the north, and this involves a strong offensive movement through the north-east corner of Bosnia. Such a move would have been attended by great danger for the Serbs, in view of their lack of reserves, the increasing difficulty of communication with their base, and the ease with which the Austrians could push up reinforcements from Croatia. If the plan was ever seriously considered, its abandonment became inevitable from the moment when the third Austrian offensive began; and this in its turn has rendered retirement from the neighbourhood of Sarajevo necessary.

Since the beginning of October precise information with regard to the Serbian campaign has been scantier than ever. The Austrians appear to have brought up



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Pronunciation: — c = ts, č = tch, š = sh, ž = French j.

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additional heavy guns, and after weeks of almost hand-to-hand fighting occupied the hills of Gutchevo, between Shabatz and the Bosnian border. Their numbers have been gradually increased by new levies, until they are believed to amount to 5 or even 6 army corps; and the Serbs, after falling back upon Valjevo, have at length found it necessary to evacuate that town altogether and to take up a strong defensive position in central Serbia, with the town and military arsenal of Kraguyevatz as their centre.

It is impossible to attempt any estimate of the losses of the campaign. The Serbs have admittedly suffered far more severely than in either of the Balkan wars, and their scanty medical resources have been strained to the uttermost. On the other hand, the Austrian casualties have been appalling. According to a seemingly authentic report which has reached the 'Morning Post' from Budapest, the campaign against Serbia is officially, though not publicly, admitted to have cost the Dual Monarchy up to the end of October 791 officers and 37,647 men killed, 2219 officers and 90,736 men wounded, and 118 officers and 17,087 men missing—in other words, a total of 148,598! Such is the heroic record of the Serbian army, whose destruction is likely to strain the resources of Austria-Hungary to the uttermost.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

Art. 8.—RECRUITING, AND THE CENSORSHIP.

THE military situation, so far as this country is concerned, gives ample food for thought. In some respects it is satisfactory, in others not. The War Office merits high praise for the celerity and smoothness with which our Expeditionary Force was mobilised, concentrated and despatched to the Continent, prepared in every respect to take the field. The Fleet was ready even before the declaration of war, and has, with comparatively slight loss, performed its difficult and dangerous task of holding the seas. Above all, the officers and men of our army in the field have shown a degree of self-sacrifice, courage and endurance unsurpassed in the most glorious pages of our military history, and, in conjunction with our Allies, have succeeded in stemming the tide of invasion which had engulfed Belgium and threatened the existence of France. All this is so much to the good; it is matter for legitimate satisfaction. Indeed, we were so agreeably surprised at the efficiency displayed, at our readiness for war, so far as the Expeditionary Force was concerned, that we have never ceased to congratulate ourselves upon it since. It has saved at least some portion of that self-complacency which is our national besetting sin, and has half obscured the unpleasing fact that we are, as usual, in a spasm of belated anxiety, only doing our best to 'muddle through.' Forewarned was not, in our case, forearmed; the warnings were in plenty, but they were unheeded or ignored. We were caught unprepared, and we are now improvising an army in the middle of a war.

Nothing is to be gained by recrimination now; and, although Ministers who have ruled the country for the last eight years must bear the principal blame for the present difficult and even dangerous situation, the Opposition cannot escape its share. The Unionist party, as a whole, have indeed striven manfully to prevent the reductions in our naval and military forces to which benighted pacifists sought, only too successfully, to coerce their leaders; but they never came out clearly—as did a few members like Col. Weston—in favour of any measure which could give us real security. To the pleadings of the war-worn veteran who has just been laid to rest in St Paul's, Conservatives were only a shade less deaf than

Liberals. But it is necessary to point out the results of the policy which has been pursued, and to consider the difficulties in which we are now involved.

To begin with, the whole scheme of defence launched some years ago, after so much 'hard thinking,' has proved utterly inadequate and has had to be abandoned. One of the first things the Government did after the outbreak of war was to send for Lord Kitchener;* and the first thing Lord Kitchener did was to call for a million of men, not for home defence but for service abroad—a demand which has since then been largely increased. What becomes of the repeated assurances so comfortably, we might say unctuously advanced, that an Expeditionary Force of 160,000 men was all that could be required? The Territorial Army was to consist of some 300,000 men (it never reached nearly that figure before the war); that number has now been exceeded by at least 50 per cent. Its duties were to be those of home defence—to guard the coast and repel raids or even invasion; this limitation has been abandoned, and a large proportion of the men have volunteered for foreign service. Many of its units have gone to our dependencies and foreign possessions; others are fighting in Belgium, and more will doubtless go. They have, in fact, become the reserves of the Expeditionary Force. And all this rearrangement has had to be made in the midst of war, a war in which we are struggling for national existence hardly a hundred miles from our own coast. Has the parable of the Foolish Virgins ever received more damning illustration?

On what grounds, again, it may well be asked, was the number of the Expeditionary Force fixed at just 160,000 men? What military problem was this number designed to meet? What particular enemy was to be faced? The answer was given by that especially 'hard thinker,' Lord Haldane, only a short time ago when, in the debate on the Army Annual Bill 1913, he said:

'The six divisions, the 160,000 men, of the Expeditionary Force owe their origin to no calculation of what sort of an army we should require on the Continent or in any other place.'

* Incidentally it may be remarked that, if the Ulster imbroglia did nothing else for us, it at least gave us Lord Kitchener in our time of need; for it may be presumed that, but for Col. Seeley's resignation, the present Secretary would now have been wasting his energies in Egypt.

It can hardly, then, be called a miscalculation, for there appears to have been no calculation at all. Whatever it was, we have paid and are paying bitterly for it. Our little army—numbering, at first, little over half the promised total—was flung, like a 'forlorn hope,' into the breach; and it has suffered the losses of a 'forlorn hope.' By this time its losses amount to about the full number of men originally sent to the front. That it escaped complete destruction at the outset was due, not to the non-calculations of the late Secretary for War, but to its own extraordinary fighting qualities, which barely averted a disaster more crushing than any that has hitherto befallen the British arms. Had we been able to put only half a million trained men in the field, that risk need never have been run. Since the first woeful inroads upon its strength during the retreat from Mons, that little force has displayed, in the battles on the Marne and the Aisne, a recuperative vigour and a courage in attack which are nothing short of marvellous; while, in the defence of Ypres, it has withstood day after day, night after night, and week after week, the repeated and concentrated attacks of overwhelming armies. A more magnificent example of stubborn endurance in defence and of courage and vigour in counter-attack has never been displayed. But at what a sacrifice of noble lives has the victory been won! We do not envy the feelings of the politicians—if indeed they are capable of remorse—when they survey the results of a blind and cheese-paring policy which condemned that thin khaki line, daily growing thinner, to bear a brunt which required at least thrice its strength.

That crisis over, the immediate danger staved off, we have now, after nearly three months of fierce and incessant fighting, another problem to solve—how to get, and how to train and equip, the armies which will be required to wear down the resistance of a brave, skilful and resolute enemy. How to *get* them, first; the rest, we may assume, will follow. A fine response has been made to Lord Kitchener's demand—a response the like of which has never been made in this country before. Speaking at the Mansion House, the Secretary for War avowed that he had no complaint to make on this score; and again, in the House of Lords, on Nov. 26, he expressed

himself as satisfied with the results. But at the same time he made it clear that he would want more, many more men; and, when the time came, he would make the appeal. Is he so sure, then, and can we be sure, that they will come when called; or will he, like Glendower, call in vain? The future safety of the country, and the durability of the peace that will end the war, depend upon the answer to this question. Recruits are coming in now, Lord Kitchener tells us, at the rate of 'approximately' 30,000 a week. That is well, so far as it goes; but at this rate it will take between eight and nine months to collect another million of men, and it will be a year or fifteen months before a considerable proportion of these will be ready to take the field. That is not the way in which this war can be brought to a successful termination; at all events we cannot contemplate without dismay the idea that the summer of 1916 may find us still engaged. Nothing is so futile as to go on indefinitely dribbling-in reinforcements merely to make good losses. If it is true on land, as Nelson held it to be at sea, that only numbers can annihilate, at this rate we shall never have the numbers. We shall manage to defend positions, to repel attacks, perhaps even to make some progress, but we shall never win the decisive victory. A year hence we shall be holding trenches in Flanders as we are to-day. For the Germans can play this game as well as we; and, unless the Austrians desert their allies, or the Russians completely crush their opponents—which is too much to hope for within many months—they will continue to do so.

The fact to be faced, then, is that we want a great many more men; and the problem is to ascertain what causes hinder us from getting them, or from getting them quickly enough. We can perhaps afford a long-drawn conflict better than our opponents; but, even if we were to think of ourselves alone, we cannot contemplate without the gravest anxiety the economical and other effects of a prolonged struggle. But we are not to think of ourselves alone. War is not raging in this country; it is raging, with all the disastrous results of a ruthless invasion, in France, Belgium, Russia and elsewhere. It was a most unfortunate suggestion—for which certain Ministers are not devoid of blame—

that we can look forward with equanimity to a three years' war. The statement is unwise if limited to ourselves; it is absolutely untrue if we consider our allies, and the last thing we should do is to speak or act as if we did not consider them. On every account, we must strive to finish the job as quickly and as completely as we can, and remember that 'only numbers can annihilate.'

The Government have done well to institute a house-to-house enquiry, with a view to ascertaining what number of able-bodied men may still be relied on to come forward if required; though the implication, that they may not be required for some time, if at all, is, if the foregoing considerations are correct, likely to create an unfortunate impression. But this is not enough. In view of the efforts that are being made, both by individuals and by organisations like the Central Committee, to bring home to the backward portions of the community a sense of their duty to the country, it is very desirable that information should be accessible—not necessarily for publication—as to what districts, towns or villages, and what sections of the people have hitherto failed to produce their proper quota of volunteers. The withholding of such information seems to be part of the secrecy which has enshrouded so much that might well be known. As things are, the efforts referred to are often wasted or misdirected. Meetings are held and stirring addresses delivered in places from which practically every available man has volunteered; others, in which there has been little or no response to the call, are neglected. Civilian assistance in the work of recruiting, as in other matters, seems to be disregarded or even snubbed by the War Office; although, as has been frequently pointed out in the 'Spectator' and elsewhere, it is or may be, if properly informed and directed, of the greatest use. So long as the voluntary system is maintained, and recruits, in large numbers, have to be persuaded to come in, civilian assistance, through the spoken or written word, is in fact indispensable. The military authorities can bring no such pressure to bear.

In some respects the military authorities themselves are, it would appear, to blame for the falling-off in the number of recruits. At one time men were coming in, no doubt,

faster than they could be handled, housed, or equipped. Having never foreseen, or rather having deliberately refused to provide for, the possibility of a war requiring millions rather than thousands of men, the War Office found itself naturally unable to cope with the sudden demand for all that appertains to the training and equipment of large numbers. They were in risk of being 'snowed under,' so to speak, by recruits; they therefore raised the standard and otherwise checked the supply. But military enthusiasm is like a syphon; so long as you let it run, it runs; once checked, it may be difficult to restore the flow. We do not presume to judge of military details, but surely the importance attached to height is, in these days, mistaken. A short man may perhaps be at some disadvantage in a bayonet charge; he is, on the other hand, less likely to be hit by bullets. Girth and depth of chest—to speak of physical qualities only—would seem to be far more important than height; and to insist on a standard which would exclude Goorkhas and Japanese from a fighting force appears absurd. However, by this and other means the supply of recruits was checked; and the result has been unfortunate. The impression was given that men were not wanted; and such an impression is not easy to eradicate. It is hard to see why the War Office should not have adopted—should not even now adopt—some such plan as that ably advocated in the 'Spectator,' by which all fit men who offer should be accepted at once, but should return to their homes and work, with a retaining fee, till arrangements can be made for them, when they should be summoned to join the force, civilian aid being called in to assist, and what training is possible being given before they join the camps. But, even under Lord Kitchener, the War Office seems slow in adapting itself to novel circumstances.

The attitude of the business community in the grave difficulties that have come upon them is worthy of high praise. They are making, and are evidently ready to make in future, great sacrifices for the common weal. They have, in general, done their best to encourage their employees to enlist and to facilitate such action; and the straits to which they must have been put can only be guessed, but not fully appreciated, by the outsider.

At the same time it may be doubted whether the motto 'Business as usual' has not been too widely advertised, or pressed too far. Business must be carried on, for the sinews of war depend upon it, and unemployment on a large scale would exhaust our resources. So long as we retain command of the sea, we may and should take full advantage of it and, for the welfare of the whole, carry on our affairs. But business cannot, in the circumstances, go on 'as usual'; and the emphasis so widely laid on the maxim tends to obscure the fact that our *first* business now is not to trade but to beat the enemy. It is not 'business first and war afterwards,' but the other way about. In this connexion far too much, in our opinion, has been made of the 'War upon German Trade.' However justifiable it may be to push our wares in markets from which German goods are temporarily excluded, that is not the object for which we went to war; and the world-wide publicity that has been given to this aim, the energy with which it has been advertised in certain newspapers, will inevitably lend credence to the reproach constantly levelled against us by German writers, that the chief motive of our action has been jealousy of their commercial success. Regarded, moreover, from the economical point of view, the cry rests upon a very unsound basis. Trade captured in this accidental way, and not resting on real superiority or greater cheapness of the goods concerned, will not long outlast the war; and the advantage hitherto enjoyed by Germany, if it is due to higher skill, better advertising methods, or any other permanent cause, will speedily be recovered, with the result of serious dislocation and loss to businesses whose energies will have been wrongly directed into lines in which they were unable to compete on equal terms. The worst of it is, however, that, while we are thus wasting our energies on a delusive aim, the enemy is straining every nerve to win a victory in the field which, as a secondary result, would shatter our trade for ever. The whole agitation has and must have a most detrimental result upon recruiting. The ordinary man engaged in industry, manual labour, or business of any kind, is misled into thinking that his first duty is to keep the works going or the shop open. If he is hesitating whether to go or not, this motive will turn

the scale; if he is inclined to shirk, he will have a pretext for shirking. Let us do what business is necessary; but the less these cries are heard, the better.

A great deal has been said about the playing, or rather the watching, of games, especially football, as a hindrance to recruiting. Vast crowds of lads and young men, estimated at 350,000 on a single afternoon, troop to these spectacles, and not only during the time of play but from one week to another are absorbed either in watching or in thinking about the performances of their favourite champions, to the detriment of national interests. Appeals to the spectators, recently made upon the football grounds, have produced, in most cases, little or no result. In estimating the truth and force of the complaints, it must be remembered that the football crowds consist, for the most part, of men engaged in more or less exhausting labour during the rest of the week. Sundays and Saturday afternoons are their only time for recreation. For many it would no doubt be better that they should play themselves, rather than look on; but a very large proportion do not require physical exercise. Amusement and relaxation are what they want, and they get little enough of it in their lives. If the motto 'Business as usual' is to be observed, if our great industries are to be carried on in war-time—as indeed they must be—it is difficult to see that many of these hand-workers can be spared. In those industrial centres where arms and ammunition, uniforms, etc., are manufactured, it is obvious that the men cannot enter the army; and in some such places it is understood that appeals for recruits have actually been discouraged by superior authority. Of the mining districts much the same may be said; the coal must be won, and the men must work to win it.

After making all these allowances, however, it is probable that there are a good many men in the football crowds who are not really required for necessary industries; and on them the moral effect of these gladiatorial shows must, from the point of view of national interest, undoubtedly be bad. But the question arises, what would they do if the matches were stopped? It is surely absurd to suppose that for want of amusement they would flock into the army. If they were men

of the volunteering type, it is not football which would have kept them away; and, if there were no football, they would mostly take to something worse. Upon men like these we must bring other means of persuasion to bear. On the whole, therefore, we cannot help regarding the outcry against football matches as mistaken or at least excessive. At all events, if the matches are stopped, the results are likely to be disappointing. Moreover, it would be obviously unfair to stop football, while allowing golf, racing and other pastimes to go on just as usual.

A much more serious hindrance to recruiting is the ignorance and consequent apathy still prevailing in many places, especially in some rural districts, in villages and small towns.* In such places meetings and addresses of the ordinary type seem to be of little use. All appears to depend on the presence of one or two active residents who bring their energies to bear on individuals. In a certain Yorkshire village, last September, the doctor (R.A.M.C. retired) was drilling between twenty and thirty men; from the upper part of the dale, beyond the range of his activities, one man only had volunteered. In a southern county, a series of eloquent addresses, delivered at largely-attended meetings, produced next to no results. Facts of this kind must be within the experience of every one who has interested himself in the matter. As to the feeling of the country at large, we may take it that, where the nature of the struggle is understood, there is no lack of readiness to enlist. Such replies as are occasionally given—'We don't care whether the Germans come or not; we couldn't be worse off than we are now'; or 'King or Kaiser, it's all one to the likes of us'—may be regarded as eccentricities, not to be taken too literally. But the fact is that, to a vast number of inhabitants of these isles, war is not a serious national business, and one war is very like another. Between the South African war and that of to-day they make no distinction. It is something going on in 'furrin parts,'

* Of pure ignorance the following story (first-hand) may serve as an example. A wounded but convalescent private in a Hertfordshire village was discussing the war with his friends. One of them—not a rustic but an artisan—asked him, 'What sort o' barracks have you got out there?' 'Barracks?' he replied, 'what do you mean?' 'Well, after a day's fightin', you goes back to barracks, I suppose, don't you?'

with which the ordinary man is only remotely concerned—an affair of interest to the soldiers alone.

There is nothing to surprise us in this attitude of mind. For ages our people have seen nothing of invasion; for more than a century even the fear of such a thing has been unknown. When they are told of the dangers that would arise from a permanent German occupation of Belgium, they do not understand, or they refuse to believe. This is partly due to want of imagination, but far more to the pernicious fallacy that underlies our military system—with its strange disproportion between the Foreign Service Army and the Territorial Force—the fallacy that this country can and should be defended within its own shores. It is not within our borders but across the seas that our defensive battles are to be fought. But the fallacy clings, and the man who has imbibed it says, 'We've been told we only want 300,000 men to stop any invading force that could land. You've got half as many again now. What do you want with more?' And what are we to say of that other still more deadly delusion, that it is time enough to begin to drill your men when war breaks out; it will only take six months to turn them into soldiers! Six months! and meanwhile what may happen? The piteous appeals for 'men, more men' that occur every day in the letters from the front published in the newspapers teach us what we—or rather our soldiers abroad—are paying for the delay. But the ordinary man at home, who has been lulled into lethargy by these false prophets of politicians, replies, when the appeal is made, 'Time enough! The fleet's all right'; or 'If the Germans land, I'll come—not before.'

If the ideas of national defence and military duty which have been inculcated for years past are to blame for much of the reluctance which is now seen, the unduly optimistic tone adopted by many newspapers, the blatant headlines, the exaggeration of small successes, the minimising of reverses, even the speeches of some of our public men, increase the difficulty of recruiting by diminishing the appearance of necessity. It is, we venture to think, a pity that the First Lord of the Admiralty constantly attempts to minimise the losses that we have suffered at sea. He deplores, in a perfunctory way, the

loss of life; the ships, we are always told, don't matter, or matter little. But they do matter; the loss of a ship like the 'Bulwark' matters a good deal. And even Lord Kitchener, in expressing, as he has done more than once, his satisfaction at recruiting, adopts an optimistic tone which is, to say the least, not stimulating. We do not want to scare the public; but neither do we want to reassure them too much. We hold our own in Belgium, it is true, but that is far from being enough. There is still cause enough for anxiety; and the decisive victory, short of which we cannot be satisfied, is still far off, and demands greater efforts than any we have yet made. But what is likely to be thought by the man in the street when he reads in the columns of one of the most widely read of our daily papers, under the name of a correspondent who, it is to be presumed, 'draws' the ignorant public, a report like the following:

'Of this German retreat from Northern Belgium there is no doubt. The German right is smashed like a fallen wine-glass. The retreat is no less than a rout. Their rifles, their stores, some of their guns, and even some of their wounded comrades the Germans have left behind in their rush from this fatal battlefield—which has been rated as the most stubborn and bloodthirsty of the whole war. The flooding of the German positions, a natural piece of strategy which German generalship seems to have most blunderingly overlooked, came only as a climax of disaster, not as the root cause. The Germans' chance was well on the wane before that. Their generals had butchered man after man, battalion after battalion, in striving to cross the Yser Canal by brute force, and all without success. They were lying like beaten dogs, licking their wounds, when the floods came upon them.'

The execrable taste of the last sentence will not escape observation, but the delusive effect of the whole passage is deplorable. And this precious piece of would-be picturesque journalism was published on Nov. 6, just before the opening of the tremendous attack which culminated on Nov. 11. 'What do you want with more soldiers,' says the man in the street, 'if the Germans are getting beaten like that?'

Mr J. A. Grant, M.P., writing to the 'Times' on Nov. 24, avows his opinion, formed after three months' experience, that

'the reason more men do not join is that they see no necessity for doing so . . . These men form their opinion from the public press, with the result that they have the conviction that this matter with Germany will be easily and victoriously settled in a few months. They read of nothing but victories for the Allies . . . The true proportions of the struggle are seldom, if ever, presented to their minds. The natural result is that only a fraction see the necessity of enlisting.'

For this mistaken optimism, however, it is not fair to blame the newspapers alone, or even chiefly; they get their news principally from the Press Bureau, and what they publish must have the approval of that body. It is the Press Bureau that sets the tone; and, if the tone is mistaken, as we believe, the responsibility is mainly theirs.

On the other hand, it can hardly be doubted that neither the War Office nor the Admiralty has sufficiently realised the stimulating effect of vivid narratives setting forth the gallant deeds of the army, and especially of individual regiments or battalions. It is well known that the story of the brilliant charge made by the London Scottish at Ypres led immediately to an enormous increase in the numbers anxious to join that regiment. But that charge was no isolated or exceptional event; many other regiments have distinguished themselves in a similar manner. The difference is that we hear nothing about them, or the action is related without any mention of the corps by which it was performed, or perhaps it crops up casually weeks afterwards through a Brigade Order published in a local paper. One such Order, in which the splendid performance of the 1st Loyal North Lancashires, the Northampton, and the 2nd King's Royal Rifle Corps on Oct. 23 is described, was published by the 'Times' on Nov. 17. As the 'Times' very truly says, 'The simple publication of General Bulfin's Order . . . would have done more for recruiting in Lancashire than all the perfunctory posters issued at great cost by the War Office.' Again, on Nov. 23, Sir Henry Lucy called attention to a letter of the 'Times' correspondent describing 'one of the most wonderful bayonet charges that have been seen during the war,' and pertinently asked, 'Why should the name of this company of heroes be suppressed?' He surmises that the Censor struck it out,

or that the correspondent, knowing it would be struck out, omitted it; and he adds: 'The result is cruel injustice to gallant men, grave discouragement to others in the fighting line, and the ignoring of a splendid opportunity of inciting recruiting at home.' It would be easy to multiply examples of this mistaken reticence, but these may suffice. It is absurd to suppose that the enemy is unaware what regiments he has in front of him, or of their strength or character. The information we desire could be of no use to him, and would be of great use to us.

Apart from these questions of the Press and the dissemination of news, a serious drawback to the recruiting campaign is to be found in the physical and other conditions of service, including in these the state of the camps and other centres where the men are collected, the accommodation and food provided, the want of uniforms and equipments, etc. To say that these conditions, at the outset, left much to be desired, would be putting the matter far too mildly. There was no excuse for the state of things which existed, as a rule, till recently, except that it was only part, and an inevitable part, of our general unpreparedness. The War Office cannot be blamed—the responsibility for this, as for other shortcomings, lies elsewhere; and we are happy to believe that accommodation and other arrangements, though still far from perfect, are much improved. But that they have acted as a drag upon recruiting there can be little doubt. Soldiers, both officers and men, expect to 'rough it,' but they may at least claim to be kept warm and dry and to be decently fed; and this for a long time was not the case. Not only were they disgusted, but their health suffered. Writing a month ago ('Times,' Nov. 9), Mr G. Pragnell, chairman of the Employers' Territorial Association, said:

'The greatest drawback to recruiting is dissatisfaction with the management. I find this feeling exists among miners, agricultural labourers, factory hands, and bank clerks alike. . . . The state of things in the training camps is now known all over the country. These conditions are quoted against me wherever I go. . . . For our good lads and true surely the best is not too good, instead of giving them the same menu of poor food day after day, verminous bedding, all sorts and conditions of clothing supplied by voluntary

contributions, and practically nothing in the shape of entertainment.'

He recommends that the War Office should hand over 'the accommodation, sanitation, food, clothing and recreation of all the training camps in Great Britain' to a committee of business men. But no; here again the military authorities ignore the willing civilian, and prefer, overworked as they must be, to do the job themselves, with the result of indefinite delay, damage to the men's health, and discouragement of recruiting. The 'Daily Chronicle,' on Nov. 6, pointed to the rejection by the War Office of the offer of help from the Board of Education as most unfortunate, and proceeded:

'Refusal to accept local and civilian help in non-military matters has been at the root of most of the mismanagement; and we fear that the unfavourable reports from enlisted men are still a main obstacle to recruiting.'

It is only right to mention in this connexion the splendid work of the Y. M. C. A., which has supplied recreation tents, books, games, writing materials, etc., with temperance canteens, thereby doing much to relieve the inevitable boredom of camp-life, to keep the men happy, and to counteract the temptations which surround them.

The state of things in the camps, to which we have referred, is only, we may hope, a temporary drawback. A more serious obstacle is to be found in the pecuniary arrangements—the rate of pay, the allowances for wives, children and other dependants, the provision for widows and orphans, and for disabled men. The question is a complicated and difficult one; and to enter upon it in detail would involve too long a discussion. Moreover the Government has already made some concessions to public feeling in favour of generosity; and, as an impartial commission has been appointed to consider the whole matter, it will be well to await their report.* But certain general considerations may be offered.

Representatives of the working classes, supported by the 'Daily Citizen' and by Mr R. Blatchford in the 'Clarion,' have put forward a programme which at least

* We may refer here to a short but striking paper by Mr G. N. Barnes, M.P., in the 'Review of Reviews' for November.

has the merit of simplicity. They demand '1*l.* a week for the widow of every soldier and sailor killed; 1*l.* a week for the mother dependent on every soldier and sailor killed; 1*l.* a week for the wife of every soldier and sailor engaged in fighting; 1*l.* a week for every soldier and sailor permanently maimed by fighting.' Apart from the question of expense, which would be very heavy, this scheme would not really be fair, for the positions occupied by recruits before they join vary enormously, and the sacrifices they make, from a pecuniary point of view, are very different. The flat rate advocated would be excessive in the case of the agricultural labourer; it would not adequately compensate the artisan earning 2*l.* or 3*l.* a week, or the dependants of a clerk with a salary of 150*l.* a year. There does not appear to be any sufficient reason why a sliding-scale, on broad lines, should not be arranged, more or less corresponding to the income previously received by a recruit. Again, it has already been pointed out that, so far, no improvement upon the existing very haphazard scale of compensation for permanent injuries has been adopted or at least published by the Government. A serious discouragement to recruiting would be removed by a satisfactory arrangement under this head. The dread of returning disabled from the war, minus an arm or a leg, or otherwise condemned to be a burden on the family instead of its support, must be present to the mind of every recruit.

Further, the prospect of what may happen, at the end of the war, to men who return whole, is by no means attractive. The invitation to 'enlist for the war only,' and the promise of discharge as soon as it is over, were no doubt meant to encourage recruits, but they may have a different result. Many firms have promised to reinstate employees who volunteer, but such promises will be very difficult of execution. It will hardly be possible to turn off substitutes who have been doing the work satisfactorily for a year or more; and such men cannot be expected to regard their engagements as merely provisional. In any case, whether the substitutes are discharged or the returned employees left out in the cold, much hardship will ensue. The Government ought to undertake to continue the full rate of pay to men discharged at the

end of the war, until at least they have had reasonable time to obtain employment of a character more or less similar to that which they enjoyed before it began.

Finally, we must remember what consequences follow from the Voluntary Service system which we have deliberately adopted and for the present seem determined to follow. It is not, to our mind, the right system, but this is not the place to discuss at length a question so important and so wide. Much has been said, and may justly be said, on both sides. By the voluntary system we get, no doubt, a splendid army, for it is an army of (in a sense) picked men, and it avoids certain dangers such as militarism. But it is a wasteful system and a very unfair one. It is unfair because it throws all the burden of national defence on the public-spirited, unselfish and patriotic portion of the community, leaving the selfish and the sluggish, the laggards and the wastrels, to enjoy the protection of better men while saving their own skins. It is horribly wasteful, from the national point of view, because it is the adventurous and the energetic, the courageous and the imaginative who suffer, who sacrifice life or limb or health in their country's cause, while the less worthy remain at home to propagate the race. The loss to the community in the most precious lives is inestimable. On the waste and extravagance inseparable from the attempt to improve an army in time of war, and on the terrible risk of defeat from unreadiness, it should be needless to insist.

However, there the system is; and all we can do at present is to make the best of it. But we must face its consequences, its inevitable requirements; and the first of these is that we should act as generously as possible towards those who are willing to risk their lives on our behalf. So long as the duty of national service is not recognised in law, the State is merely a competitor with self-interest and other motives. Not only good feeling and the sense of obligation but prudence and common sense dictate that we should remove every pecuniary obstacle or discouragement, and deal generously, even lavishly, with our defenders. Both the rate of pay and the rate of allowances and pensions are at present utterly

inadequate. It is absurd that the soldier should have to give up, out of his miserable shilling a day—which is already otherwise reduced—two-thirds or more for those he leaves at home. The man with a wife and three children at home gets only threepence a day for himself. It is no abuse of words to characterise this as a simple scandal. The wonder is, not that we get so few men under these conditions, but that we get so many. We are astounded at the sense of duty which impels a million of men to leave their homes in order to fight for a country so stingy and so ungrateful. It is all very well to prate of duty and patriotism, but man cannot live by patriotism alone, and the discharge of duty too often leaves the patriot penniless. From motives of mere efficiency, apart from other reasons, and in order to obtain the forces necessary to save the State, we must alter our attitude in this respect. So long as we limit ourselves to volunteers, we must make it worth their while to come, or at least relieve them so far as possible from pecuniary loss. Lives are not to be valued in money, but to stint money to those who are willing to risk death in the service of their country is a policy at once mean and foolish, which the country will assuredly condemn.

We have already referred to the Press Censorship—meaning by this not only the Press Bureau but the control over news exerted by the Admiralty and the War Office—as having worked in a way inimical to recruiting. The relations of these bodies, their spheres of action, and the composition of the Press Bureau, are all somewhat obscure. It is a power unknown in these islands since the 17th century. Frankly we do not like it. We submit to it because the freedom of the press has been carried, in recent wars, to a stage at which it became dangerous from the military point of view; but we require that it shall be as little irksome as possible, that as much information as is compatible with military exigencies shall be published, and above all that the regulations shall not infringe the constitutional rights of citizens in a free country.

To begin with, the pretension put forward by the Solicitor General in the House of Commons on Nov. 12 cannot be tolerated for a moment. After referring to

the danger if the Press Bureau were assumed to be the creature of the Government, he went on :

‘Therefore criticism of the Government or of particular members of the Government was a thing which he should never stop, unless the criticism was of such a character that it might destroy public confidence in the Government . . . or cause distress or alarm to the people by leading them to think that affairs were really in a very serious state.’

The full scope of this remark may not have been realised or fully considered by the speaker, but it is obvious that it implies a control to which we cannot and ought not to submit. Who is to draw the line between criticism which destroys confidence in the Government, and that which does not? And will not the tendency of a censor who is a member of the Government obviously be to draw the line in his own favour? Every criticism of governmental action or inaction does, so far as it goes, and so far as it is justifiable, weaken confidence in the Government. Confidence is good, if it is merited, not otherwise; and criticism, even to the extent of destroying confidence altogether, may sometimes be necessary. Where should we have been in the Crimean War, but for outspoken criticism which eventually overthrew the Government of Lord Aberdeen? And it ill becomes a member of that party, whose criticisms of the Conservative Government during the Boer War were certainly aimed at destroying its power and reversing its whole policy, to arrogate the right of suppressing criticism, fair or unfair, now that his party is in office.

For the sake of an undivided country, we may well be thankful that a Liberal Government had to initiate and now has to carry through this war. The Opposition has promised its full support; it has fulfilled and will continue to fulfil the pledge; but it does not abdicate the right of criticism where it deems it necessary in the interest not of party but of the State. Moreover, if criticism destructive of confidence is to be put down, why does not the censor begin with assailants like Mr Ramsay MacDonald and Mr Bernard Shaw? These gentlemen have levelled at Sir Edward Grey criticisms which, apart from the handle they have given to our

enemies, were eminently calculated to destroy confidence in the Government, in the person of one of its most responsible Ministers. Still more reprehensible were the attacks made by Mr Keir Hardie on the country and the Government, and his sneers at the King, to which the attention of the House was called by Mr Edward Jones on Nov. 17. But the Government has not moved. Two of these gentlemen are members of parliament, and the third, we must suppose, is a licensed buffoon.

Finally, the Solicitor General asserts his right to suppress criticism which may cause distress or alarm by leading people to think that affairs are in a serious state. Sir Stanley is very careful of the feelings of the people, but what if affairs *are* in a serious state? Is it not better that the people should be distressed and alarmed than that they should be lulled into false security by official reticence or optimism? This people is not very readily distressed or alarmed; indeed their tendency is quite the other way, and a little anxiety would sometimes do them good. Mr Bonar Law did good service by protesting in the House, on Nov. 24, against the statement of Mr Solicitor, and his words deserve to be recorded:

'I wish (he said) to make this clear, that it is the right, not only of every member of this House, but of every newspaper in this country and of every speaker on every platform, if he honestly believes that a member of the Government is incompetent or is not properly doing his work, to try to get rid of that member, even though his trying to do so does create a want of confidence in the Government. . . . I thoroughly recognise that exceptional powers that could not be tolerated in other times must be given. But I feel most strongly that the Government should not ask for greater powers than are necessary, and that they should be most careful to show by their speeches, as well as by their acts, that they recognise the limitation of the powers which are given them, and that they do not intend to interfere in any shape or form with legitimate criticism.'

It was doubtless partly due to this protest, along with others, that the Government accepted, at the hands of Lord R. Cecil, amendments in clause 1 of the Defence

of the Realm Consolidation Bill which removed its objectionable features, and placed proper limits on the censor's powers.

So much for the question of legitimate criticism under the censorship. It may be assumed that this will not give further trouble. But there is cause for astonishment that, while putting forward a claim which, we take it, has now been withdrawn, the Government has been so slow to exert its undoubted powers to put down sedition, the advocacy of treason, and vehement discouragement of service in the British army, such as has recently been witnessed in Ireland. The ultra-Nationalist press has become increasingly disloyal, and editors who were out at elbows three months ago are now in affluence. The opportunity is too good for German agents, backed by German gold, to neglect; and reports from Ireland indicate that opinion in many parts of the country, which at the outset was, at the worst, indifferent, is now frankly pro-German. This is not surprising when Irish papers publish week by week such matter as follows:

'The spectacle of the National Volunteers with English officers at their head and the Union Jack floating proudly above them, "defending" Ireland for the British Government may appeal to the gushing eyes of Mr John Redmond, but his eyes are not likely to be blessed with that apotheosis of slavery' ('Sinn Fein,' Aug. 8, 1914).

'Stop at home; this is the spot on which to fight for our rights . . . Better to die fighting on Irish soil for Irish rights than die as a hired assassin to destroy the rights of other peoples' ('Irish Worker,' Sept. 12).

'A desperate attempt is being made to turn the majority from their path, to lead them to the foreign shambles that English trade may flourish and England's arms dominate the earth . . . No Irishman will join the army; no volunteer will ever fire a shot except for Ireland' ('Irish Volunteer,' Oct. 3).*

* Other quotations, showing 'an increasingly pro-German bias,' and ending with one from 'The Irish Volunteer' for Nov. 7—'Our only path to the glorious and happy Ireland of our aspirations lies through the downfall of the British Empire'—will be found in an article by the parliamentary correspondent of the 'Times,' Nov. 24.

150 RECRUITING, AND THE CENSORSHIP

The following leaflet has recently been widely distributed:

'ENGLAND WANTS MEN.

'Lord Kitchener is confident that he can entrap, cajole, gull, and enforce 100,000

IRISHMEN

to enlist in the demoralised, decadent, crime-stained, blood-sodden

BRITISH ARMY.

The Irish people, however, mindful of their inalienable heritage to

COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE,

will, by every means in their power, prevent—by force, if necessary—one single Irishman from selling himself, body and soul, to the only enemy Ireland has in the world, England. Germany is now at war with England but not with Ireland. England wants the Irish to save them from ruin. Will you help to save the thrice-accursed British Empire from ruin, or will you help to strike a final blow at the biggest fraud, the hollowest sham, the world has ever known?

'Irishmen! The Home Rule Bill is only sop—the crumbs that fall from the table of the rich man, Dives—England, to the beggar, Lazarus—Ireland.

'Don't believe the foul lies that the subsidised so-called "Irish Press" is circulating about the Germans. Remember, it is only a few years since the Irish were stigmatised in the jingo Press as Thugs and Murderers! Remember the order issued during the last year of the Boer War by Lord Roberts, that where the railway line had been tampered with by the Boers the houses for a radius of 10 miles were to be burnt! Remember the famine of '47, when England deliberately starved nearly two millions of men (Irish) and drove another million and a half in exile! Remember the Manchester Martyrs! Remember the doing to death in prison of the men of '67! Remember Howth Sunday, July 26th, 1914, when "Our" Army deliberately fired on the unarmed citizens in revenge for the beating they got from the unarmed volunteers and Boy Scouts!

VOLUNTEERS,

if the war is prolonged England will be in a state of starvation, and will seize all the Irish food stuffs—then the Irish will starve.

HOLD THE HARVEST!

England wants men, but by God! she will not get Irishmen!'

What is the Government doing, we ask? A fortnight ago Sir Stanley Buckmaster declared that he had not seen any of the seditious newspapers. He appears to have eyes for nothing but English news and English criticism. And what of Mr Birrell? He was asked in the House whether he had seen these papers. He replied that he had been reading them for the last six weeks. 'And done nothing?' retorted his interrogator. The criticism which this inaction deserves would perhaps be regarded by the censor as calculated to 'destroy confidence' in the Irish Secretary. But this could hardly be, for was there ever any confidence in Mr Birrell to be destroyed? We are almost sorry for Mr Redmond, who figures with his former supporters as 'Judas.' Such is the union of hearts which we were assured was to follow upon Home Rule. If Mr Birrell will not act, are there no laws of treason and sedition? Will not even the new Defence of the Realm Act work in such a case?*

That the conduct of the censorship has caused grave annoyance in the circles most friendly to this country in the United States is well known to all who have watched the Transatlantic press. The complaints from America fall under several heads—lack of information, unwarrantable delay in the transmission of news, and suppression of important facts. From the first of these troubles we suffer as much as do our cousins in the United States. Why, for instance, do we hear scarcely anything of the fighting in East Africa, severe as it has evidently been? Why, again, were the despatches about the fight in the Heligoland Bight kept back for some six weeks?

As to the second complaint, American journalists appear to admit that things have been much better during the last two months. But under the third head grave charges have been made. To those brought forward by Mr Corey, correspondent of the 'New York Globe,' to the effect that 'despatches have been altered for the purpose of hiding the truth and blackening the enemy's character,' the 'Times' referred in its issues of Oct. 24-27. We should have been inclined to treat such

* Since these sentences were in type, the military authorities have, we are relieved to see at length intervened.

a charge with silent contempt but for the fact that Mr Corey adhered to it in a letter published on Oct. 27, and that it was supported in the 'New York Evening Post,' a widely read and respectable paper. In a leader issued on Oct. 25 that journal says :

'That the British censorship of the war news has reflected credit neither upon the intelligence of the officials nor upon their reputation for fair play, is daily becoming more evident. . . . The censorship may not be responsible for the deliberate falsification of the official German despatch of Sept. 11, which we printed in our issue of Oct. 10 ; but, if not, this merely transfers the blame to the newspapers which printed the despatch, or to the news association which supplied it. We have reason to believe that the German press is justified in asserting that this is not the only case in which official despatches have been altered to German disadvantage.'

We quote this passage not, it need hardly be said, with any idea that the charge is true, but because it is an attack upon our honour under which we ought not to sit quiet. Silence in such matters may be dignified, but it is not wise. If these charges are not refuted, they will be believed ; and the good opinion of this country, now so widely held in the United States, will receive a severe shock. We venture to think it is high time that the Government, or, at all events, the Press Bureau, should take the matter up, sift it to the bottom, and authoritatively refute so odious an accusation.

It is, however, most unfortunate that the charge of suppressing important facts should have lately received support from the grave error of judgment—we can regard it as nothing less, and need regard it as nothing more—involved in the concealment of the mishap which befell the navy off the coast of Ireland on Oct. 25. There was reason, perhaps, for the similar concealment by the Japanese of the loss of the 'Hatsuse' in the Russo-Japanese war ; for the Japanese navy was numerically inferior to the Russian, and it was possible to conceal the fact from the enemy till the war was over. But in our case the attempt at concealment was doomed to failure from the outset. The accident was witnessed by the crews of many other vessels, including that of an Atlantic liner

plying between New York and Liverpool. Such an event was bound to be talked of far and wide, whether it got into the English papers or not. On the return of the liner to New York, it *was* talked of, with the result that about three weeks ago the news was in all the New York papers. There lies before us a copy of the 'New York Tribune,' in which several circumstantial accounts by eye-witnesses appear. An enquiry sent by the 'Tribune' to its London correspondent elicited the reply: 'Matter referred to is news which we were not and are not permitted to send.' Of course the event was soon afterwards known in Germany; and we have also before us a copy of the 'Vossische Zeitung' for Nov. 24, with the heading 'Ein englischer Dreadnought vernichtet' ('Destruction of an English Dreadnought') in large type on its front page. A telegram from Rotterdam of the same date confirms the news; and the 'National Tidende' of Stockholm for Nov. 23 gives full details.

How ill-judged and hopeless was the attempt to conceal the fact may be conceived from these occurrences. The most unfortunate feature of the affair is the result which the belated disclosure must inevitably have upon the public mind. It is not open criticism which sows distrust and want of confidence; it is the feeling that the public is not allowed to know what it ought to know.

The reason for such misguided conduct can only be either the 'military exigencies' to which Mr Asquith referred on Nov. 17, or the desire to avoid giving cause for 'distress and alarm' (as the Solicitor General put it), or finally the fear that the event might reflect discredit on the Admiralty. None of these reasons is good. By no possibility could the phrase 'military exigencies' be stretched to cover the case, especially considering the superiority of force on which the First Lord insisted so buoyantly the other day. As to the public, disasters are apt only to stiffen the backs of Englishmen; the loss of a single ship, if known at once, would not cause a tithe of the 'distress and alarm,' not to say suspicion, likely to be caused by the attempt to hush it up. We are loth to attribute the error of judgment to the third cause; and, if it is to be so attributed, the idea is just as mistaken as the action itself. Everyone knows that

such accidents may happen in the best of navies; everyone knows that, if mines are about, ships are liable to strike them and go down; and no one could have expected to find mines off Lough Swilly. Neither Admiral Togo nor the Japanese Admiralty was blamed for losing the 'Hatsuse'; nor would the English people have blamed the Admiralty for the accident to the 'Audacious.' They are, we believe, too sensible and too generous for that. What we do blame the Admiralty for—and we blame them severely—is for attempting to blindfold the public.

The note which follows, by an influential Anglo-American, will show how the matter is regarded in the United States; and, seeing how much depends on the public opinion of that country, we cannot but think that his views merit thoughtful consideration.

THE CENSORSHIP AS IT APPEARS TO THE UNITED STATES.

Of all the neutral powers, by far the most important for Great Britain to keep on good terms with is the United States. But the relations between these two Powers are, at the same time, peculiarly exposed to the risk of misunderstandings. In the early days of the war the appearance of Japan as a combatant sent through America a thrill of uneasiness; day by day the measures taken with regard to American shipments to neutral ports are watched with the greatest anxiety. The self-denial of Japan in restricting her activities to her own waters has allayed the fears that she might establish herself in a position in the Pacific dangerous to American interests; and the careful diplomacy of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and the fairmindedness of the American people as a whole have enabled the interference of England with American commerce so far to be carried on without arousing popular protests. But this does not alter the fact that at any moment trouble may crop up and the United States may make enquiries, perhaps more annoying than dangerous, into Great Britain's war measures, and may display a reluctance to grant her the facilities she needs for purchasing military necessities and borrowing money. It is therefore worth while for the British Government to do what

it can to preserve American sentiment as it is at the present moment, overwhelmingly on the side of the Allies.

That sentiment, it must be realised, is not by any means entirely the result of a somewhat mythical kinship. It is based on reason and on a settled conviction that Germany was the aggressor, and that Great Britain in particular had good cause for entering the fight. The famous White Paper has been sold, for example, by the 'New York Times' by the thousand; and Bernhardt's works have had an equally phenomenal circulation, with fortunately a very different result. So far as descendants of British stock are concerned, Americans are predisposed in favour of the Allies; but one-ninth of the population looks back to Germany or Austro-Hungary as the fatherland, and, as is so often the case in private life, the very relationship of the Anglo-Saxon element makes it critical and jealous for the good name of its cousins.

So far, every Englishman living in the United States can acknowledge with gratification and gratitude that the life-and-death struggle of his native country has been followed with the deepest sympathy. The Germans have made active but clumsy efforts to turn the tide of sentiment in their favour, and have used the most specious methods to make their own appear the better cause. They have started newspapers; they have hired public debaters in the market-places; they have engineered professedly humanitarian movements to stop the fight before the Kaiser is crushed. Above all, they have spread broadcast the most astonishing statements about the events and the methods of the war. Hitherto Englishmen in the United States have done nothing to combat their efforts. They have deliberately held their hands, not because they were unwilling to do all they could to forward their country's cause, but because they regarded the German activities as futile and believed them to react against their own side. Englishmen have been able to boast that, no matter what the enemy said, the facts were their vindication, and that the ordinary news, as it came from British sources, carried with it its own proof of authenticity.

But recently this confidence has received a severe

shock. The censor, or the naval and military authorities, by failing to understand the nature and effects of publicity, have cut the ground from under the British champions' feet. In the early days of the war the censorship was blundering enough. A special despatch for which a newspaper was paying heavy cable tolls would come mutilated to one office, and complete to another. Names and dates would be deleted in one message, only to be left untouched in an almost precisely similar one. Purely descriptive articles about engagements which had happened weeks before would be held up, and the most harmless speculations would be reduced to an unintelligible collection of words. Important speeches like those of Mr Asquith and Sir Edward Grey were kept back for thirty-six hours, for no conceivable reason. It must be understood that, in making these charges, the newspapers were not in any way complaining of the proper activities of the censors. They fully realise that, in such times as these, there are matters which no Government can permit to be published; and they are willing to do nothing to prejudice the plans of the generals. Indeed one New York newspaper, at any rate, was completely informed of such a stirring piece of news as the gathering of the great fleet of transports at Quebec and the sailing of the expeditionary force, and yet refrained from publishing it because it was hardly the thing to do. But they do feel annoyed that they have not been permitted to receive legitimate and harmless news for which they have paid, and have been at the mercy of amateur censors, who cannot agree among themselves as to what intelligence is contraband and what is not.

These complaints, however, are of more concern to the professional newspaper man perhaps than to the people at large. The average reader knows nothing of the secrets of the prison house, and will accept one despatch as readily as another. But it is not a matter of indifference that the newspapers of America should be offended by the treatment they have received. On them depends the opinion of the public at large; and some of them, in centres with a large German population, have every temptation to side against the Allies. It is the reasoned conviction of the justice of the British cause, the hatred of German 'culture' as displayed at

Louvain and Rheims, the horror of the mutilation of Belgium and the dread that something of the same sort may befall England herself, which have kept them faithful to the Allies.

Far more serious than all this are the blunders and the shortsightedness which the censorship has displayed in connexion with the defeat of Admiral Cradock and the sinking of H.M.S. 'Audacious.' The United States heard of both these disasters from sources entirely independent of the Admiralty, and is still waiting for the official confirmation of one of them. Naturally enough, when a naval battle takes place off Chile, it is impossible to hide it from the people of the United States. It was hardly less improbable that the sinking of a battleship in view of a crew, which visits New York regularly, would remain a secret in that port. Yet it was days before London would admit that anything had gone wrong in the Pacific; and six weeks after the loss of H.M.S. 'Audacious' the British Government still refuses to announce it.

Is it any wonder that Americans are amazed at the pusillanimity of a system which can produce such results as these? They are amazed and distressed as well. 'The New York Sun' could come out with a leader headed 'John Bull Ostrich,' and could assert that 'John Bull metamorphosed into an ostrich is one of the strangest sights in history'; but in that very article it could express the belief that the knowledge of such disasters would only stiffen the back of the British race. With no possible strategic reason for hiding the truth, why, ask the Americans, try to hide it, and what conceivable advantage have you in pretending to ignore what all the world knows?

Moreover by this policy of secrecy the censors have discredited everything else they do. Early in the war the Germans announced the sinking of nineteen British battleships, and the Englishman laughed and asked where was the official confirmation? He cannot do that now. If the New York 'Staats Zeitung' or 'The Fatherland' to-morrow announced that Admiral Jellicoe had been blown up, he could not turn to the latest cables from London and prove the falsehood of the statement by showing that they did not admit it. When the

censorship was imposed, a pledge was given that every scrap of news, bad as well as good, should be revealed, unless there were good and definite reasons against it. That pledge has been broken. Naturally enough other misgivings are now appearing. For example, was the whole truth told about the Antwerp adventure? Is there some radical defect in British naval architecture, which sent the 'Good Hope' to her fate? Are some of these stories the Germans spread about trouble in Egypt absolutely baseless? Is or is not the recruiting at home, particularly in Ireland, progressing as well as could be wished?

America, as a whole, asks such questions in no captious spirit. The news of the loss of one British ship after another has come as a blow to a good many Americans, who are proud to boast themselves Englishmen by birth. It has hurt their pride in a way which has astonished them not a little; and they ask for an explanation, for the actual truth, with real anxiety. How can the Englishman at home now answer them? Once he was proud in the assurance of the integrity of his Government; once he could boast that, the harder the blows of fortune, the tighter would Britain shut her teeth and determine to fight the matter out. Now he can only keep silence, or say that he does not understand what his Government is thinking about. It is a humiliating attitude to be obliged to assume; it is still more humiliating amid a nation disposed in the main to be so friendly. It is above all humiliating because it is so unnecessary, and because there would be no people so willing to accept explanations as the people of the United States, if only it could believe that it was honestly getting the truth.

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